India’s shrinking influence in SAARC

THE fall of Oli government in Nepal is the latest in the series of regime or system changes in five SAARC countries, which began with the fall of Kabul to the Afghan Taliban in August 2021. Pakistan followed next.

In April 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan's coalition government, which had a parliamentary majority, was ousted from office through a dubious legal and political process encouraged by the army and the judiciary. Three months later, a macro-economic collapse led to intensified protests in Colombo, culminating in the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the eclipse of Sri Lanka's main political family.

In August 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled Dhaka to seek refuge in India. This, too, occurred after continuing protests, including over the restoration of job quotas. And, now in Nepal, the established political order has crumbled after the students took over Kathmandu's streets and torched the symbols of the country's political power.

The apparent trigger was a protest against the closure of social media sites ostensibly not adhering to registration requirements. The government used force resulting in the death of 19 protesters on the first day (the death toll now stands at 72 including 59 protestors, 3 police officials and 10 jail inmates) and the people's anger boiled over.

Taken together, these developments point to disarray and instability in the SAARC region, where India occupies a central position both geographically and politically. This is not what Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have wanted when he invited the organisation's leaders to his oath-taking ceremony in May 2014. He had then said that his vision of 'sabka saath, sabka vikas' also encompassed the region. SAARC was meant to be at its core.

Indeed, the system change in Afghanistan, the further weakening of Pakistan's traditional political parties and the severe setback to the established political forces in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal through extra-constitutional means demonstrate the collapse of Modi's vision for India’s periphery.

Besides, with a recalcitrant Bangladesh and, now, the dislocation in Nepal, the BIMSTEC option, which India adopted after its refusal to accept Pakistan organising a SAARC summit, is also jeopardised.

All this has occurred at a time when an aggressive China is keen to knit the region under its leadership.

There are specific reasons for changes in each country. But there is one common feature in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal (Afghanistan is in a different category): popular disillusionment with the established political classes. This feeling is the strongest among the youth, whose despair has led to rage against the ruling elites.

Facing an uncertain future, the youth are disgusted with the corruption, nepotism and extravagant lifestyles of the elites. These are the consequences of economic policies that have led to the unbridled concentration of wealth. Unlike the past, the present elites — both political and commercial — take pride in their vulgar display.

No wonder the youth seek to migrate abroad and take great risks in doing so. But in a Trumpian world, that path has shrunk, adding to their frustration.

With Leftist ideologies largely moribund in the periphery, the space vacated is being filled with faith-based social and political intolerance. This is witnessed in the growing Islamism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh and the aggressive Theravada Buddhism in the majority Sri Lanka.

Beyond SAARC, in Myanmar which also follows Theravada Buddhism, the Sangha is not willing to give any quarter to the Rohingya Muslims. It is also an anchor of the majority Burman group's ethnic nationalism, particularly against Christian ethnic minorities.

It is difficult to conceive of a return to an era of Communist insurgency in Nepal. What remains to be seen though is how Hindu sentiments will manifest themselves politically in the new conditions even as an interim government has been formed, the parliament dissolved and elections slated for March 5, 2026.

Sri Lanka is on the path of recovery following the election of President Anura Dissanayake, a one-time Marxist but now left-of-centre.

The role of the armies of the peripheral states in diffusing contentions to find political resolutions in the wake of protests for regime changes has become significant. This is natural as the armies have remained cohesive and want national stability.

Significantly, in none of the four countries — Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh or Nepal — have the armies sought to take direct political control. This is a break from the past when they did so in Pakistan and Bangladesh, promising new democratic constitutions, which were interminably delayed.

The armies' preferred route is now elections, which in Pakistan though were manipulated. Despite that, the jailed Imran Khan remains a thorn in the army's side, for his popularity continues in sections of Pakistan's most important province, Punjab, apart from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

The return of the Afghan Taliban to power in Kabul after two decades of military action constituted a strategic defeat for the United States and a pyrrhic victory for its patron Pakistan. The Taliban are gaining greater international recognition while not abandoning their extremist Islamist Deobandi-Wahhabi mazhab.

Unlike the other four countries which still want a kind of democratic order with elections and, hence, experienced regime change (the Gen Z revolt is committed to ending corruption and bringing in more open democracy), Afghanistan saw a system change with the replacement of the Islamic Republic with the Islamic Emirate. There is no possibility of it giving way in the near future as the expatriates who sought to usher in 'democracy' under Western tutelage have retreated to their safe havens abroad.

Two points in the message that the periphery has sent to India in these five changes stand out. First, that its capacity to influence the course of events in its own immediate neighbourhood is lamentably limited.

Second, except for a fundamentally hostile Pakistan, the others need to maintain ties with India even in the midst of their anti-India sentiments and a desire for more equal relationships. In the light of the latter point, India needs to go back to what was called the Gujral doctrine with the Afghan Taliban too.

Wise societies and polities learn from developments in their smaller neighbours. Will the Indian elites realise that growing disparities of wealth are dangerous in developing countries?

Vivek Katju is former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.