Nature of war vs character of war

Lt Gen DS Hooda (Retd)

Former Northern Army Commander

WARS have always been a subject of intense scrutiny and debate among scholars and strategists because of their impact on shaping the fate of nations. At the heart of this discourse lies a crucial distinction: the nature of war versus the character of war. The nature of war, immutable and unyielding, encompasses the enduring elements of conflict anchored in the fundamental aspects of human conflict. Conversely, the character of war is mercurial, shaped by time, technology, societal norms and geopolitical landscapes.

The assertion that war is a clash of wills underscores its intrinsic nature as a struggle of military might and the capacity to endure.

We are living in an era marked by rapid technological advancements, and the character of war is evolving with a velocity and complexity unseen in previous ages. Therefore, much of the emphasis of the current study of warfare is on the character of war and the adoption of technological tools to our warfighting techniques. However, as we embark on strategic and structural changes to meet future challenges, we must pay equal attention to the nature of war, which, at its core, is characterised by violence, uncertainty, a clash of wills and the pursuit of political aims through force.

At the heart of every conflict lies a political aim, a truth famously articulated by Carl von Clausewitz when he described war as “the continuation of policy (politics) by other means”. This principle, though simple in theory, is often found missing in practice. Military leaders tend to see war as separate from the political process and frequently frame military successes as victory in a war. There are numerous examples in military history where battles were consistently won but the war was lost.

American Colonel Harry Summers, author of On Strategy: The Vietnam War, recounts a conversation with Vietnamese Colonel Tu after the war had ended. When Harry told him, “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield,” Colonel Tu responded, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”

Problems also occur when political objectives are poorly defined or are overambitious. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, it was unclear whether the aim was to punish a state sponsoring terrorism, eliminate weapons of mass destruction or promote democracy. Gen George Casey, commander of the coalition forces in Iraq from 2004 to 2007, admits that he found it difficult to answer the question: “What are we really trying to accomplish?”

Improbable political objectives can lead to the application of military force with little hope of success. When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of the ‘special military operation’, he said the purpose was to “demilitarise and denazify Ukraine”. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has vowed to retake all the occupied territory, although this does not appear militarily feasible. Amid the pursuit of these unattainable objectives, the war continues with neither side in a position to achieve a decisive victory.

Wars are, by their nature, violent and extract a heavy cost. The advent of technology has enhanced their destructive power. Cyber and information warfare are necessary warfighting tools but cannot ensure a non-kinetic victory. Even where one side has clear military superiority, there is no bloodless victory. In the First Gulf War, the US-led coalition force suffered less than 300 battle-related deaths, but casualties on the Iraqi side ranged from 1,00,000 to 2,00,000, most of them civilians. Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine and Gaza reveal the horrific human costs of war.

The costs are not only human but also material. In the Ukraine war, Russian units are firing as many as 6,00,000 artillery shells per month, and the Ukrainian forces approximately 2,40,000 shells every month. A May 2023 report by the UK’s Royal United Services Institute found that Ukraine lost roughly 10,000 drones every month.

These staggering figures have led many countries around the globe to reassess battle losses and scale up defence production capability. Russia has ramped up its capacity to manufacture two million artillery shells annually. The Russian defence minister has stated that the country produced 1,530 tanks and 2,518 armoured fighting vehicles in 2023. Ukraine’s drone industry is projected to manufacture one million drones in 2024. Countries unwilling to bear the cost of war will not win.

The assertion that war is a clash of wills underscores its intrinsic nature as a struggle not only of military might but also of determination, resolve and the capacity to endure. The Soviet and US invasions of Afghanistan and the Vietnam War pitted negligible military forces against the strongest powers in the world. Yet, the outcome was very different from what would have been arrived at by the traditional method of bean-counting the number of tanks, ships and aircraft, and technology levels.

The US war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, and Kabul was captured on November 13. After the swift military victory, then President George W Bush stated that a “revolution in our military is only beginning, and it promises to change the face of battle. These past two months have shown that an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict.” Twenty years later, this assertion fell apart as the Taliban’s enduring tenacity and strategic adaptability forced a hasty and chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Facing challenges on both its continental and maritime frontiers, the Indian military is undergoing reform and transformation. The Indian Army has declared 2024 as the year of technology absorption. However, even as we adapt to the changing character of war, the transformation must address some fundamental questions: Will wars be long or short? What are the political objectives? What is the nature of the adversary? How much are we prepared to sacrifice for victory? What is the national strategy to be adopted? The immutable nature of war provides more complete answers to these questions.

Military leaders must heed Clausewitz’s words: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

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