No ‘free hand’ is given to army

Nearly two weeks have passed and there is no scent of Pahalgam terrorists; it marks the first time terrorist have probably escaped and evidence to nail Pakistan may not be forthcoming. As surprise is lost, India's inevitable military response becomes problematic. Political rhetoric and veterans have hyped expectations about the intensity of retribution. Modi's grant of strategic autonomy to the armed forces to design and deliver punitive action is misleading. There is no such thing as 'free hand' and 'full operational freedom' given to the military. While optics is impressive, the onus of consequences lies mainly with the military.

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RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat also met Modi immediately after his meeting with the service chiefs. It brought back Bhagwat's statement in 2018 after troops involved in a massive terrorist hunt in J&K had not succeeded in the operation: "Preparing an Army takes six to eight months while the RSS can raise a force within two to three days." The statement was withdrawn. Free hand and full operational freedom for retribution are within the limits of escalation.

Civilian control over the military is one of the major successes of India's democracy. Military response after 1947 in most cases was based on political guidance. Military objectives were shaped within political parameters. India's statement on national interest has led to security and defence strategies. The armed forces are given the Raksha Mantri's operational directive, which is periodically updated. The last known directives were issued in 2013 and 2021.

Frequently, political directives are given verbally and may be confirmed in writing. A commander's dream is a clear mission, adequate resources and no political interference.

The Cabinet Committee on Security lays down the terms of reference for military actions. The COAS has been the 'lead service chief' during conventional wars. The escalation of wars in J&K, 1965 in particular, and their cessation were outcomes of PM-COAS consultations. Decision-making during the 1971 war is a classic study of meshing political urgency with operational readiness. The Kargil skirmish ushered in the era of sub-conventional war fought under a nuclear overhang. Operation Parakram, the response to attacks against Parliament and Kaluchak cantt in 2001-02, is the best guide to shaping the government's package of political, economic, diplomatic and kinetic responses.

In Kargil, the military was tasked to vacate Pakistan's aggression of multiple intrusions across LoC. The term of reference that "LoC will not be crossed" came from the government as an afterthought. Like now, there was no timeline for the operation. The restriction was imposed due to nuclear signalling by Pakistan. In Parakram, when air strikes against terrorist camps in PoK and Pakistan were considered, PM AB Vajpayee told the service chiefs: "Pervez Musharraf to paagal hai. Woh yuddh kar sakta hai." The international focus shifted from stopping cross-border terrorism to a nuclear exchange. Nuclear fear has become the key deterrent to any kinetic response.

India's first overt kinetic response to a terrorist assault was ordered in 2016 by Modi after the Uri attack. Special forces struck across LoC at eight places 5-9 km deep. Modi had told the Army Chief, Gen Dalbir Suhag, there were to be no casualties to own troops and evidence that targets had been struck be brought back. In building a bold and punitive response to the Pulwama attack, the IAF had told the government that Pakistan's counter-air offensive and escalation were unlikely. After the mission, IAF announced that its target was only the terrorist camp at Balakot, not the Pakistani state. This was done to ensure that there would be no escalation. Pakistan's surprise response was similarly measured; which is another story.

The strategic fallout of the air offensive was the establishment of deterrence, which was disrupted by the Pahalgam carnage. Deterrence erosion was the result of lack of military capability enhancement. A muscular counter-terrorism doctrine must be backed by military power, not political rhetoric.

Full operational freedom is a misnomer: it is circumscribed by the strategic imperative of escalation control. The Indian military operates within red lines and tacit political control. But Pakistan has freed itself from civilian control. On Kashmir Solidarity Day 2025 (5 February), the Pak Army Chief, Gen Asim Munir, said: "Pakistan has fought three wars over Kashmir; it can fight ten more." India's punitive strikes must steer clear from the trap of war. You can keep it guessing!

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd) is a military commentator.