Security stakes must spur jointness

THE 16th Combined Commanders’ Conference was held in Kolkata from September 15 to 17 on the theme of ‘Year of Reforms — Transforming for the Future’. In his address at the conference, Prime Minister Narendra Modi instructed the Ministry of Defence to swiftly implement concrete steps to achieve greater jointness, Atmanirbharta and innovation to meet future challenges.

Among the decisions taken on promoting jointness, it was announced that the three services agreed to merge their education branches into a single unified Tri-Services Education Corps. Three new joint military stations are to be formed where all facilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force will be combined under a lead service.

Several joint doctrines have also been released in recent months. These include cyberspace operations, amphibious operations, special forces operations, airborne and heliborne operations and multi-domain operations. These joint doctrines collectively represent a systematic approach to military transformation, emphasising integration across different warfighting domains while maintaining service-specific expertise and capabilities.

It has long been recognised that the Indian military needs to shed its siloed structure and fight as an integrated force. In December 2019, the government created the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and established the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) within the Ministry of Defence. The DMA was explicitly mandated to drive integration by promoting joint planning in procurement, training and staffing, and to “facilitate restructuring of military commands… by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands.”

While a lot of effort is going into promoting jointness in the three services, the establishment of the Integrated Theatre Commands remains mired in dissonance, with the Indian Air Force (IAF) pushing back against their creation. Holding only 29 fighter squadrons against a sanctioned 42, the IAF fears that parcelling out its air assets to multiple theatre commands could dilute the effectiveness of airpower. The IAF leadership has argued that air power by its very nature is best used as a flexible, centrally controlled resource that can swing between theatres, an approach that might be compromised under rigid geographic commands.

Last month, the IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, cautioned against rushing the rollout of theatre commands and “disrupting everything to build one structure.” Arguing that no new structures are required at the lower level, he suggested the creation of a joint planning and coordination centre in New Delhi, where plans can be made centrally, and execution of tasks is decentralised.

At the event where the Air Force Chief had expressed his reservations, Navy Chief Admiral DK Tripathi said, “The Navy is committed to theaterisation as the ultimate goal.” The Army Chief, Gen Upendra Dwivedi, has also asserted that theaterisation of the Indian armed forces will definitely happen, even if it takes time.

These dissonant views raise the larger question of whether any structural changes like the theatre commands are required to move the Indian military to a more efficient warfighting model. Proponents of the status quo cite Operation Sindoor as an example of how coordination and planning at New Delhi, between the service chiefs and the CDS, combined with regular interactions with the political leadership, provides a successful model for future operations. To strengthen coordination, a joint planning structure could be created at New Delhi.

Operation Sindoor has provided many valuable lessons, but treating it as a blueprint for future wars would be an overstretch. This was a brief, tightly controlled operation with limited political objectives. After the initial standoff attacks against terrorist targets, the Army’s role was restricted to fire assaults at the Line of Control. The Navy adopted a forward posture to serve as a deterrent but did not actively engage in kinetic operations.

Being primarily a limited air and missile campaign, many critical capacities were not tested during Operation Sindoor. A protracted war involving significant ground or naval combat would demand robust traditional capabilities, including sustained armour and infantry operations, naval operations for sea control and logistics for sustenance over weeks or months. Such operations cannot be executed through coordination at New Delhi but will require a unified command structure in the field that can directly oversee operations in its theatre of responsibility. Even today, the service headquarters primarily serve a staff function, while the responsibility to conduct operations is with the respective command headquarters.

It is often stated that India cannot just copy theatre command structures from the US and China, as we have our own unique requirements. While there is some merit in this argument, we also cannot ignore the very valid reasoning behind why these structures were created. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, which reorganised the US military, was meant to remove the service parochialism and rivalry from the battlefield and address problems of poor quality of collective advice from the Joint Chiefs, cumbersome chains of command and inadequate authority of the warfighting commanders in the field.

China’s scrapping of the old Military Regions and raising theatre commands marked a shift from ground forces’ dominance towards a joint warfighting model integrating all domains under a unified commander. While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still refining its structure, the direction is clearly towards joint commands being essential for the PLA to fight modern, high-tech wars as a unified force. Some of the problems that forced reorganisation in the US and China are common to the Indian military.

India’s operational needs are distinctive, but that cannot be a pretext to preserve service silos and delay true integration. The debate should not be whether to integrate, but how to tailor integration to India’s threat challenges.

Our uniqueness should show up in how we design the integrated architecture. Discussion on this architecture includes the organisational structure of the integrated commands, the command-and-control arrangements, the precise role of the service chiefs in campaign planning, and a clear, rules-based authority for allocating scarce joint resources — especially air and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) assets — across theatres. In short, India’s specific national security context should shape the model of integration, not justify avoiding it.

Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is former Northern Army Commander.