Don’t rush into a détente with China

THERE has been a flurry of high-level visits from India to China, and a recurrent theme in the Chinese social media is that a “beleaguered” India is desperate to mend fences with its northern neighbour. The recent visit of External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar to Beijing was interpreted as a tactical retreat by India driven by economic and strategic compulsions, such as US tariffs, NATO’s threats of secondary sanctions over Russian oil and India’s need for rare-earth magnets and other essential supplies from China.

We must acknowledge that the geopolitical context of India-China relations has changed to our disadvantage.

The impression that India is reaching out to China under external pressures must be allayed, because it is never helpful to engage with China from a position of weakness, real or perceived.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, the EAM and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval travelled to China for meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ahead of its summit in Tianjin, but all three visits had significant bilateral components. Jaishankar met Vice President Han Zheng, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Liu Jianchao in Beijing on July 14. The EAM was quoted as telling Wang Yi that “we have made good progress in the past nine months for the normalisation of our bilateral relations”.

Some stability has indeed been restored in India-China relations since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with President Xi Jinping in Kazan, Russia, on October 23, 2024. However, it is less clear that there has been steady progress towards normalisation of ties.

During the prolonged military standoff in eastern Ladakh, the EAM conveyed a consistent message that the state of India-China borders will determine the state of relations. In his statement in Parliament in early December last year, he reiterated this linkage between maintenance of peace in border areas and normalisation of relations, emphasised the imperative of de-escalation following disengagement of troops and underlined that India would pursue “bilateral engagement in a calibrated manner, keeping our national security interests first and foremost”.

As the EAM reminded Wang Yi, the process of de-escalation along the borders has not yet commenced. Both sides continue to maintain troops in abnormally high numbers in forbidding terrain and this situation is likely to persist for the sixth consecutive winter. There has been no movement towards the resumption of patrolling by Indian troops and grazing by herdsmen in the so-called “buffer zones” (described by the EAM in Parliament as “steps of a temporary and limited nature”). The objective of restoration of status quo ante as of April 2020 that the Chief of Army Staff had publicly advocated, is no longer being reiterated. In other words, the Chinese have retained incremental gains made by them in eastern Ladakh, consistent with their playbook of “grey zone operations”, though we don’t have visibility on the extent of “salami-slicing”.

Moreover, while there has been some progress towards the resumption of “people-centric” contacts, including the pilgrimage to Kailash-Mansarovar, marking the 75th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations, easing of visas and agreement to restore direct flights, all these steps, except the pilgrimage, were part of the Chinese wish list conveyed in Track-II conversations even before disengagement was completed last year. There is little evidence of China being inclined to address any of the structural challenges in the relationship. Indeed, some of the old concerns have acquired sharper, more ominous overtones.

Three important developments must be taken note of. First, China has started construction of a cascade of five massive hydropower plants on the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet on July 19 without considering interests of the lower riparian nation, India. China undertaking this mega-project, thrice the size of the largest hydropower project in the world (Three Gorges), barely 30 km from the place the river enters Arunachal Pradesh has serious downstream implications for India — in terms of impact on water flows in the lean season, the danger of flooding, risk of major disasters linked to massive construction in a highly seismic and unstable zone and effects on the livelihood of residents and biodiversity. The government of India has not commented publicly on the launch of the project.

Second, the Chinese assistance to Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack and during the four-day India-Pakistan military operations (May 7-10) included not only diplomatic support and amplification of Pakistan’s propaganda, but an unprecedented level of battlefield collusion.

The significant role of Chinese military hardware, provision of ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) data, deployment of BeiDou satellite navigation system and China’s advisory inputs amounted to the emergence of an extended theatre, where China’s ability to provide real-time support to Pakistan without explicit military engagement allows it to play a long strategic game. However, there is no public confirmation of New Delhi’s concerns being conveyed to Beijing.

Third, the Chinese have systematically deployed tools of economic coercion against India, including denial of supplies of rare-earth magnets, specialised fertilisers and tunnel-boring machines, Chinese electric vehicle companies being directed not to transfer technology to India or undertake fabrication of major components in India, and Foxconn being asked to withdraw several hundred Chinese technicians from its factories in India. These issues were reportedly raised by the EAM with Wang Yi.

We must acknowledge that the geopolitical context of India-China relations has changed to our disadvantage. The US policies towards both India and China have become unpredictable since Donald Trump returned to the White House. Compared to his first term, during which the US shifted to defining China as a “strategic competitor”, the second Trump administration’s strategy is far less coherent. Trump’s pursuit of a “beautiful deal” with China prioritises short-term economic gains over strategic clarity.

The Chinese believe that they have stared down the US in their tussle on trade, tariff and export controls. Likewise, they are deploying hardball tactics in their dealings with the European Union. China’s tactical charm offensive seems to be running thin now.

For India, improvement in its relations with China will afford greater room for manoeuvre amidst the current global uncertainty. However, that objective cannot be achieved by showing weakness or undue anxiety in engagements with Beijing. Indeed, any sign of vulnerability will invite more pressure from China.

We must not, therefore, shy away from conveying our concerns and expectations to China, and avoid lowering the bar to seek an elusive détente, thereby letting the neighbour retain the gains of the “new normal” it has created unilaterally in eastern Ladakh. The restoration of normalisation in ties is desirable, but that will require China respecting the Line of Actual Control and making an endeavour with India in good faith to work on the outstanding issues.