Centre’s overbearing presence bodes ill for J&K

UNLIKE the more constitutionally defined role of a Governor, the responsibilities and powers of the Lieutenant Governor (L-G) are relatively ambiguous, situational and dependent on the Centre.

There are union territories (UTs) of various shades when it comes to defining an L-G’s role. There are ‘half states’ like Puducherry, which has a CM and a Cabinet, and Delhi with its unique national capital dynamics. There are strategic ‘outposts’ like the Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep. Relatively smaller UTs like Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu warrant a simpler bureaucratic ‘administrator’. Then there is Chandigarh, a two-state capital with both Punjab and Haryana making competing claims over it. And five years ago, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was split into two UTs — Ladakh and J&K — with the abrogation of Article 370.

The topical lay of the land and the perceived urgency in the UT concerned would define the tenor and preference for the office of the L-G. It is functionally wired to the Union Home Ministry, making it susceptible to the priorities of the Centre, not just administratively but also politically.

My experience as an Army officer was helpful, given the overarching security considerations (and relief and rehabilitation efforts following the 2005 tsunami) for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, anchored at the mouth of the Chinese ‘chokepoint’ in the Strait of Malacca. My tenure in Puducherry entailed the more traditional role of constitutional oversight and propriety in a federal democratic structure. At least then, the office of the L-G in these two different types of UTs had no partisan requirements (though turf wars between the L-G and the CM in Delhi were common at the time).

It would be incorrect and naïve to say that the trend of using one Raj Bhawan/Niwas or the other for partisan reasons began only after 2014. Even earlier, there were many incumbents who conducted themselves in a partisan fashion — rather than having an apolitical stance, which is mandated — especially in politically significant states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Karnataka. But it is true that many honourable exceptions had refused to kowtow to the Centre. Some Presidents and gubernatorial incumbents bravely took on the Central Government to uphold the independence and dignity of their constitutional offices. But sadly, the last decade has not seen virtually any constitutional office refuse the Centre’s political or partisan insistence.

Now, with the elections imminent in J&K, sudden steps pertaining to the strengthening of powers of the L-G’s office are telling. The Transaction of Business of the Government of Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024, empower the L-G to control the police, public order, bureaucracy transfers and postings. They mandate the J&K L-G’s approval in those realms and give him the final say on any proposal for the grant of prosecution sanction. This empowerment automatically results in the direct disempowerment of the writ of the future CM. The possibility of an intense turf war, like the one between the L-G and CM of Delhi, looms large in J&K. Expectedly, national and regional Opposition parties have slammed the seemingly preemptive move by the Centre as anti-democratic, small-spirited and manipulative. Some local leaders have likened the future Assembly to a ‘glorified municipality’ where the ostensible House would have no powers to legislate.

The background to this J&K narrative is pertinent. The last elected government was dissolved in 2018, when the BJP walked out of an alliance with Mehbooba Mufti’s People’s Democratic Party; much political water has flown since then. Incidentally, the BJP had been in an alliance with Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference much earlier. However, for the past more than six years, the state/UT has been under the Union Government’s rule via the Centre-appointed Governor/L-G, and it has been largely denied popular participation and democratic imperatives. But ironically, this denial of democracy has counterintuitively emerged as one of the most successful claims of decisive and muscular governance by the ruling dispensation. Many premature claims of a return to normalcy (despite continuing encounters and terror attacks) and the end to stone-pelting were attributed to the Centre’s ‘successful’ handling of the situation. The ‘rest of India’ was sought to be galvanised by the J&K storyline.

However, while the powers that be are aware of the unprecedented polarisation and societal disconnect, this regrettable detachment is wrongly postured as normalcy. Therefore, the three Lok Sabha seats of Kashmir (Srinagar, Baramulla and Anantnag-Rajouri) were not contested by the ruling party (and by its coalition partners) even as it pursued the ‘400 paar’ agenda in the General Election. Clearly, the party sensed the mood in the region, and the decision not to contest the elections afforded it the plausible claim of remaining ‘undefeated’, as the contest was reduced to one between the ‘others’.

However, with the Assembly elections on the cards, staying out of the fray is no longer possible. The undeniable ground reality of perceived diminishment by the Centre is apparent. The history of insurgencies is instructive (Punjab, Mizoram, etc) — partisan considerations must always take a back seat to win over the disenchanted populace. This does not mean lowering the guard in the Valley but only to remain genuinely inclusive and open to an occasional partisan ‘defeat’ in order to strengthen democracy, integrity and nationalism (which is not the exclusive preserve of any party). The move to further strengthen the Centre’s imprint through the L-G does not suggest confidence, commitment or largeness of spirit necessary to handle societal disaffection. The ‘idea of India’ needs to win, not necessarily one party or the other.