Highs & lows of our defence and security

Defence reforms were triggered by failures. Even the reforms initiated were exercises in ‘tinkering’, not de novo ones. Planned holistically and integrating political, military and diplomatic instruments of state, the 1971 victory stands out in solitary splendour. Its military success, however, could not be translated into political gain.

2020 PLA aggression: It signalled that China was going to determine the border and the nature of bilateral relations with India. PTI

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Military commentator

India’s record since Independence in keeping its borders secure and itself internally stable has been satisfactory, but for patches of erratic planning and erring in performance. India hit the ground running to confront its security challenges with a war over J&K days just after the Partition. Since then, it has not ceased fighting wars and skirmishes against Pakistan and China, both blood brothers in their enmity towards India. Over time, threats have magnified as India faced serious internal security challenges of left-wing extremism, insurgencies and terrorism, and more lately, the threat to national cohesion.

For a country with myriad challenges staring in the face, scant attention was paid to nurturing and developing systematic defence planning and capability building processes. This led to ad hoc and piecemeal reforms, resulting in substandard operations laced with stunning failures in intelligence, leadership and higher political direction.

The Himalayan tragedy in 1962, the half-fought war against Pakistan in 1965, the costly Kargil skirmish, the wasteful Operation Parakram and the clumsy response to Mumbai terror attacks illustrate the infirmities.

Defence reforms were, therefore, triggered by failures and were not standalone. Even the reforms initiated were exercises in ‘tinkering’, not de novo ones. Planned holistically and integrating political, military and diplomatic instruments of state, the 1971 victory stands out in solitary splendour. Its military success, however, could not be translated into political gain.

Of all the reforms, the Kargil Review Committee report was the most far-reaching, though cherry-picking marred its implementation. Other reforms emanated from the Krishna Rao Committee on Forward Policy, the Arun Singh-led Committee for Defence Expenditure and the creation of the Defence Planning Staff (DPS), National Security Council, National Security Adviser with the National Security Advisory Board, Naresh Chandra Task Force and Shekatkar Committee. The first comprehensive Long-Term Defence Plan (1985-2000) was produced by the DPS (I was its founding member), the forerunner of the existing Integrated Defence Staff.

The first National Strategic and Technology Environment Review, which is the equivalent of the contemporary Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), meshing all elements of national power was done by the DPS. The National Security Strategy and war-fighting doctrines will emanate from the SDSR. None of these has materialised so far, not even after the transformational creation of the CDS and Department of Military Affairs.

There is not even a White Paper on defence. India is limping towards an overhaul of its national security and defence architecture. The higher defence organisation has gone somewhat blurred with the National Security Adviser encroaching on the Defence Minister’s turf. Political direction from the government to the armed forces is couched in the Defence Minister’s 2009 Operational Directive (which is drafted by the services, and none issued thereafter) which states that they will fight on two fronts (Pakistan and China) simultaneously for 30 days (intense) and 60 days (normal).

The intensity for the duration of combat has been revised and updated by each service and synchronised by the IDS. In 2013, the then Army Chief, Gen VK Singh, created a furore by revealing the critical shortages in ammunition and equipment even to fight a 10-day war. Individual service chiefs tend to decide unilaterally on the force levels. So, the IAF aspires for 42 squadrons, the Indian Navy for 200 warships and the Army for four strike corps and so on. Due to India’s continental strategy, except the Army, the other services are woefully short of capability.

Defence planning and procurement processes have broken down despite numerous reviews. Compounding these deficiencies is the paucity of modernisation funds. Although the GDP is targeting for $5 trillion by 2025, the percentage of the defence budget has been declining over the last decade and without the pension bill, it is around 1.3 per cent of the GDP, when it is meant to be three per cent as per the 15th Finance Commission. The dedicated non-lapsable fund for modernisation recommended by the commission is missing.

The government’s focus on Atmanirbharta and ‘Make in India’ is laudable, but given the fledgling private sector, poorly invested R&D and reluctance of foreign players to transfer high technology, the modernisation process will be retarded. The late CDS, Gen Rawat, had suggested: “We can do with second best equipment”, and before him, in Kargil, the then Army Chief Gen VP Malik had said: “We will fight with what we have.”

The government has been gung-ho about national security. It implemented the OROP without working its finances, which led to the pension bill exceeding the allocation for modernisation and the hair-brained Agnipath scheme to redress it. Soon, the government shifted its focus from strengthening defence capacity to winning elections, a fair bit of politicisation of the armed forces and targeted deep selection of the service chiefs.

Commendable cross-border attacks in 2016 and 2019 established deterrence against Pakistan and political will of the leadership. These military triumphs created complacency. The absence of urgency in appointing the CDS after Gen Rawat’s tragic accident seven months ago reflects that the priority of the defence of the realm has been relegated and the selection of the CDS made maddeningly intricate.

Chinese PLA’s intrusions in May 2020 were a big blow to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, destroying the rapport he built with President Xi Jinping. But more significantly, the PLA aggression signalled that China was going to determine the border and the nature of bilateral relations. Consequently, the realignment of the Indian forces has led to an active second front, reversing the old threat logo: “While Pakistan is the immediate threat, China is the long-term challenge.” The PLA achieved strategic surprise in occupying its 1959 claim line. This is yet another major intelligence and operational failure and lessons must be learnt.

This survey depicting the highs and lows of India’s defence and security story shows how it has muddled through, and yet acquired a niche in international peacekeeping, recognised as the region’s first responder during natural disasters and defended the country's perilous borders.

Once theaterisation is in place, the existing processes refined and political guidance, supervision and funds provided, the military will be second to none. What it needs is a clear mission, adequate resources and no political interference. Also, the military must be fully professional, undauntingly secular and defiantly apolitical to remain the pride of the nation at 75.