Nuanced strategy can address J&K challenges

Luv Puri

Journalist and Author

IN December 2001, District and Sessions Judge Vijay Kumar Phool and three others were killed when militants ambushed their vehicle and fired at them in Poonch district. The four were attacked when they were on the way to Poonch from Rajouri.

Early that year, a police vehicle was ambushed in Gambhir Mughlan village of Rajouri on January 1, 2001, in which 14 personnel of the Special Operations Group (SOG) and two health workers were killed. On July 22, 2003, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Virendra Singh was killed in an ambush at Pagai in Rajouri district. The vehicle of the DSP, who was on his way to Shahdara Sharief from Rajouri, was also ambushed in the evening.

In the same vein, the recent attack on an Army vehicle in Bhimber Gali area of Poonch resulted in the death of five soldiers. The solitary truck was reportedly taking fruits and other items to Sangiote village in Jammu and Kashmir for iftar that was being organised by the Army.

In the last quarter of 2021, not far from the site of the present attack, an unsuccessful hunt for militants in Mendhar area of Poonch led to the killing of nine soldiers. The Kashmir valley has witnessed targeted killings of members of the minority community in the past three years, whereas in Rajouri and Poonch districts, most of the attacks have been carried out by trained militants armed with sophisticated weaponry.

This is not the first time that Rajouri and Poonch have presented a challenge. The developments in the area have to be understood through a complex interplay of vectors such as geography, ethnicity and history. While researching for my books — Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir: The Uncovered Face and Across the Line of Control — which cover these areas as well as the region across the Line of Control (LoC), I found that binary assumptions must be shunned.

In 1947, India’s political case over Muslim-majority J&K rested on the support of Sheikh Abdullah in the Kashmir valley. Abdullah’s influence among the non-Kashmiri-speaking Muslims to the south of Pir Panjal, an area more populous than the Valley, was minimal. Unlike the Valley, which never had the tradition of its residents joining the military, many non-Kashmiri-speaking Muslims, particularly from undivided Poonch, had fought in World War II. As they were influenced by communal conflagration from neighbouring Punjab province in 1947 and trained in military warfare, the result was predictable. Many areas in undivided Poonch became the sites of a rebellion by some locals, including ex-servicemen, against the princely ruler with the support of important sections in newly created Pakistan.

After accession, Indian Army’s quick success in the Valley against the invaders, mostly of Pashtun ethnicity, was enabled by the ground assistance of Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference cadre, who had unquestioned support in the Valley, going by independent accounts. In contrast to the Valley, in the areas across the LoC, the Indian Army was outnumbered by the Pakistani army and its supporters. This is evidenced in the official document, History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48), by military historian SN Prasad and cited by AG Noorani in a journal in 2019.

Rajouri and Poonch share geographical, ethnic, linguistic and family ties with the areas across the LoC. In 1965, during Operation Gibraltar, infiltrators pushed by the Pakistani army established control in several pockets of the hinterland, going as deep as Darhal area in Rajouri district. In sharp contrast, in the Kashmir valley, infiltrators were easily caught and they failed to receive support from Kashmiri-speaking Muslims.

In Rajouri and Poonch, infiltrators were finally pushed back after several days of the Army’s operation. Some locals, who had helped the infiltrators, went across the LoC and spent the rest of their lives there. In the early 1990s, Rajouri and Poonch were initially used by Kashmiri-speaking militants to enter this side of the LoC and later militancy engulfed the area. After years of bloodletting in the region that continued till 2005, it had more or less attained peace till 2019.

So, what explains the resurgence of violence in the past three years? It is hard to attribute the developments solely to the 2019 abrogation of Article 370 and the bifurcation of the state. However, such attacks cannot take place without local support. The political vacuum, which prevails in J&K since 2018, is causing an information glut from far-flung areas. In the past three years, the only visible political mobilisation that the region witnessed is courtesy bitter ethnic polarisation between Paharis and Gujjars. The former demanded Scheduled Tribe status, as is enjoyed by Gujjars; the latter opposed the demand.

The recent developments may necessitate bringing back the protocols of the late 1990s and this will require additional troops to fill the gaps. Post 1995, after the militants became active in Rajouri-Poonch, the area domination and road-opening patrols became part of the protocol. Unlike the Valley, where troops can move from one end to another within two to three hours, it takes eight to nine hours to reach far-flung posts along the LoC and the hinterland. The areas close to the LoC are historically infamous for guides and informers who work for the best bidder.

Going forward, militants will aim to attract global attention with these attacks. The G20 tourism working group meeting in Srinagar next month and, more importantly, the G20 Heads of State and Government Summit in New Delhi, expected to be attended by US President Joe Biden, are events for which it is critical to maintain vigil.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the multi-layered challenges that are emanating from various parts of J&K. India’s political leadership needs to connect the dots of J&K between its diverse components, grounded in history, demography and geography, with broader geopolitical trends, including from across the border, and take corrective measures. The past has shown that employing a unidimensional approach to sanitise the region, without a nuanced strategic as well as political approach for which collation of inputs, analysis and execution require distinct competencies, doesn’t work.

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