Security implications of Manipur mayhem

Maj Gen Amrit Pal Singh (Retd)

Military Commentator

THE volatile situation in Manipur is dominated by several narratives, ranging from ethnic cleansing to narco-terror and the Christian-Hindu conflict. However, the fact remains that sponsoring mercenaries or armed groups on the basis of ethnic- or region-based loyalties is a self-destructive exercise.

In early June, 3,000-5,000 sophisticated weapons, including mortars, AK-47s and sniper rifles, and vast amounts of ammunition were looted from the armouries of the local police and reserve battalions in and around Imphal by mobs. The state security apparatus, responsible for safeguarding the armouries, did not offer much resistance. The attack and looting fit the bill of a well-planned operation with support from those responsible for local security and law and order in the Imphal valley, which is dominated by the Meiteis. This is tantamount to raising and arming a group of fighters with state-owned arms and ammunition.

Meitei terror groups have a history of violence and a secessionist agenda which is surreptitiously supported by politicians, bureaucrats and a section of the local police. This backing forms a vicious cocktail along with the blatant use of women’s social groups — the ‘Meira Paibis’ — that oppose the enforcement of law and order and have been at the forefront of the blockading operations against the security forces. The Meira Paibis (women torchbearers), also known as Emas or ‘mothers of Manipur’, belong to the majority Meitei community and use a mix of activism and vigilante tactics.

On June 24, the Army had to release 12 captured terrorists of the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup, an outfit banned by the National Investigation Agency, including the mastermind of the ambush of 6 Dogra in which 18 soldiers were killed in 2015. The release took place after a mob of 1,200-1,500 people, led by women, surrounded the target area and obstructed the operation.

The blockading of Army and Assam Rifles in the valley areas of the state by women has been a major challenge. The Spear Corps has since released a statement requesting women and civilians not to obstruct its response to relief and rescue operations of the security forces. Clearly, the Army has to find ways of blunting the sensitivity of engaging women obstructionists by integrating women police.

The Kukis and Naga tribes, which typically inhabit the hills, are basically a stock of hunters and have always carried hunting rifles; they are expert in jungle craft and laying traps for hunting around their villages. There are reports from the ground which indicate that the attacks on Kuki villages in the hills surrounding Imphal were led by mobs with women in the first attacking tier, closely followed by armed fighters who use this screen and close in to cause destruction and death. The presence of police commandos in the attacking mobs, who have suffered casualties in the exchange of fire, points to sponsored violence.

After extortion, the drug business is the second major source of income for valley-based terror groups. Kuki villages grow opium and some of them also sell small quantities to the larger drug syndicates — mostly run by politicians and valley-based groups. Due to the proximity to the infamous Golden Triangle and the fact that the Myanmar junta is using opium production and sale as a means to augment its income as international support for the nation has dried up, combating drug trafficking is a major security challenge.

The border is extremely porous due to the difficult hill and jungle terrain, which is exploited by drug traffickers and smugglers and not just the Kukis in the hills. The valley-based groups have a significant stake in the drug trade. Claims of the current state leadership seem partisan when hill tribes are targeted in the name of waging a war on narco-terror.

The Friendship Road, which runs parallel to and just along the Indo-Myanmar border, has witnessed cross-border attacks on Assam Rifles posts by Myanmar-based groups either supporting the drug trade or those waging a war against the Myanmarese army.

The threat of forces inimical to India is exacerbated by the redeployment and thinning out from the border of the Assam Rifles to the present conflict areas around the Imphal valley.

The primary task of the Army is to guard the northern borders with China. The focus has to be on matching the Chinese build-up to be able to thwart incursions. Such a deployment in Ladakh has resulted in some sort of stalemate due to the presence of trained and well-prepared Indian troops. The retrograde deployment of the Army for internal security duties is not without adverse implications in the Arunachal sector.

The Manipur mayhem is apparently politically sponsored, going by the loot of state-owned arms and ammunition; it has resulted in the Army being confined to the area for law and order duties, akin to the AFSPA era. The advantage of the AFSPA, which was withdrawn from Manipur in March 2023, was that no insurgent or terror group was given a free rein in the Areas of Responsibility (AoRs), which were effectively manned by the Army and Assam Rifles personnel who operated in delineated distinct areas with actionable intelligence.

The present situation has seen the large-scale deployment of not only the Army but also almost 30,000 Central police forces such as the CRPF and state reserve police battalions. The deployment has been incremental, with troops being rushed to trouble spots, and lacks basic coordination, as is obvious by the persistence of arson and killing. The paramilitary sub-units have been deployed in widely separated posts and have little or no coordination, leadership or intelligence to operate and they simply occupy the post with little area domination, which is so vital to prevent arson or clashes between armed groups.

Security forces were initially rushed to trouble spots in a bid to increase deterrence to violence. It is now imperative that these forces be organised into clearly delineated AORs, which they must dominate in a coordinated manner under a unified leadership. A unified leadership is not practical, with the state government forces being used independently and the Central security and paramilitary forces operating in pockets of deployment. The security situation in Manipur can rapidly go out of hand if political considerations dominate and obstruct the effective deployment of security forces. 

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