Eradicating naxalism requires more than firepower

The Central government has reiterated in multiple forums since early 2024 that left-wing extremism (LWE) would be eradicated from the country by March 31, 2026. It has asserted that the entire ecosystem of naxalism would have to be destroyed with a ruthless approach. Interestingly, the Director General of Police, Odisha, emphasised this deadline on the Police Commemoration Day last year: "I am confident that Odisha police is capable of meeting this deadline." He added that the LWE activities were now limited to very few pockets of the state and they would be eliminated soon.

Such an assertion by the government can, at best, be taken as a political statement intended to influence a targeted audience in a specific context. However, it is disconcerting to note this deadline being repeated by security forces personnel at the apex level, responsible to direct the anti-naxal campaign in the affected areas.

Undoubtedly, the security forces combating LWE in the eastern parts of India need to be complimented for the recent notable successful operations against the naxals, especially in targeting their leadership. On March 20, in two separate encounters in Chhattisgarh's Bastar region, security forces gunned down 30 Maoists, taking the total to 113 this year so far.

As per a statement in Parliament by the MoS Home, LWE in the country has been contained in a significant manner in the last one decade in that the number of affected districts has come down to 38 from 126 in 2013 and violence-related incidents have reduced by 73 per cent since 2010.

Irrespective of the recent successes notched up by the security forces, a realistic assessment of the conflict is imperative so as to avoid knee-jerk reactions by the security establishment. A number of LWE outfits have been operating in remote and poorly connected eastern areas of the country for decades. While LWE is a socio-economic problem, aimed to bring in a revolutionary democracy, it had assumed alarming proportions after 1999. The naxals had acquired significant capabilities to launch multiple coordinated attacks, executed with military precision by a large strength of cadres after detailed planning, reconnaissance and notable synergy.

In April 2009, hundreds of cadres had even hijacked a train in Jharkhand. The attack on Nayagarh town in Odisha (February 15, 2008), when naxals overran three police stations and killed 13 policemen and two civilians and decamped with 1,100 weapons should not be forgotten.

They still have IED manufacturing units to maintain a continuous supply and wreak havoc on the civilians as well as security forces in the affected areas. An IED blast at Bijapur in Chhattisgarh on March 23 is a reflection of this capability. Destruction of infrastructure, levying of taxes and cess on narcotics plantation are being resorted to with impunity.

The naxals are also known to have domestic, regional and international linkages. The current volatile situation in Bangladesh and the increasing influence of Pakistan in its domestic and foreign policies can further complicate the situation. It is only a matter of time before the ISI steps in to exploit the situation to its advantage, with the aim of achieving its objective of destabilising India.

We need to remember that conflicts get transformed over a period of time with very significant evolutionary effects, which may lead to changes in the original goals of the movement, public attitude, external support, intensity levels and methods of operation of extremist cadres. An analysis of the current trends of naxalism is also indicative of the profound changes that have occurred in the very character of this conflict. It is imperative to identify and understand such a process so that the state response to the conflict can be suitably adapted.

It is apparent that the factors which gave rise to naxalism — the extent of poverty, uneven development, poor governance, neglect of land reforms, rising unemployment and tribals getting a raw deal — are, unfortunately, very much present today also. Land reforms, an important facet of countering left wing extremism, have not been taken up by the states. Unless these basic issues are sincerely addressed, a security-centric approach by itself would not be enough to deal with the problem.

The employment of the security forces is but one element of the integrated government response to deal with the problem of LWE. It entails the concurrent application of all elements of national power to address the root causes over a protracted period of time. Imaginative application of the security forces constitutes an indispensable component of the national strategy for creating secure conditions that are conducive for other elements of national power to function. Security and development are interlinked and inseparable. In the long term, a fine balance between the two has to be maintained as a way forward.

While the policy and approach of the government to deal with naxalite activities are multi-pronged and comprehensive, setting a timeline to totally eliminate violence in a low intensity conflict is best avoided. Pressure on units at the functional level can lead to violation of human rights and collateral damage.

We need to expect and plan for a long struggle, despite the reduction in violence levels. It takes time to develop organisations and formulate and implement the policies necessary for the campaign, which now have matured after a long period of evolution. The process of identifying and rooting out the naxal infrastructure and locating and bringing them to battle is long and drawn out.

The security forces have a critical role to see that the situation is not reversed and continue to relentlessly pursue further improvement in the security situation. The gains of the last few years need to be consolidated. Dramatic action to create a short-term effect or give the impression of decisive action usually proves counter-productive in such situations.