Public trust key to India’s nuclear push

IN his Independence Day speech, Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid stress on the critical role of nuclear power in building a truly self-reliant India and achieving energy independence. The importance of nuclear energy is also reflected in this year’s Budget, subsequent policy statements and efforts to open the sector to private sector participation.

An interim target of achieving 100 GW (gigawatts), which includes both large and small reactors, by 2047 has also been envisaged. Small Modular Reactors (SMRs with a capacity of 300 MW or below), are gaining special attention these days as they can play a key role in decarbonising hard-to-abate industries, providing a stable power supply to remote areas, serving captive power requirements and producing hydrogen. Hard-to-abate industries — such as cement, steel, power, oil and natural gas, chemicals and fertilisers — are difficult to decarbonise due to high energy requirements and emissions from chemical processes.

Three types of SMRs — 200 MWe (megawatt electrical) Bharat Small Modular Reactors, 55 MWe SMRs and five MWth (megawatt thermal) High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors — are being designed and developed indigenously. These augur well for realising India’s nuclear vision. The road ahead, however, is not that rosy. There are hurdles to be crossed, the main one being ensuring public acceptance by addressing apprehensions about human safety and environmental impacts.

Public unease around nuclear energy is deeply shaped by history. Memories of Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) continue to loom large, fuelling perceptions that a nuclear accident is both catastrophic and inevitable. The core fear is the uncontrolled release of radioactive material in the event of severe accidents that could cause long-term environmental damage and health impacts.

Radioactive waste, with its millennia-long hazard profile, is another persistent worry. Questions are often raised about the long-term storage safety, risks of leakage and economic costs.

For SMRs, these general fears are compounded by their limited operating experience, potential siting closer to population centres, fuel supply chains and waste management. As private sector participation grows, questions may also arise about adequate availability of trained operators. The regulatory framework in India is fairly strong. The public concern thus seems to be based on limited public exposure to factual safety records and modern reactor safety features.

India’s nuclear fleet has operated for decades with an enviable safety record. As documented in reports, radiation exposure to plant workers has consistently been well below global regulatory limits, with public exposure averaging less than 10 per cent of the prescribed thresholds. The country’s plants follow a “defence-in-depth” approach — multiple, redundant safety barriers, robust heat removal systems, emergency core cooling and airtight containment structures.

After the Fukushima disaster, Indian reactors underwent significant safety upgrades: hydrogen recombiners to prevent explosions, filtered containment venting systems to limit radiological release and enhanced flood protection measures. Every site also has Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) in place, supported by emergency power backup and mobile equipment for extreme events.

India’s operating nuclear power plants have demonstrated a commendable safety record. The International Atomic Energy Agency, in its latest safety review, has acknowledged the strong commitment and professionalism of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)/Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) in ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in the country. Building on this foundation, emerging technologies like SMRs incorporate advanced safety features to further enhance reliability and public confidence.

The SMR concepts incorporate passive safety systems that function without human intervention or external power, relying instead on natural forces such as gravity. This inherent resilience makes them particularly robust in the face of extreme events, including station blackout scenarios. Their design offers multiple advantages: smaller reactor cores containing less fissile material, thereby reducing the potential radiological source; and lower operating pressures in certain configurations.

Furthermore, factory fabrication of modules ensures stringent quality control and reduces variability associated with on-site construction. These combined features not only strengthen overall safety but also make it possible to consider smaller Emergency Planning Zones, opening opportunities for siting reactors closer to demand centres such as industrial hubs or urban microgrids.

It is heartening to note that the DEA and the AERB are looking into this matter with requisite urgency. Nonetheless, regulatory bodies emphasise that emergency planning will continue to be rigorous for all nuclear facilities to safeguard against security-related contingencies.

Building public trust is a major prerequisite for ensuring successful deployment of nuclear power plants. India’s own experience — local opposition in some cases — shows that even the best-engineered plant can face hurdles if safety is not understood and accepted by those living nearby.

It would also be desirable that the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) and the AERB involve a few other reputed organisations to ensure wider outreach with no information bias. The communication strategy must be proactive right from the site selection stage and address all safety concerns.

Sharing of success stories in India and other countries would also be helpful. By embedding such outreach into the project timeline, SMR development can move beyond a technology-first approach, making public trust and acceptance a parallel pillar to engineering excellence, and projecting the plant as a shared community asset from the outset.

K Ramanathan is a Distinguished Fellow and Arunendra Kumar Tiwari is a fellow at the The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI).