Myanmar’s politics continues to be messy

Luv Puri

Ex-member of UN Secretary-General’s Good Offices on Myanmar

TWO years have passed since the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw staged a coup on February 1, 2021, but the country seems to be sinking deeper into an abyss with the loss of lives every day. In the midst of continuing violence throughout the country, the military leadership recently announced that it would organise an election within six months; this announcement came in the background of a slew of court sentences against National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

With a population of nearly 54 million, Myanmar, a land in which the majority adhering to the Theravada Buddhist tradition coexists with ethnic and religious minorities, is no stranger to military rule. Except between 1948-1958 and 2010-2021, the military has governed Myanmar with absolute control of its republican reins since 1948.

The 2021 military coup and its present rule coincided with developments such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. As compared to the Myanmar crisis, these developments garnered far more attention because of understandable reasons. However, from a regional perspective, the two years provide some essential lessons, including in the context of a possible return to 2010-style hybrid form of democracy in Myanmar.

As expected, the firepower and intelligence apparatus of the military that have been honed for more than seven decades, which existed even during the short-lived semi-democratic hybrid regime, seem to be intact. Anyone familiar with the pre-2010 situation in Myanmar knows the ubiquitous and brutal nature of military intelligence as it deeply penetrated society.

Unlike the past, when Suu Kyi remained the face of the resistance, this time around, civil disobedience has engulfed entire Myanmar, including Burman-majority hinterland. That doesn’t mean that violent resistance will remove the military leadership from the power structure.

Greater unease between the ethnic Burman majority and some of the ethnic minorities, who comprise nearly one-third of the country’s population, is visible. The recent airstrikes in Chin area that borders Mizoram are a manifestation of this trend. One of the consistent lessons from Myanmar is that when politics fails and the military is used to repress political demands and discontent, the result is greater loss of lives and further polarisation between the ruling political elite and the ethnic minorities. The resurgence of the Arakan Army in Rakhine even before the coup is part of the same trend. The present army leadership, with a narrow view of governance, is only causing hopelessness and has further enraged ethnic minorities.

The present geopolitical context has allowed the military leadership to continue to harness the limited benefits of international trade. The big-ticket items on the export list, including oil and gas that provide the bulk of the military’s revenue, continue to make their way to China. The ASEAN countries had been reluctant to expend their diplomatic capital on Myanmar beyond a point, as that would expose their double standards domestically. With Indonesia taking over the ASEAN chair, there is hope that it may leverage its position to influence the military leadership positively. But its ability to change the course of events in Myanmar is also limited, as history tells us.

The western countries, including the US, Canada and the UK, have progressively strengthened the sanctions regime against leaders and families connected with the military regime, including military commanders, ministers, judicial and prosecutorial officials. But with Myanmar economy’s limited engagement with the West, this can do little to impact the military leadership’s behaviour. Asian countries such as India and Thailand have stuck to their policy rooted in realpolitik to protect their own strategic and security interests as neighbours.

The only symbolic development has been the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution on December 21, 2022, which demanded an end to violence and called on the country’s military rulers to release all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi. The council has long been split on Myanmar — with China and Russia blocking any concrete action in the past. However, this time, both allowed a concession, as they, along with India, abstained from the UNSC vote, while the remaining 12 members voted in favour.

The Myanmar military seems to have identified U Khin Yi, a former General and a minister in the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government, as the person who could be the potential face of the ‘democratic’ set-up after the 2023 General Election. Made the USDP chairman, an important position in the context of the upcoming elections, U Khin Yi is a known Myanmarese face internationally.

It was under U Khin Yi’s stewardship as the Immigration and Population Minister under the quasi-civilian 2011-16 government led by President Thein Sein that a Census was conducted by Myanmar after three decades. In doing so, he had sought the international community’s support; one of the questions that led to differences was the enumeration of Rohingya residents of Rakhine state and their right to self-identify as Rohingyas. The Thein Sein government, including U Khin Yi, didn’t want ‘Rohingyas’ as a separate category for enumeration, as according to it Rohingyas were not part of the 135 national races as mentioned in the Myanmar Constitution.

In sharp contrast, the international community didn’t accept this plea and was categorical that everyone should have the chance to self-identify their ethnicity either from the list of 135 official ethnicities or by describing their own ethnicity.

Going forward, it is hard to predict the military leadership’s political behaviour, though the military may continue to present itself as a saviour. The international community will continue to be caught up in the quintessential Myanmar quagmire — trying to find or retain access to the country on the one hand and putting pressure on the military leadership to civilianise the power structure on the other.

The success of the resistance movement will depend on the navigation of variables such as finding an able successor to the ageing NLD leadership, the ability to neutralise China to some extent and coalescing of inter-ethnic ties for a national vision; otherwise, the military will continue to exploit structural vulnerabilities and weaknesses.

Join Whatsapp Channel of The Tribune for latest updates.

#myanmar