Russia key to India’s quest for self-reliance

RUSSIAN President Vladimir Putin’s two-day visit to New Delhi was his first trip to India since the onset of the Ukraine conflict in 2022. Hosted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the summit emphasised the enduring strategic partnership between the two nations, nurtured during decades of Cold War-era cooperation.

The visit elicited considerable global interest since the US and the European Union have sought to ‘isolate’ the Russian President over his war against Ukraine. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Putin with regard to war crimes in Ukraine. Hence, the Indian decision to receive him with customary summit pageantry and related protocols had its own strategic significance.

Modi welcomed the Russian leader at the airport with his trademark embrace, underscoring the rapport between the leaders. The visit took place amid escalating US pressure on India to curb Russian oil imports and defence purchases; both sides reaffirmed that their ties were “resilient to external pressure”.

Moscow has been a traditional supplier of military equipment and major platforms (tanks, ships, aircraft) to India since the mid-1960s, but contrary to pre-visit expectations and speculation, no major defence deals were announced during Putin’s visit.

The reference in the joint statement was relatively bland and noted that military and military-technical cooperation had traditionally been a pillar of the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia. It added: “Responding to India’s quest for self-reliance, the partnership is reorienting presently to joint research and development, co-development and co-production of advanced defence technology and systems.”

The emphasis was on joint manufacturing in India of spare parts, components, aggregates and other products for maintenance of Russian-origin arms and defence equipment under the Make in India programme through transfer of technology; setting up of joint ventures for meeting the needs of the Indian armed forces; and preparing for subsequent exports to mutually friendly third countries.

The Modi-Putin summit signalled a potentially strategic pivot in India-Russia defence relations, moving beyond the traditional buyer-seller dynamic towards deeper collaboration. This aligns with India’s Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) initiative in defence manufacturing, aiming to further reduce import dependency — it dropped to 36 per cent (Russian share, 2020-24) from a high of 72 per cent (2010-15).

It is instructive that despite acquiring substantive military hardware from the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s (the first MIG fighter aircraft, Petya/Kamorta-class ships and tanks), India never managed to obtain any design knowhow from its close ally.

Thus the bulk of the Soviet/Russian-origin equipment that was ostensibly ‘manufactured’ in India largely involved assembling kits/components that were imported. This meant that whether it was the ordnance factories or HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited), the primary activity was assembling the parts and there was little or no attempt to reverse-engineer or embark on an indigenous design.

This inability/reluctance to enter the design domain is in stark contrast to the Chinese example. The most successful reverse-engineering accomplishment by China of Soviet-era military equipment is the development of the Shenyang J-11 fighter jet family from the Sukhoi Su-27 ‘Flanker’. The PLA Air Force initially acquired Su-27SK fighters from Russia in the 1990s under a licensed production agreement, assembling them as the J-11A using Russian-supplied kits. However, by the mid-2000s, China succeeded in reverse-engineering the aircraft — disassembling, analysing and replicating key components — to produce the fully indigenous J-11B variant without further Russian involvement.

This involved copying the airframe, avionics, radar systems and propulsion, then integrating Chinese upgrades like the WS-10 turbofan engine (reverse-engineered from the Russian AL-31F), active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and domestically produced weapons systems.

The Su-27 itself originated in the Soviet Union (designed in the 1970s, entering service in 1985), making the J-11 a direct adaptation of Soviet technology. This design breakthrough allowed China to reduce its import dependency, acquire self-sufficiency and then export this fighter, with Pakistan being a major buyer.

India acquired its first Sukhoi, the Su-30, in 1997, but the prevailing national ecosystem remained inhibited and import dependency continued, with France emerging as an alternative supplier for fighter aircraft (Rafale). Putin’s visit witnessed a revival of interest in the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets, with India seeking source code access and stealth enhancements. Whether this potential acquisition will complement the indigenous Tejas remains a moot point at this stage.

There is no denying the fact that Moscow (both during the Soviet era and afterwards) has provided invaluable technological assistance to India in certain niche areas that are strategically critical — both missiles and underwater nuclear propulsion (INS Arihant) are a case in point. The joint-venture BrahMos missile is a success story, and the current visit has listed a lighter variant of this missile as a potential area for cooperation.

Design knowhow of major military equipment is akin to the crown jewels of a nation and this kind of knowledge cannot be bought off the shelf. It is illustrative that even the USSR/Russia, with whom India has had a very robust military supplier relationship, has not parted with design knowhow.

Putin’s visit will be consequential if India is able to prioritise Atmanirbharta in an earnest and resolute manner and reorient the partnership with Moscow to realise the full potential of joint R&D, co-development and co-production of select advanced defence technologies. But this will be an arduous journey and many cobwebs would have to be cleared within the Indian ecosystem.

Even for Moscow, there are red lines regarding how deep the military cooperation with Delhi can be and how Russia will allay Beijing’s anxiety. Likewise, Delhi has to remain cognisant of Washington’s strictures pertaining to the engagement with Russia.

Putin’s trip has burnished the bilateral relationship, but new challenges are emerging for both nations.