Manipur ambush sets alarm bells ringing

THE killing of Col Viplav Tripathi, Commanding Officer (CO) of the 46th Battalion of Assam Rifles, along with his wife, six-year-old son and four jawans in an ambush by the outlawed People’s Liberation Army (PLA), an insurgent group of Manipur, and a newly formed outfit, Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF), came as a shock to the nation. There had been no incident of this magnitude in the state during the past few years. The last major incident happened on June 6, 2015, when 18 personnel of the Dogra Regiment were killed in an ambush in Chandel district, leading to a stealth attack on insurgent hideouts by Indian Army commandos across the Myanmar border.

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A prolonged lull in violence by insurgent groups naturally lulls the security forces into letting their guard down. And it appears that no intelligence input regarding the presence of insurgents in the area had been fed to the battalion for the CO to take any precautionary measure. A study of ambushes carried out in Manipur reveals that the insurgents usually lay an ambush in a strength of 15-20 men covering a stretch of 50-100 yards. Positioning themselves at a vantage point, they rehearse for a few days before carrying out the attack on the forces.

In the attack on the CO’s convoy, the insurgents would have expected him to return by the same route by which he had gone to Behiang to inspect his battalion’s forward base. The road passing through the forested area afforded several vantage points to choose and plan the ambush.

Having activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), they followed them up with heavy firing on the target. The IED blasts usually stun the personnel in the convoy and before they regain their composure, there is a barrage of bullets, leading to heavy casualties, while the insurgents escape through pre-designated routes. Cadres of the PLA were trained some years ago by Maoists, who in turn were trained by explosives experts of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Of the two insurgent outfits — the PLA and the MNPF — that have claimed responsibility for the attack, the former is one of the oldest militant groups, while not much has been heard of the latter in the Manipur valley. An offshoot of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the armed wing of the erstwhile Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM) which was led by Sudhir Kumar, the PLA was founded by N Bishesore Singh in September 1978 and soon came to be recognised as a force to reckon with. It was corruption that led him to the path of insurgency. Having been trained by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in China, an indoctrinated Bishesore returned with a batch of insurgents to Manipur, well equipped with weapons, and launched the PLA. The early 1980s saw a series of attacks on the security forces and even non-Manipur people, known as Mayangs or foreigners in the state.

The arrest of Bishesore in July 1981 after an encounter in Tekcham in which seven of his companions were killed came as a huge setback to the organisation. Second Lieutenant Cyrus A Pithawala (who retired as Major General) was awarded the highest peacetime gallantry award — Ashok Chakra — for his derring-do in the encounter. Bishesore contested the Assembly elections from jail and won. He was later shot dead by PLA personnel.

With other PLA leaders taking up the mantle of leadership, this outfit has survived many a setback and is regarded as the most dreaded one, though there have been a few others such as the UNLF, Peoples Republic of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) among the 50-odd insurgent outfits in the state.

The PLA-MNPF combine has stated that it was not aware of the presence of the CO’s family in the convoy, but this claim does not sound credible. Usually, informers keep the attackers apprised of the strength of the personnel and the number of vehicles. They would have known of the CO’s visit to Behiang with his family and that he would return by that route. Insurgent outfits are known to have lobbed grenades on school buses carrying children of security forces in the Manipur valley.

In the normal course, the insurgents could not have stayed in Churachandpur district as the PLA comprises Hindus and even Muslims and the district predominantly has Christians. The MNPF insurgents are Christians, but the district is dominated by Kukis and other Zomi tribes who have a running feud with the Nagas, often resulting in clashes. Hence, it can be safely conjectured that the attackers must have intruded from across the Myanmar border, carried out the attack and safely retreated to their base.

While the Naga peace talks are still hanging fire after the Framework Agreement of August 2015, there is a need to begin serious talks with numerous outfits that operate in Manipur, lest they make their presence felt like they did through the recent attack. Senior officers of security forces are specifically targeted as that draws countrywide attention. Kuki outfits such as the Kuki National Army have been in the SOO (suspension of operations) mode for the past several years, but there has been no progress in any peace talks so as to bring them into the mainstream and utilise their services.

Paresh Baruah, the head of the United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent), can play a vital role in restoring peace in the Northeast if he is roped in by the government for talks, along with Naga leader Niki Sumi. Baruah is also the leader of the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia, a conglomeration of 11 insurgent outfits, including the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang). The Centre has to extend its hand to the insurgents to lay down arms and come to the negotiating table. A series of surrenders by Bodo militants in recent months augurs well and also the surrender of 46 Dimasa National Liberation Front cadres on November 13. The trend should continue.