South Africa learning to keep up with a changing world
THE ruling African National Congress (ANC) has recorded its worst poll performance since the end of apartheid in South Africa three decades ago. It has bagged barely 40 per cent of the votes in the recent elections, even as former President Jacob Zuma’s newly founded uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party secured a vote share of 15 per cent.
South Africa went to the polls on May 29. Voting was held for the formation of Parliament and state Assemblies. The new Parliament will elect the President. Observers have viewed the poll outcome as a sign of the diminishing value of the single-party system. A transition to a coalition government was anticipated, but the scale of the ANC’s decline is huge. Will this lead to a more mature polity? Or, like in other African countries, will election outcomes widen fissures? Kenyan President William Ruto, who led the African Union (AU) observer mission, suggested a coalition based on agreement.
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ANC has had a majority in both Houses of Parliament. The party’s vote share had been in excess of 60 per cent, except in 2019, when it dipped to 57.5 per cent.
Though the ANC still has the largest vote share, it lacks a majority to form the government. It is holding talks with other parties over stitching together a ruling coalition. A 14-day window for government formation is open.
While the White-dominated Democratic Alliance (DA) has improved its vote share from 20.77 per cent to 21.69 per cent, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has seen its share decline from 10.8 per cent to 9.46 per cent. The good performance delivered by Zuma’s MK is the major reason why the ANC has lost ground, mainly in KwaZulu-Natal.
With Cyril Ramaphosa as the President, South Africa tried to play a larger role on the world stage. A stable nation would be able to continue to do so. A coalition government, however, would need to harmonise the nuances of foreign policy.
The MK and the EFF are unlikely to have major differences with the existing foreign policy. Their domestic demands may be stronger. A coalition including the DA will lead to a balancing act in foreign policy and perhaps push South Africa to a less strident anti-West position. The DA is a centre-right party with an anti-corruption and economic reform agenda, which is preferred by investors.
In the past five years, the salient features of South Africa’s policy have included a closer engagement with China and, consequently, with Russia. It has distanced itself somewhat from the Western bloc. After initial criticism of the Russian action against Ukraine, not only did South Africa abstain from voting on UN resolutions pertaining to the conflict, but it also led an African peace initiative to visit both warring countries. This is not in consonance with the position held by the US-led West on Ukraine.
Between 2019 and 2021, South Africa held a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council and chaired the AU. The challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic and the civil war in Ethiopia during that period showed the limitations of South African influence.
During its BRICS chairmanship in 2023, South Africa played a role that was aligned with China’s push for rapid expansion of the grouping. It is uncertain if the new members — Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and Egypt — are beholden to South Africa in any way. If South Africa was trying to project itself as a leader of the Global South, it failed as it couldn’t persuade Argentina and Indonesia to join the bloc.
South Africa, which will take over as the G20 president in 2025, will become the fourth country in a row from the South (after Indonesia, India and Brazil) to chair the multilateral body before the US assumes its presidency in 2026. It remains to be seen whether South Africa will play the role of a Global South leader or a Chinese-influenced president.
South Africa has been taking the lead in the World Trade Organisation in conjunction with India in regard to issues of importance in the countries of the Global South. On the West Asian crisis, it has stepped out of the crease to attack Israel through the International Court of Justice, invoking the Genocide Convention.
South Africa is learning to cope with a changing world. Some analysts, who are sceptical of Ramaphosa’s foreign policy, blame him for a decline in the nation’s global moral standing. Some believe that he focuses on international crises as it diverts attention from domestic issues. The huge blow to the ANC may see Ramaphosa lose his presidency unless the coalition partners value his potential for stability.
A coalition government will test South Africa’s ability to push a stronger foreign policy agenda. Even if Ramaphosa survives the electoral disappointment, the churn in the ANC will continue. He will need to project a stronger voice for the Global South. Domestic politics and foreign policy are interrelated. What happens domestically impacts a country’s global stature.
Arina Muresan of South Africa’s Institute for Global Dialogue stated that in a coalition, the partners’ oversight over policy would increase through Parliament. The DA is an investor-friendly party. It will not hedge relations with China and Russia if the business makes progress, but it will seek adjustments with the West and Israel. The DA has questioned the anti-Israel economic policy. Evidently, the coalition partners will need a common minimum programme. This will be a new experience for South Africa.
For India, what matters is that a stable South Africa plays an important role in the next troika of the G20 presidency, including Brazil and the US. India sees South Africa as an important partner in the BRICS and G20 forums and hopes to strengthen the bilateral relationship.
