Make pre-emptive moves to ward off China

Lt Gen Pradeep Bali (Retd)

Military Analyst

SIXTY years ago, Mao’s China launched an offensive across our Himalayan borders, resulting in a humiliating defeat for India. The casus belli was the territorial dispute across our northern borders, which were neither clearly demarcated nor delineated. Tensions over asylum given to the Dalai Lama in India and over Tibet, in general, were also contributory factors.

The 1962 war was a glaring example of the complete failure of the intelligence setup in the country. Despite the writing on the wall, intelligence organisations drew a blank in assessing and analysing the impending Chinese threat. Ironically, while there is a lot of literature on the political and military failings, no attention has been paid to this shortcoming. After Independence, the Army was downsized and put on low priority in terms of acquisitions & procurement, adversely impacting its operational readiness.

Though history is only “a lantern on the stern”, it will be worthwhile to revisit the grave flaws which afflicted our planning and preparations and their relevance today. The debacle of 1962 has had a lasting impact, scarring the national psyche.

The fact that only a limited number of formations of the land forces fought the battle is lost sight of. Some figures, therefore, need to be considered. The contact battle at various locations lasted from October 20 to 24 in the first phase of operations and from November 17 to 20 in the second phase. The total force levels involved were four divisions of the PLA against less than three divisions of the Indian Army. The Indian Air Force was used only for limited logistic support and the Navy did not find any role in the conflict. The figures of total casualties suffered on either side have been gleaned from Chinese, Indian and US sources. The broad figures in all three almost match. The Army lost around 3,000 personnel (killed/missing) and there were 4,000 prisoners of war. The PLA had about 2,000 killed and wounded.

This defeat has been squarely attributed to the national political and higher military leadership. The reversals were mainly in Kameng, where a study of individual battles points clearly to operational and tactical incompetence. Acts of outstanding individual gallantry and fierce sub-unit and unit-level battles, especially in eastern NEFA and Ladakh, notwithstanding, in Kameng, it almost became a rout, where commanders and troops lost heart.

While the reasons for this debacle are multi-fold, political naivete at the very apex in understanding and dealing with national security issues was the prime one. The Chinese subjugation of Tibet, the flight of the Dalai Lama and the internal dynamics of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Beijing were all given scant attention. India’s energy was focused on becoming the leader of the non-aligned world and building its image as a peaceful nation, with no aspirations beyond its borders, which ironically were still unsettled — cartographically disputed and politically unstable.

The Panchsheel Agreement and the “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” rhetoric of the 1950s seem to have lulled the government of the day into a sense of complacency, while ignoring or downplaying the signals emerging from the Tibetan plateau or Aksai Chin where a major communication artery linking Tibet with Xinjiang had been constructed by the Chinese, well within the claimed Indian territory.

The geographical remoteness and lack of infrastructure, both in Ladakh and NEFA (present-day Arunachal), contributed in a large measure to poor awareness and understanding of this vital aspect of national security and sovereignty. Several visits and meetings with the then Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, seem to have further lulled the political executive about the unlikelihood of any conflict, although in 1959, in a curt missive, China had categorically stated that it did not agree with the Indian understanding of the border.

The 1962 war was also a glaring example of the complete failure of the intelligence setup in the country. Despite the writing on the wall, intelligence organisations drew a blank in assessing and analysing the impending Chinese threat. Ironically, while there is a lot of literature on the political and military failings, no attention has been paid to this shortcoming.

After Independence, the Army was downsized and put on low priority in terms of acquisitions and procurement, impacting adversely its operational readiness and training. A stark example was the fate of the Fourth Infantry Division. Under-equipped, under-trained and with poor logistic support, this formation suffered the brunt of the PLA offensive in the Tawang sector, leading to its decimation.

The military leadership of the day, at the operational and strategic levels, was revealed in very poor light as it played ball with the political masters, to the detriment of the organisation. Competent commanders were never given operational control when most needed. After the fall of Tawang, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh was all too briefly given the command of Four Corps and was readying the formation for the battle of Sela, when Lt Gen BM Kaul was sent back to replace him. After Kaul’s disastrous showing, Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw took over the command, but by then the war was over.

The ghosts of 1962 may be dead and buried by now, but the alternate scenarios that could have panned out in that war need to be revisited, as they may well apply to the present, with the CPC often displaying bellicosity.

A clear understanding and enunciation of the national security policy and strategy supported by a reliable information and intelligence mechanism could well have prevented the political blunders committed by the leaders of the then young nation. This would also have ensured better-equipped and prepared armed forces, which could have been mobilised in larger numbers well in time for deployment on the Himalayan borders. Non-interference in military affairs would have brought a better class of military leadership to the fore, leading to very different outcomes in the key sectors of the conflict. Also, the use of offensive air support could well have been a game-changer.

To safeguard our national interests and deter China from inimical actions, whether military or non-military in their scope, India needs to be proactive in dealing with the northern adversary and this does not necessarily imply being aggressive, but rather being pre-emptive in our planning and actions to counter any perfidy by outguessing the adversary. It also means having credible deterrence capabilities. Credible deterrence should not be viewed in terms of quantifying military capabilities alone. Military preparedness must be underpinned with diplomatic efforts of the same, if not greater, intensity if they are to be meaningful and credible. The other organs of the state should be similarly aligned, whether in harnessing technology for defence needs, development of infrastructure or generation of materiel resources. This whole-of-nation approach is a must in dealing with China.

Join Whatsapp Channel of The Tribune for latest updates.