No room for triumphalism amid global crisis

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement, “This is not the era of wars”, which he made during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting at Samarkand in September, seems to have come in handy at the G20 summit in Bali as diplomats of member-countries struggled to find a mutually acceptable language for the declaration as the US and its western allies were keen on condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While the Indian government has rightly claimed it as a diplomatic triumph, however small, because India is set to take over the G20 presidency on December 1 and will host the next summit in 2023, it seems to be just the beginning of delicate diplomatic manoeuvrings New Delhi would have to manage during the G20 presidency.

The bilateral meetings between the leaders of the member-countries revealed much more than the conference deliberations and statements. Prime Minister Modi had an unstructured meeting with US President Joe Biden, and both leaders seemed to have reiterated the close relations between the two countries, and Biden is reported to have talked of the Quad, comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia, as well as the India-Israel-US-United Arab Emirates (UAE) with its interesting acronym of “I2U2” as examples of US-India strategic cosiness. Modi is said to have looked forward to the US cooperation during India’s G20 presidency. This meeting was followed by another joint meeting with the outgoing G20 president and host of the summit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and Biden. It would seem that the Americans are playing a key behind-the-scenes role in shaping the G20 strategies. In the midst of managing the G20, Biden had an over three-hour meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and he declared afterwards that he saw no need for a new Cold War! Modi’s interaction with Xi was a brief exchange of courtesies, which is an improvement on the silence that the two had maintained at the SCO summit in Samarkand.

The US has adopted a double-pronged approach towards China — that of keeping the channels of communication open with China on the one hand, and of building up an anti-China network in the Indo-Pacific. Parallel to the US stance towards China is India’s stance towards Russia. While seeking closer strategic ties with the US as part of its undeclared power struggle with China in south Asia, New Delhi wants to keep its strategic closeness to Moscow intact, both in economic and military terms.

Of course, the scale of India-Russia and India-China ties is much smaller than the US-China and US-Russia relations, but they share the same quality. Indian strategic experts should not be eager to declare Modi’s triumph at Bali and its continuing flavour as India takes over the G20 presidency.

There is a cold war between India and China at many levels even as Biden has declared there is no need for one between the US and China. The US and Europe are up in arms against Russia, but it is unlikely to break into an open war because the US does not want a war with Russia, if it can help it. Biden was quick enough to say that the missile that hit a Polish village was not fired from Russia. So, India has to maintain its ties with Russia in the face of western opposition, though US Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen had said that the cap on Russian oil would not apply to India as long as India does not use western insurance and shipping agencies.

The India-China, India-Russia, US-China and US-Russia equations will continue to be irritants as India seeks to play a greater role in world affairs. Modi is acutely aware that the Ukraine war is causing problems, but he is not in a position to do anything more than state the problems. He said in his address at the G20 summit conference that the “fertiliser shortage of today is the food crisis of tomorrow”. The problem arises from Russia blocking Ukrainian export of fertilisers, which are of importance to India. And New Delhi is also not in a position to export wheat to take advantage of the shortage created by Russia blocking Ukrainian wheat export. It is a prickly situation for India.

These issues would appear as a dampener for India only if there are unrealistic expectations that India during its G20 presidency will cover itself with glory. What India can do at best, and it is something which has it has been good at, is to manage contradictions of a fragmented world and its power struggles. Indonesia has done it without too much fanfare. It has tried to keep the G20 unity, while keeping Russia in the loop.

Indonesian President Widodo travelled to Russia in June and he kept the possibility of Putin attending the summit open. And he has tried to focus on other major issues as the problems of climate change and the slowing down of growth in the global economy. And the baton is now being passed on to India. The Modi government can use the G20 presidency to get recognition for India on the world stage and play upon this on the home front. But on the international stage, India will have to perform as a team player, passing on the baton to Brazil, which will take over the presidency in 2024.