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Project delays are a drag on IAF power

Concerns of Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal AP Singh on the industry’s failed promises and missed deadlines are a sobering reality check.
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Hurdle: The IAF has long been struggling with the effects of sloth in our aircraft production capability. iStock
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AS the fog of Operation Sindoor begins to lift, the actual magnitude of success is beginning to emerge after the initial days of the media blitzkrieg. The offensive air power and air defence that the Indian Air Force (IAF) demonstrated was heartening, despite decades-old inventory shortcomings. Equally encouraging was the test of combat-worthiness of indigenous weapons and systems that played a defining role in the short, swift and high-intensity operation.

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Whether it is the homemade Integrated Air Command and Control System, the backbone of the Indian air defence, the Akash surface-to-air missile or the BrahMos cruise missile — the star of the show — credit must go to the Indian industry. But, amidst the heady feel-good factor of success, the refreshingly frank and justified concerns of Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal AP Singh on the industry’s failed promises and missed deadlines are a sobering reality check.

The irony is that despite being the primary customer of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, one of the oldest and largest aviation industries in the world, the IAF has long been struggling with the downstream effects of decades of sloth in our aircraft production capability.

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The Air Chief’s angst reflects years of over-promise, under-delivery, slippage of timelines, less-than-acceptable product quality and inadequate product performance follow-up, which the IAF has been a victim of despite decades of hand-holding and support. There is a serious need for the industry to introspect on the slippages in every indigenous platform — the Light Combat Aircraft, Advanced Light Helicopter, Light Combat Helicopter, the Netra Airborne Early Warning & Control System etc and weapon systems.

In the absence of accountability, the harsh fact is that the IAF’s declining numbers of combat and support platforms have created an ever-increasing inventory gap due to the inadequate future ‘fill rate’ and is already in an irrecoverable downward spiral.

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Future inductions will no longer be able to close the gap unless the industry achieves a substantial production capacity. Slippages snowball further into delays in induction, operationalisation, training and development of employment tactics. The capacity shortcoming is an equally serious challenge in the industry’s maintenance, repair and overhaul, as this means that a significant number of platforms are always waiting in long queues, and therefore there are lesser platforms available on the flight line.

The reduced numbers are weakening India’s conventional deterrence, especially in view of the unique twin-adversary multi-front threat. Post-Op Sindoor, with the widened space for conventional employment of kinetic force, the possibility of a future conflict has gone up.

The recent conflict has shown that the China-Pakistan relationship, especially between the two air forces, is no longer a collusive affair. Instead, it is a bold display of open support between two ironclad strategic friends. Since there is no doubt about the role air power will play in any future conflict, the technology differential, the increasing disparity in numbers and the strategic synergy between the China-Pak aviation industry and the air forces are red flags for India’s future security paradigm.

This is because the joint air power advantage will alter the continental security dynamics and impact India’s force application options. India’s already delayed Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project, which has been recently opened to the private sector, is expected to take over a decade before the platforms can be inducted into service. By that time, China would have altered the air power balance and infrastructure in Tibet in its favour with sixth-generation platforms, and Pakistan would have operationally inducted the fifth-generation J35 as well. Of equal concern is that in this period, the IAF’s mainstay fourth-generation fleet would have also become a decade older, despite their upgraded capabilities.

Like the AMCA, specialist weapons, advanced support platforms, future manned and unmanned teaming projects and space-based support for multi-domain operations are future imperatives that need accelerated research & development, supported by advance manufacturing processes and large production capacities.

The pace of technological advancements can only increase if the IAF and the industry short-circuit the synapses between the development of future operational concepts, identifying operational requirements, industrial research, development and production and finally operational testing and evaluation. These need to be addressed on the highest priority, given the long distance and lead times between the drawing board and the field.

A much-needed and most critical transformational change is for the industry to assume responsibility as a vital stakeholder of national security, and to be held accountable for it. The erstwhile silo-based design-development-testing-production process needs to be made inclusive, with much greater symbiotic institutional embrace between the industry and the customer.

The aviation industry should expand its engagement with the IAF more proactively to widen the aviation expertise base of its human resource in order to bridge the customer-producer divide — from the conception stage of a project, its production, operational integration and future upgrade. Creation of project management groups for progress and performance monitoring follow-up till the full maturity of a developed product must become a norm based on the life-cycle needs. They must be able to shut down a programme early, if necessary, to prevent cost overruns.

Supply chain robustness and resilience must be ensured to avoid delays and slippages. Similarly, projects cannot be executed on single prototypes; they need adequate pieces for running development and testing in parallel. Field trials are extremely complex affairs involving many players and stakeholders, where delays and failures have pushed back projects for months, if not years. Shortage of test beds, testing equipment, non-availability of certain specialist test facilities in India, pre-mature testing etc. add to the challenges.

Greater independence, transparency and oversight on certification and quality assurance are necessary to ensure stringent adherence to desired operational and safety standards.

Considering the expanding defence industry space, with its vast count of players and the growing number of projects, there is clearly a need for a visionary strategy for India’s aviation future. Given the immense growth trajectory of civil aviation, assets and infrastructure, adopting a model of an ‘integrated military-civil aerospace industry’ will be a strategic investment for the future.

In view of the combat-proven credibility of Indian defence products, speed and scale are of the essence. This will fill our critical inventory gaps, and generating extensive low-cost competitive exports will also serve to expand our regional influence by creating technology dependencies. It’s a carpe diem opportunity for the government to drive the change. No more failed promises and missed deadlines.

Air Marshal Diptendu Choudhury (retd) is ex-Senior Air Staff Officer, Western Air Command.

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