India gaining ground as ASEAN partner

Gurjit Singh

Former Ambassador

There is a growing sense of trust and acceptance among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of India’s influence in the region. This is evident from this year’s State of Southeast Asia Survey conducted by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

The ASEAN’s desire to be a zone of peace is being impacted by the competition between rival powers. It is now an arena for power rivalry in the region. This is due to the US-China trade battles, the demand for decoupling from China, the impact of Covid, the fallout of the Ukraine crisis and challenges to the ASEAN’s unity and centrality, which often make it look ineffective.

Sixty per cent of the survey respondents said ASEAN was concerned about economic recession and unemployment. Around 57 per cent indicated climate change as the major concern. Military competition in the region is now among the top-tier worries of ASEAN.

As many as 82.6 per cent of the respondents felt that ASEAN was slow, ineffective and unable to cope with the dynamism of the international situation. Seventy-three per cent of the respondents thought that ASEAN had become an arena for major power competition. Its unity will be impacted when individual members start taking sides in the emerging competition. The lack of unity in ASEAN’s response to the Ukraine crisis is an illustration of this trend.

The third major concern was that ASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited; this was felt by 60 per cent of the respondents. Other major concerns were that ASEAN is an elitist body and has low connect with its own people; and it is unable to overcome the upheaval caused by the pandemic. Forty-six per cent and 37 per cent respondents labelled these as major concerns, respectively. It is evident that ASEAN unity and centrality are losing their effectiveness.

While China remains ASEAN’s main economic partner, its trustworthiness has decreased from 76 per cent in 2022 to 60 per cent this year. The US is well behind at 10.5 per cent, marginally improved from 9.8 per cent in 2022. Misgivings about China’s utilisation of its economic dominance are rising, with 64.5 per cent of the respondents expressing concern about this influence. At least 41.5 per cent still believe that Chinese political and strategic influence is a cause for concern.

These apprehensions are ascribed to recent actions by China, such as sanctions against their trading partners, aggressive moves in the South China Sea (SCS) and inconclusive talks on the Code of Conduct for the SCS. This has directly affected several ASEAN countries.

The ASEAN belief in India as a trustworthy partner has increased. Overall trust in India, which was 16.6 per cent in 2022, is now 25.7 per cent. The major reason provided in the survey is that India was seen as a responsible partner with an interest in upholding an international rules-based order. At least 25.4 per cent held this view; 18.2 per cent had a better appreciation of India’s military power and saw it as an asset for ensuring security and stability in the region.

In response to questions about which countries would ASEAN like to deal with to balance the uncertainties arising out of the China-US strategic competition in the region, India scored 11.3 per cent this year, doubling from 5.1 per cent in 2022.

This makes for interesting reading. The biggest jump has come in the survey results from Myanmar, where India as a trusted strategic partner scored 21.7 per cent compared to only 1.7 per cent a year ago. In Thailand, again an unlikely source of support, 16 per cent see India as a trusted strategic partner compared to 7.7 per cent in 2022.

Laos and Malaysia both show about 13 per cent support base, increasing from 2 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively. Indonesian support has increased to 10 per cent compared to 3.8 per cent a year ago. Brunei and Cambodia have about 6 per cent support for India. The lowest rating for India came from the Philippines, at 4 per cent. Vietnam has been consistent at 11 per cent in both years, whereas support in Singapore has doubled from 5 per cent to 10.6 per cent. Yet, despite the depth of the India-Singapore relationship, their support for India is sixth among 10 ASEAN countries.

Among other countries offered as choices as alternative strategic partners for ASEAN, the European Union scored the most, 43 per cent (up by 2 percentage points), followed by Japan at 26.6 per cent (down by 2.5 percentage points). Australia’s score reduced from 10.3 per cent to 9.3 per cent. The score of the Republic of Korea, from whom many ASEAN countries are now buying new weapons, has halved from 6.8 per cent to 3.2 per cent. Despite its forays into the region, the trust in the UK has fallen from 8.4 per cent to 6.8 per cent. The conclusion from this is that the biggest leap in the trust factor has come for India.

Despite China remaining the major partner and influence for ASEAN, the balancing countries for ASEAN were generally the EU, Japan and Australia. This time, India has overtaken Australia.

India is seen as strategically autonomous, which is akin to what ASEAN would like to be. India and ASEAN have often looked at recent crises similarly. Public perception in ASEAN seems to have understood this better and views India as a strategic counterbalancing force to China, which theoretically has been a part of the ASEAN lore for decades.

India’s good response to the Covid crisis, both domestically and in support of other countries, including in ASEAN, has been noted. India’s capacity to manufacture vaccines and willingness to share them have been appreciated. Despite a long-standing partnership with Russia, India’s autonomous position on the Ukraine crisis, including PM Narendra Modi’s advice to Russian President Vladimir Putin that this is not an era of war, has shown India in a good light in the public perception in ASEAN. India’s ability to exercise strategic autonomy without necessarily taking an ambiguous stand is now better understood by ASEAN members.

India’s G20 chairmanship is finding resonance, particularly its willingness to highlight the priorities of the Global South. The robust effort to address the problems of the Global South, despite the G20 cleavage between the big powers, has been appreciated. On climate change and solar energy, India’s efforts are regarded as being responsive to the Global South’s needs.

It is evident that these public perceptions may not necessarily be reflected in the strategic choices made by the ASEAN members, but it is an important public diplomacy achievement. For long, India has suffered a lack of positive perception among citizens of ASEAN countries, even when governments were well-inclined. This survey shows a turnaround coinciding with India’s G20 leadership.

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