Myanmar remains in politico-economic flux

The post-coup developments in Myanmar have impacted the majority Burman ethnic community-dominated Irrawady delta the most as armed resistance groups, known as the “People’s Defense Forces”, are carrying out attacks on the military. In retaliation, the military has cracked down on the pro-democracy activists, allegedly killing over 2,000 of them. Despite calls for clemency from across the world, it recently excecuted four activists. The NLD has called it an ‘outrageous crime’.

UP IN ARMS: Post-coup protesters in Myanmar are hopeful of restoring democracy. Reuters

Luv Puri

Ex-member of UN Secretary-General’s Good Offices on Myanmar

IN a region which is reeling under the current global recessionary trends, Myanmar faces the danger of being embroiled in a dangerous combination of political and economic uncertainty. The situation there is no longer attracting international attention, as it did in the initial months of the military takeover on February 1, 2021.

However, at the regional level, the situation demands a continuous tracking as it has gone from bad to worse, with wide-ranging ramifications, and it is to be seen in the context of the structural realities that the country faces. On the economic plane, the recent World Bank report has reportedly stated that the “country has reversed a decade of reforms and strong economic growth, leaving 40% of the population living in poverty. The World Bank is forecasting that the economy will have grown at a 3% annual pace in the fiscal year that ends in September, following an 18% contraction the previous year.”

This is in contrast to the World Bank's October 2019 report, where it had remarked that “poverty was halved between 2005 and 2017 (from 48 to 25 per cent), based on the national poverty line”. In fact, during the early years of the last decade, many analysts believed that at least some parts of Myanmar were ready to replicate the success story of the manufacturing hubs of other Southeast Asian countries like Cambodia, Laos etc.

However, these figures make little sense in explaining the broader contours of Myanmar’s post-colonial political economy. Coupled with the Covid-19 impact, the post-coup situation, resulting in civil unrest in various pockets of the country’s heartland, is a factor in causing the economic turmoil and the structural realities of the political economy that exist in Myanmar, including during the decade-long phase of semi-democratic set-up, cannot be ignored.

Much of the country’s periphery has parallel economies. A 2017 study by California-based Asia Foundation stated that “almost one-quarter of Myanmar’s population hosts one or more ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) that challenge the authority of the central government”.

In the Kachin area, the lucrative and risky business of mining jade is allegedly controlled through ambiguous arrangements by various groups, including a section of the leadership of the armed ethnic minority groups, with the complicity of serving or retired generals and other non-state actors. Jade is popular among sections of China’s elite as it is considered auspicious.

There is the United Wa State Army which reportedly has around 25,000 soldiers. With co-ethnic community members present across the border in China’s Yunnan province, the Wa area is an autonomous zone, as recognised by Myanmar’s constitution, a kind of modus vivendi. Chinese currency renminbi is the de facto currency there.

In the South-Western periphery, Rakhine is heating up again as the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group of Rakhine Buddhists, has resumed its armed operations after a year-long peace. This has consequences for India as its flagship Kaladan Project, linking Myanmar to India’s landlocked northeast, is located here. The project is behind schedule.

In the heartland, the post-coup developments have impacted the majority Burman ethnic community-dominated Irrawady delta the most as armed resistance groups, known as the “People’s Defense Forces”, are carrying out attacks on the military or Tatmadaw.

In retaliation, the military has cracked down on alleged members of the armed resistance, pro-democracy activists, killing over 2,000 persons. Despite calls for clemency from across the world, on Monday, under Myanmar’s counter-terrorism laws, the military executed four democracy activists, including former member of parliament Phyo Zeya Thaw, also a hip-hop star, and activist Ko Jimmy, who was also active in the 1988 demonstrations. The National League for Democracy (NLD) has called it an “outrageous crime”.

At this stage, it is hard to say if the struggle against the military will be able to significantly alter the calculations of the military leadership, which is reportedly committed to holding a national election in the second half of 2023. There are reports that a proportional representation system may be introduced in place of the present first-past-the-post one. It is an old proposal. With this, the military attempts to dilute the electoral potential of the NLD. If allowed to contest and held fairly, which at the moment seems doubtful, the NLD is expected to sweep the elections, as it had done in 1990, 2015 and 2020 as it has overwhelming support, particularly among the Burmans who comprise nearly two-thirds of the population.

Meanwhile, true to the nature of praetorian regimes, where the military digs deep structural roots in institutions and society, the fact is often ignored that the Tatmadaw remained a significant player from 2010 to 2021, the period which saw a semblance of democracy in Myanmar. It was just that the larger-than-life profile and iconic global status of Aung San Suu Kyi effaced many uncomfortable facts, including the majoritarian impulses of the society, which was a main factor for the anti-Rohingya violence. Both Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw leadership continued their respective engagements with all critical international players, particularly the Chinese.

In the present context, the command and control structure of Tatmadaw is intact except for a few cases of defection by low-level military officers that happened immediately after the coup. A propaganda machinery regularly amplifies the message that the military alone can guarantee national unity.

The lessons of over a year are illustrative for peace and reconciliation. In the face of the archaic post-colonial structures of economy, where a large chunk is outside the mainstream, few levers are available with the international community, particularly the democratic world, to influence the situation.

Myanmar seems a classic case of the revenge of geography, to borrow the phrase from author Robert Kaplan’s book, as distant western democracies, which often cited the developments of the last decade as irreversible, are finding it difficult to respond to current situation in the country.