How India foiled Op Gibraltar in 1965

THE 1965 India-Pakistan war officially began on September 6, but Pakistan’s covert infiltration into Kashmir commenced earlier with Operation Gibraltar, launched in early August.

This operation aimed to incite a civil uprising in Kashmir and was orchestrated under the leadership of then Pakistan Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He presumed that Kashmiris were ready to revolt and would welcome Pakistani forces as liberators.

A high-level meeting to plan this operation took place on May 15 at the headquarters of Pakistan’s 12 Division in Murree. It was attended by President Ayub Khan, Chief of Army Staff Gen Muhammad Musa Khan, Chief of the General Staff Gen Malik Sher Bahadur and others. It was decided that a specialised force, codenamed Gibraltar Force, would be deployed in various sectors across the ceasefire line.

This force consisted of six main groups — Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin, Ghaznavi and Babur. Each group was assigned specific targets in Kashmir. The objective was to infiltrate Indian territory, sabotage communication lines and infrastructure, and trigger an uprising, creating conditions for a larger military offensive by Pakistan.

At the time of Operation Gibraltar, 12 Division’s area of responsibility covered a 640-km front. The operation had three primary objectives:

(1) Disrupt Indian military and civilian control of J&K.

(2) Encourage, assist and direct an armed revolt by the people of Kashmir against military occupation.

(3) Create conditions for an advance by the Azad Kashmir forces into the heart of ‘India-occupied’ Kashmir, followed by its eventual ‘liberation’.

The plan of the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of 12 Division, Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik, envisaged two phases — first, to create a shock wave by launching attacks on selected targets and thus prepare the ground for an uprising, and second, to integrate it into the guerrilla operations.

The infiltration was scheduled to begin on August 5. That day, a Gujjar boy named Mohammad Din reported to the Indian police his encounter with suspicious armed men in the forest near Tangmarg. The 19 Division was alerted. Indian patrols intercepted and killed several infiltrators. They were identified as members of the Salahuddin group led by Major Mansha Khan. It was the first confirmed intrusion of the war.

Similar incidents occurred in other sectors. In the Rajouri area, Capt CN Singh of 2 Garhwal Rifles led a small patrol that attacked a stronger Pakistani unit. He was killed in action and posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.

On August 8, two Pakistani officers — Capt Ghulam Hussain and Capt Mohammad Sajjad of 18th Azad Kashmir battalion — were captured. The documents found on them and their interrogation revealed vital information about the Pakistani plan to infiltrate the Kashmir valley.

The Gibraltar Force groups had already crossed into India and broken into smaller units, as planned. However, contrary to Pakistani expectations, the Kashmiris did not support them. Instead, locals often reported infiltrators to the Indian authorities.

Each group had distinct goals:

n Tariq: Disrupt road traffic over Zoji La, take control up to Amarnath and Gagangir.

n Qasim: Destroy bridges on the Bandipura-Gandarbal road; coordinate with Salahuddin in Hazratbal.

n Khalid: Attack infrastructure at Handwara and Sopore; destroy Kupwara power station.

n Salahuddin: Sever road links, destroy bridges and communications, neutralise key political figures and capture the Srinagar radio station and airfield.

n Ghaznavi: Attack targets in Rajouri-Naushera, assist Salahuddin and cut off roads to Srinagar.

n Babur: Target Udhampur HQ and disrupt communications.

Indian forces inside the Valley were limited — only four J&K militia battalions and an AT (animal transport) company. Reinforcements were rushed; 4 Sikh Light Infantry and 2/9 Gurkha Rifles were sent in immediately. Additional brigades were pulled in from Leh and Jammu.

The infiltration began unravelling quickly: the Tariq group never reached its objective due to high-altitude casualties; Qasim managed some attacks but withdrew by September 4 due to no local support; Salahuddin initially withdrew after being detected. It re-entered but withdrew again by August 18 after failed attacks; Ghaznavi was the only group still active by the time the ceasefire was declared but it had a limited impact.

On August 8, the J&K government panicked and sought the imposition of martial law. However, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, Western Army Commander, cautioned against such a move. He reasoned that it would validate Pakistani propaganda and demoralise Kashmiris, who might start cooperating with the raiders out of fear. His advice was accepted.

Army reinforcements arrived under challenging conditions. One aircraft carrying troops and Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh landed in Srinagar in poor weather with no navigational aids, a feat accomplished by Wg Cdr Chandan Singh.

The Indian response was swift: On August 11, orders were issued for offensive operations; 68 Brigade (led by Brig Zoru Bakshi) and 93 Brigade (led by Brig Zora Singh) were assigned a pincer attack through the Uri-Poonch bulge; 104 Brigade targeted the Kishanganga bulge. The Siri Force was raised on August 14 under Maj Gen Umrao Singh to manage counter-infiltration inside the Valley.

On August 13, Pakistan launched renewed attacks. That morning, Maj Haq Nawaz Kiani’s group attacked 8 Kumaon at Naugam. The battalion CO, Lt Col MV Gore, was killed. Indian retaliation forced the attackers to withdraw.

Brig Manmohan Singh, then commanding 162 Brigade, was moved to take over the command of 191 Brigade; he was tasked with the recapture of posts in the 191 Brigade area that had been taken by the enemy.

By mid-August, Operation Gibraltar had largely failed. Its key assumptions — especially local support from Kashmiris — proved false. The Indian forces responded with well-coordinated reinforcements and aggressive counterattacks.