Post-Pulwama lessons for India, Pak

SIX years ago, on February 14, 2019, a CRPF convoy was attacked by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in the tragic loss of 40 personnel. Pakistan-based terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for the attack. It released a video of the assailant, Adil Ahmad Dar, who had joined the outfit one year earlier.

Indian strategic planners viewed the suicide bombing as an unacceptable provocation that demanded a strong response. In the early hours of February 26, 2019, a formation of Indian Air Force (IAF) Mirage 2000 aircraft crossed into Pakistani airspace and struck a JeM camp at Balakot, located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This was a striking departure from previous engagement patterns, where operations remained confined mainly to areas along the Line of Control (LoC).

The next day, Pakistani fighter jets launched a retaliatory strike in the Jammu sector. In the ensuing aerial engagements, India claimed to have downed an F-16 fighter, while an Indian MiG-21 was shot down, and its pilot, Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman, was captured by Pakistani forces.

The capture of a serving IAF officer raised the stakes, and there was a brief period of heightened tensions, with reports that India was readying for a missile launch into Pakistan. The situation eased when Pakistan announced that it was releasing Abhinandan as a ‘peace gesture’. Ajay Bisaria, who served as Indian High Commissioner to Islamabad during that time, writes in his book that the release of the pilot was due to India’s “coercive diplomacy, backed by a credible resolve to escalate the crisis”.

Both India and Pakistan claimed victory in the Balakot affair. India had shown that it would not demonstrate passiveness in response to major terror strikes on Indian soil by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists. Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail had run its course, and India would use the military instrument to impose costs on Rawalpindi.

Pakistan’s retaliatory strike, named Operation Swift Retort, was also celebrated as a victory. On the first anniversary of the operation, the Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations tweeted: “February 27 commemorates the resolve of Pakistan Armed Forces against any aggression. The way we responded on this day is a proof that any misadventure by enemies of Pakistan will always be defeated.”

As both sides made victorious declarations, there was no incentive to escalate, and the crisis rapidly subsided. However, even in this brief episode of hostilities, there are some important lessons for future crises.

How adversaries view the results of their actions will determine how they behave in the future. The Indian political leadership is determined that it must use its conventional military superiority to deter Pakistan from using terrorism as an instrument of state policy. This now includes the use of airpower, which was considered highly escalatory earlier.

In 2020, then IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhaduria, declared, “Balakot was a clear demonstration that there exists a space within the sub-conventional conflict boundary wherein the Air Force can be used for targeting and yet have escalation control.” Using precision, stand-off weapons, the employment of airpower carries lesser risks than physically sending soldiers across the strongly held LoC, as was done in 2016.

Pakistan, on the other hand, states that it has a ‘Quid Pro Quo Plus’ strategy, implying that it would retaliate against India’s limited military action with a response that is slightly more potent or escalatory while remaining below the threshold that could spark an all-out conflict. If this strategy is to be credible, Pakistan must be prepared to employ its military forces to mount quick, targeted operations.

While India discounts Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, the latter puts it on a higher pedestal. Speaking at an IISS-CISS Workshop in London on February 6, 2020, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai (retd) stated that the Balakot crisis “amply demonstrated” that “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons continue to serve the purpose for which they were developed… It is precisely the presence of these nuclear weapons that deters, and in this specific case, deterred India from expanding operations beyond a single unsuccessful airstrike.”

These perceptions on both sides of how Balakot played out mean that there is likely to be lesser restraint on using military force in the event of a crisis between the two countries. With diplomatic channels being almost absent, there is a risk of misunderstandings or misinterpretations that can lead to unintended escalation. International mediation can help in a crisis, but India rejects any third-party role in responding to national security threats.

The problem is also exacerbated due to the public rhetoric surrounding events like the Balakot strikes. With a strongman image at stake, social media-driven mass sentiment could put pressure on political leaders to take swift, decisive military action. As Henry Kissinger points out in his book, World Order, “The temptation to cater to the demands of the digitally reflected multitude may override the judgment required to chart a complex course in harmony with long-term purpose. The distinction between information, knowledge and wisdom is weakened.”

Does this throw up scenarios of an India-Pakistan crisis quickly ascending the escalation ladder, bringing nuclear weapons into play? While some Western observers feel that this is a possibility, the reality is different. The scope for the use of military force by India in response to terrorist attacks has indeed widened, but there is also a very deliberate effort by both sides to control the escalation through public messaging.

Following the Balakot airstrikes, the Indian Foreign Secretary issued a statement calling it a “non-military pre-emptive action” with the target selection being “conditioned by our desire to avoid civilian casualties.” The Pakistan Foreign Office statement after their retaliation said the strikes were on “non-military targets, avoiding human loss and collateral damage…We have no intention of escalation but are fully prepared to do so if forced into that paradigm.”

That neither side wants to escalate beyond a point is perhaps one silver lining in the lessons from the Balakot crisis.