India’s strategic autonomy policy put to the test

Deputy Editor

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When Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar descend on Washington DC today, the main talking point will be India’s reluctance to fall in line with western economic sanctions. A persisting lack of trust about America’s endgame in Russia tends to influence the reflexes of the Indian state, as Jaishankar mentioned eloquently to visiting UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss.

Jaishankar’s message to Truss was stark. Countries with oil self-sufficiency or those importing from Russia cannot credibly advocate restrictive trading. Seventy five per cent of Russia’s total natural gas export is to European members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), such as Germany, Italy and France. European nations (Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Finland, Lithuania and Romania) are also large importers of Russian crude oil. The sanctions even have carve-outs to avoid impacting their energy imports from Russia. Some banks close to the Kremlin have been spared from a SWIFT ban because they still remain the main channels for EU payments for Russian energy imports.

In South Block, the mood is a sense of déjà vu. After all, India’s investment infrastructure in a mega oil field in Venezuela turned to junk after the US decided to economically strangle Caracas. But as the world gaped, a high ranking US delegation landed in Caracas on March 16 looking for alternatives to Russian oil; three years after Washington had cut diplomatic ties and summarily expelled the Venezuelan diplomatic staff. Unsurprisingly after this rough treatment, Venezuela refused to switch sides.

WikiLeaks has documented how relentless US pressure turned barren India’s well-established channels of crude imports with Iran. New Delhi was forced to make a painstakingly expensive pivot to alternate oil suppliers. In time, the loss of Iranian oil began to be made up by purchase of US Texan crude. What was a net loss to India turned into a double win for the US.

And just six months back, the US abruptly exited Afghanistan, leaving several embarrassed strategic faces in the neighbourhood. A hostile regime now in Kabul has effectively turned India’s investment of $3 billion into dust. India also shuttered its diplomatic investment of four consulates and an embassy. Worryingly for India, some of the Taliban factions in power have more than a passing acquaintance with the ISI while the allies it had nurtured for decades are on the run.

If there is still residual incredulity among western diplomats from the Baltic and Scandinavian nations posted in New Delhi over India’s foot-dragging for a perfectly legitimate cause — to bring down a corrupt dictator who is holding world prosperity to ransom — they might look at the back-stories of US sanctions in the region that have not just caused collateral damage but left countries siding with Washington in the lurch when there is an about turn.

This leaves many to wonder if a different set of business and strategic interests emerges with each change of US regime. The Washington Post has reported, based on government records, court documents and newly-disclosed bank statements, about the US President’s son signing a contract with a Chinese energy company which paid him and his uncle $ 4.8 million. The US right wing is expectedly politically capitalising on the news. But together with the son’s unexplained loose ends left with a Ukrainian company, such reports sow doubts and have led to the US sliding 11 places in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in seven years.

As oil flows from Russia to Europe have increased since the invasion of February 24, America’s Deputy NSA Daleep Singh expectedly received a frosty welcome in New Delhi. The American cause was not helped by a top White House aide stating that Singh had spelt out the long and middle-term impacts of India’s non-compliance with the diktat.

The western world has so far well-camouflaged its peeve with India’s stand of strategic autonomy in foreign policy. What once sounded like a stuck rhetorical cliché may well begin to show its worth as India navigates the two worlds. India used this mantra in the past to soften the damage from previous ‘righteous’ western wars in the region. On the eve of the Rajnath-Jaishankar interaction with their opposite US numbers, the Indian Foreign Office has clearly spoken about New Delhi’s need to stabilise its economic ties with Russia. In the absence of a permanency in US’ friend-or-foes identification system and as the latest UNGA vote of April 7 shows, in which two-thirds of the world voted no, abstained or sat out, this is a reality Washington should learn to live with.