Siliguri Corridor vulnerable to Chinese machinations

Jaideep Saikia

Security & Terrorism Analyst

IN his 1996 book Insurgent Crossfire, Subir Bhaumik wrote: “Two decades after the break-up of Pakistan into two countries and the relative stability achieved by the Indian politico-military effort in the North East, Pakistani talk of entrusting the security of East Pakistan to the ‘China factor’ might, in retrospect, seem to have been without substance. But, to an Indian decision-maker in New Delhi in the late 1960s, the threat raised India’s worst fears of a Chinese sweep through the region, and an eventual link-up with Pakistani forces in East Pakistan… This could have led to the secession of the entire North East.”

Though the pincer threat is no longer present, there are some issues that plague the region, which shares borders with Bhutan and other nations. Geography has compelled Bhutan to lean on India not only for its security, but also for most of its commercial needs. Nevertheless, recent times have seen Beijing reaching out to the Himalayan kingdom. The ‘Three-Step Roadmap’ signed by Bhutan and China is an irritant for India. It is as if Bhutan has betrayed its friend India.

However, PM Modi’s visit to Thimphu last month and the conferment of Bhutan’s highest civilian award, the Order of the Druk Gyalpo, on him indicate that the Himalayan kingdom’s heart is in the right place. Therefore, it is apparent that Thimphu would have consulted New Delhi before it entered into negotiations with China on the ‘Three-Step Roadmap’. Rather, India would have encouraged Bhutan to speed up boundary negotiations with China. It is vital for India’s national security interests. An iron-clad boundary between Bhutan and China would have ensured that there is a veritable strategic buffer between China and India by way of Bhutan, and China’s border with India would, as a result, not be a contiguous one.

PM Modi recently stated that “for New Delhi, ties with Beijing are important and the prolonged situation at the borders should be addressed urgently”. Is he trying to recast the India-China-Bhutan relationship in a new mould?

The Doklam incident of 2017 had caused concern. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied the plateau and developed military infrastructure right up to the base of the Jampheri Ridge, which overlooks the Siliguri Corridor. The Chinese even constructed a Xiaokang (well-off) village, Pangda, in the area. And, there was apprehension that the Chinese would cross the Torsa Nullah and intrude into Indian territory. But in such an event, the Indian Army, too, would cross it, leading to a full-scale war.

In this age of information warfare, one does not quite need to physically dominate the heights in order to conduct surveillance. Satellites can be launched from PLA bases in the Tibet Autonomous Region and even from Chengdu, the headquarters of the PLA’s Western Theatre Command.

Chinese satellites have a revisit time of four hours and these are far advanced than the Indian ones. These can monitor Indian Army movement in the Siliguri Corridor and thereabouts with greater clarity. Therefore, China’s reasons for attempting to occupy the Jampheri Ridge are two-fold. One is to occupy high ground (elevated positions) throughout the 3,488-km-long India-China boundary, after which it would fortify the border with the land border laws that it enacted on January 1, 2022, and the second is to maintain a posture that would keep the Indian Army perpetually deployed and on its toes.

Indian strategists must also comprehend the need to build new axes to and from the North East via Bangladesh to the rest of India. This would not be too demanding an affair, given the present affable India-Bangladesh relationship. Moreover, it would call the Chinese bluff with regard to the corridor, the severance of which would have isolated the North East.

Another important aspect that needs to be flagged with reference to the corridor is the threat of radicalisation. A study conducted a few years ago found that there was a huge radicalised population among the minorities of Nepal’s Terai region, including areas in Jhapa and Ilam, which are close to the corridor.

It is being said that it’s a matter of time before these radicalised groups invade this region. The loyalties of these elements are being controlled by anti-India forces. A radical group, the Islamic Sangh Nepal (ISN), has emerged as the premier Nepali Muslim outfit; it is said to be under the control of both the ISIS and Pakistan’s ISI. Anti-India subterfuge is being planned by utilising the ISN. The ISN is the primary vehicle for the spread of Salafi Islam in the region.

There are five key mazhabs or schools in Islam: Hanafi, Shafei, Maliki, Hanbali and Zafariya (which is chiefly Shia). The Muslims of India are predominantly from Islam’s Hanafi sect, which is a moderate lot.

But the transformative moment that Islam is passing through has witnessed the entry of the Hanbali or the Salafists into the region, and there is a possibility of north Bengal turning out to be the epicentre of this radical strain. The Tablighi Jamaat is also reportedly active in this region.

It has been reported that the Chinese are attempting to manoeuvre their way inside Nepal, especially among the Muslim population. For those who had written off the Islamic State, the March 22 attack in Moscow should act as an eye-opener.

Lastly, there is the growth of new social formations in the region. Some Nepalis are entering into wedlock with radical Islamists.

The Siliguri Corridor cannot be permitted to become the soft underbelly of India’s strategic northern frontiers.

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