How best to set up integrated theatre commands

The best option could be to convert the existing five Army commands (Eastern, Central, Northern, Western and South Western) into ITCs. The South Western ITC could have a commander from the IAF, with some role (deploying IAF resources) in the Arabian Sea in support of the Navy. These ITCs would have integrated staff. As for the IOR, there should be three ITCs — first for the Arabian Sea, second for the Bay of Bengal and third for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

CHANGE WORKING STYLE: Though we have nearly 50 DRDO establishments and many other factories, 70% of our defence weapons and equipment are imported. ANI

Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)

Military Commentator

RIGHT after Independence, the requirement of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was felt. The proposal for adopting the CDS system was floated by the first Governor General of independent India, Lord Mountbatten, who had first-hand experience of a unified command. This proposal was cold-shouldered by Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister.

Thereafter, the proposal was simply put aside. Consequent to the Kargil War, the need to adopt this system came up again. While the Subrahmanyam Committee took up a number of issues, it left out the all-important requirement for some reason. It was thanks to the Arun Singh Committee, based on my presentation to it on the imperatives of adopting the system in its full play (with integrated theatre commands or ITCs), that this issue was taken up. To start with, I had recommended two ITCs (besides one mountain corps for the Tibet border) — one for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the other being the northern ITC. To allay misapprehensions of the IAF, the first theatre commander of the northern ITC should be an Air Force officer with integrated staff from the IAF and the Army. The remaining ITCs were to come up subsequently in a phased manner. However, only the Andaman and Nicobar ITC was formed.

Finally, in August 2019, the post of CDS was announced by the PM (not as an Act of Parliament) and a committee under the National Security Adviser met to formulate the role and powers of the CDS. In January 2020, Gen Bipin Rawat assumed office as CDS.

As far as constituting integrated theatre commands is concerned, no operational role has been assigned to the CDS. It is consequent to the formulation of overall strategic war plans related to a two- or even three-front war (China, Pakistan and Indian Ocean Region) that integrated theatre commands would be constituted. In determining their composition and areas of responsibility, a range of factors need to be considered. These include the terrain, enemy capabilities in each sector, where to be completely on the defensive, where to stage an offensive defence and, finally, where an all-out offensive is to be launched.

With no operational responsibility and command over ITCs, General Rawat went ahead and recommended only two ITCs for the entire land border of the country and one maritime ITC for the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Possibly, General Rawat, in recommending only one ITC for the northern border with Tibet and a part of PoK, tried to copy the PLA (People’s Liberation Army of China) on the one hand and bring about a reduction in the number of commands (army and IAF) on the other.

It is both possible and convenient for the PLA to have a single command on the Tibet plateau due to the type of terrain and excellent road and rail system laterally and to various points on the LAC. On the Indian side, the terrain is of high mountains and deep valleys, with poor road connectivity, both to specific points on the LAC and laterally, making movement difficult and slow.

This one northern ITC would cover the borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and parts of PoK. The second ITC extends from parts of PoK down to the Rann of Kutch. The third (maritime ITC) is for the entire IOR. Three ITCs for this vast land border and sea frontage would be inadequate.

The best option could be to convert the existing five Army commands (Eastern, Central, Northern, Western and South Western) into ITCs. The South Western ITC could have a commander from the IAF, with some role (deploying IAF resources) in the Arabian Sea in support of the Navy.

These ITCs would have integrated staff. As for the IOR, there should be three ITCs — first for the Arabian Sea, second for the Bay of Bengal and third for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

While the CDS must be the overall operational commander, the existing Integrated Defence HQ should form a part of the CDS HQ and this setup must stand independent of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The IAF continues to have some misgivings and reservations on the adoption of the ITC concept. It is contended that air power is highly flexible and can be applied across a wide front on a range of targets, as a whole or in smaller components. Further, the present number of squadrons is inadequate and their distribution among the ITCs would mitigate against the fuller application of air power at critical enemy targets. General Rawat further muddied the waters by equating air power with artillery on the one hand and pitching for submarines instead of aircraft carriers on the other, to the consternation of the Navy’s top brass.

These observations of the IAF do not hold good, when subjected to a detailed analysis. While currently, the squadron strength is down to 32, this will soon have to be raised to 45, perhaps more. Their distribution among the ITCs would be based on a detailed examination of tasks of each ITC. Secondly, under certain requirements, the CDS can temporarily switch IAF resources from one ITC to another for specific missions, as is being currently done by the IAF. Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari appears to be reconciled to the idea of integrating the efforts of all three services.

Till date, we import almost 70 per cent of defence weapons and equipment, even though we have had over four dozen DRDO establishments, an equal number of ordnance factories and over a dozen defence PSUs. These establishments need major changes in their working.

The Department of Military Affairs in the MoD, instead of being headed by the CDS, should have a three-star defence services officer with integrated staff to direct and control the working of the four establishments — the DRDO, ordnance factories, defence PSUs and DG quality assurance. It would, in practice, replace the Secretary, Defence Production. This one change will, for sure, bring about a sea change in the output of these establishments and be an appropriate step towards self-reliance in defence weaponry and equipment.

Equally, it would be premature to ban the import of such a large number of defence equipment in the hope that the same would be made in India. We have to first establish acceptable quality of such locally produced equipment before banning their import. What must not be overlooked is the importance of the quality of such equipment in war-fighting.

Technology, be it cyber, space, artificial intelligence or drones, is making deep inroads into warfare and will play a pivotal role in the times to come. Therefore, modernisation of the defence forces cannot be put on the backburner any longer. Those playing the no-war tune do not seem to hear the Dragon knocking at the country’s doors.