Never a foreign policy bystander
In a recent brief but wide-ranging conversation with leading industrialist Sunil Munjal and erudite academic and commentator on international affairs Raja Mohan, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar gave an indication of his thinking on the evolving world order as well as some aspects of the country’s past and present foreign policy approaches. The subjects covered included current global challenges, China’s rise and its relative weight vis-a-vis India, Indo-US relations, India’s ties with its neighbours and the value of free trade agreements.
Jaishankar was a skilful professional diplomat and is now an important member of India’s foreign policy-making apparatus, both on account of his office and the trust and confidence PM Modi reposes in him. This serious discussion would therefore merit analysis for these reasons alone, but it also does so, for Jaishankar acknowledged the realities of India’s current external environment and also because it revealed a surprising amnesia on Jaishankar’s part of some aspects of India’s foreign policy in the first three decades after Independence.
At the outset, Jaishankar asserted that the world is ‘today so challenging’ because it is rebalancing, has become much more globalised and also because of the changes in the metrics of power. This has contributed to transforming the entire global landscape; major players have changed, so has their relative weight. All this is true. Indeed, the unfolding geopolitical processes in this digital age are so sweeping in their comprehensiveness, uncertainties and complexities that they make charting a course for the Indian ship a daunting task.
What can be added though is that national political and social cohesion in such times would immensely contribute to the successful handling of India’s manifold global challenges. Also, that while the world moved at a much slower pace at the time of India’s Independence, laying the foundational principles of foreign policy, at that stage, was a supremely difficult task too, because as Jaishankar acknowledges, India was far weaker. Another reason was the inexperience of the then Indian system in dealing with the world, though Jaishankar does not note this aspect.
He deserves to be complimented for forthrightly stating the differential in Indian and Chinese overall power. It required courage to state bitter facts in these times of zealous nationalism. He dwelt on the reasons for disparity in Indian and Chinese economic strengths. His stand that India did not invest sufficiently on health, education and did not ramp up manufacturing is correct. This does not mean that India lacks the capacity to handle Chinese aggression but it does logically lead to the inescapable inference that India cannot continue with its present policy towards China. India will be compelled to make tough decisions, though as Jaishankar rightly said, it would never be part of an alliance.
Jaishankar did not give details about how India will meet the challenge that China poses. The prevailing situation at the Line of Actual Control has understandably prevented him from doing so, but it would have been useful if he had opened up even a little bit on the possibility of India re-examining the basic postulates of the China policy set in 1988 by PM Rajiv Gandhi and pursued by all governments since then. In fact, Modi took it further by infusing it with the Wuhan-Mamallapuram spirit.
Jaishankar expressed the conviction that India cannot be a bystander, reluctant to engage the world; that it must be in the game on the great issues of the times. He mentioned four of these: connectivity, maritime security, terrorism and climate change. He stated that the time of great caution is over and the desire of the 1950s and 1960s of staying out of trouble and not getting entangled is long gone. Now, he emphasised, is the time to take risks for without taking risks ‘you can’t get ahead’. ‘There are choices we have to make and, I think, there is no getting away from it.’ How should these views be assessed?
It is misleading to think that India was a bystander on the great issues of the 1950s and the 1960s. If that were so, India would not have played a leading role in the entire de-colonisation process nor would it have raised its voice against apartheid. Indeed, the entire conception of non-alignment indicated a choice to preserve autonomy and eschew easier options. Nehru can be faulted for some wrong decisions but not for pursuing a passive foreign policy. He was engaged on the global issues of his times.
Again, at the beginning of the 1970s, India changed South Asian geography through its vital contribution to the creation of Bangladesh and later the merger of Sikkim into the Union. This entire period witnessed Indira Gandhi taking difficult decisions. These were not the attributes of preferring the status quo but of moving ahead with great confidence.
As India acquired strength, successive governments, including the present one, have not been shy of taking part in addressing global issues where India has stakes and Jaishankar perceptively identified some of them. Except that terrorism no longer seems to have the salience and priority as in the past decade. On the others that Jaishankar mentioned, India is on the right track. It is calling out the need for respect for the norms of international governance, which China is challenging, on maritime security and connectivity. And the proactive steps that the Modi government is taking on climate change are also in national interest.
All those with an interest in the present trends of Indian foreign policy would do well to access the entire discussion. It needs to be put up on the Ministry of External Affairs website but has not as yet.
