Pakistan’s hold slackens

Vivek Katju

Ex-Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

ON August 15, 2021, the Taliban captured Kabul after a few weeks of stunning military manoeuvres which led to the collapse of the already demoralised Afghan armed forces. This military success led not only the Taliban but also its principal ally, the Pakistan army — without whose support it could not have continued as a fighting force — to disregard a critical element of the Taliban-US Doha agreement of 2020. The agreement stipulated the formation of an inclusive interim government consisting of the Taliban and the Afghan Republic leadership, the withdrawal of US forces and a ceasefire between the US army contingents and the Taliban. The latter two conditions were adhered to by both sides, but the Taliban military success put paid to the idea of an inclusive interim government.

While New Delhi has to proceed cautiously, it should not be diffident in its dealings with the Taliban.

For the Taliban and its ally headquartered in Rawalpindi, the humiliating defeat of the Afghan army and the US retreat from Afghanistan in the ‘forever war’ constituted a great strategic success. Pakistan’s exultation was best captured in a widely circulated September 2021 short video and photographs of the then Director-General of the ISI, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, and Pakistan ambassador in Kabul Mansour Ahmed Khan at a Kabul hotel. They show a swaggering Faiz and a grinning Mansour. Faiz’s visit was to ensure that the bickering among the different Taliban factions ended and an interim government was formed and that the armed resistance in the Panjsher valley, under the leadership of former Vice-President Amrullah Saleh and Ahmed Masood, was crushed.

In the video, Faiz was seen informing the media, ‘Don’t worry, everything will be okay.’ At that stage, things were going Pakistan’s way, especially because the Taliban entry into Kabul had led to the withdrawal of the Indian mission, and Pakistan had demonstrated its capacity to stand its ground despite repeated US threats against giving sanctuary to the Taliban. Pakistan had won a strategic victory in Afghanistan, although its more thoughtful diplomats and generals were chary of openly acknowledging it. But it is one thing to win a war, quite another to win the peace. Pakistan is not winning the peace in Afghanistan.

Today, members of the Pakistani strategic community blame the Taliban victory of last year — for which Rawalpindi was responsible and which it could have stopped — on the US decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. They overlook Pakistan’s role, especially in the unfolding of events in Afghanistan in July and August of last year. Embrace a victory and distance yourself from sticky situations is a truism which is being seen in Pakistan’s present position in Afghanistan. This is also evident in conversations with members of Pakistan’s strategic community who are emphasising that Pakistani decision makers have come to realise that the neighbour has to be treated as a sovereign equal and should not be pushed on sovereignty issues such as the border. This implies that Pakistan would not press the Taliban to recognise the Durand Line as the international border. The Taliban had refused to do so in the 1990s too. It is impossible for it or any Afghan government to do so. Pakistan is also emphasising that it is facilitating the Taliban on trade and connectivity issues. While it is true that a large number of Pakistani and Afghan trucks are helping goods to reach Afghanistan from Pakistan, the fact is that the Taliban is chafing, as was the Afghan Republic, at being treated by Pakistan as an economic ‘colony’.

A worrying issue for the international community is, of course, Taliban’s connections with Islamic terrorist groups highlighted by the killing of Al Qaeda chief Ayman Zawahiri in a Taliban faction safehouse in Kabul through a US drone attack in July. Even more important is the relative impunity with which the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) is carrying out strikes in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s terrorism concerns in Afghanistan are more narrowly focused on the Taliban’s ties with the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). The Pakistan army expected the Taliban to rein in the TTP but the Taliban is skilfully playing the Pakistanis on this issue. Expectations of Pakistani generals that the Taliban would blindly follow their dictates on the TTP have been belied. India’s concerns are rightly on Taliban’s connections with Pakistan-based anti-India terrorist groups.

Pakistan wants the international community to help mitigate Afghanistan’s humanitarian challenges arising out of a collapsed economy. Unless it is willing to expend its stock of capital with the Taliban and push it on gender and minority issues, it is unlikely that the international community will do anything more than that which will prevent a full rush of refugees out of the country. While gender has complex social and religious connotations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pakistan army is not willing to really push the Taliban on it. Rather, it is advocating that the international community should remain patient and engage with the Taliban.

Pakistan would like to shut India out of Afghanistan but it knows that no authority in Kabul is willing to do that. Hence, while asserting that Pakistan will remain suspicious of India in Afghanistan, it is being forced to accept that the Indian role cannot be wished away. It wants India to remain within ‘legitimate’ bounds. The fact is that as in the 1990s, so now, there are many in Afghanistan who want India to be more active. There are sections in the Taliban who believe in the coincidence of Indian and Afghan interests on many issues, including in the security sector. While Delhi has to proceed cautiously, it should not be diffident in its dealings with the Taliban. It should not overlook the growing dissonance between the Taliban and Pakistan on some issues. And, India’s current restrictive visa policy on Afghanistan needs an urgent review.

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