Strategic outcomes of 1971 war must not be jettisoned
India’s former Permanent
Representative to the UN
DO the recent events in Bangladesh require the jettisoning of the strategic outcomes of the December 1971 war that led to the emergence of an independent nation? What are India’s broader strategic incentives in the light of these changes? At least four major strategic outcomes of the war remain relevant for India at a time when international relations are in a period of unpredictable churn.
First, the war proved the hollowness of the two-nation theory on the basis of which the British government partitioned India in August 1947. The war was triggered by the refusal of Pakistan to accept the outcome of its 1970 national elections, which had given the mandate to the Awami League, a political party based on linguistic rather than religious identity. The refusal of the Pakistan army to accept the swearing-in of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Muslim leader of the Awami League, as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, led to the political dismemberment of Pakistan through the war.
The strategic outcome for India’s interests in independent Bangladesh that emerged from East Pakistan has been acknowledged. The dramatic transformation of the India-Bangladesh bilateral relationship is credited to the ‘forward-looking vision’ of ousted Bangladesh Prime Minister and Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina. It is this vision that needs to be ‘tied down’ by India now to ensure that the genie of religion-based politics or terror does not derail India-Bangladesh relations. India has assiduously built up a range of interlocutors in Bangladesh, particularly during the past 15 years that Hasina was in power, to calibrate this effort in a coherent manner.
Second, the war proved that India could act to intervene militarily in the former East Pakistan to create “conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations” (Article 56 of the UN Charter) between India and Bangladesh. India concluded its armed campaign on December 16, 1971, and withdrew its military forces from Bangladesh by March 12, 1972, illustrating how humanitarian intervention can work in practice in international relations.
This strategic outcome has provided the foundation for the sustainable development of India-Bangladesh bilateral relations, particularly in the economic and security spheres. Major outcomes in recent years, apart from frequent high-level political exchanges which have been of mutual benefit to the people of both countries, illustrate this well.
Connectivity projects have made Bangladesh an important strategic partner for India’s links with its north-eastern states through Bangladesh. This has had an impact on India’s Act East Policy as well. About $8 billion in three lines of credit have been extended by India to Bangladesh in recent years for specific connectivity projects. These include the construction of the Akhaura-Agartala rail link, the dredging of inland waterways in Bangladesh and the construction of an India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline for the carriage of high-speed diesel from India into Bangladesh, which was inaugurated in March 2023. As many as six pre-1965 rail links between India and Bangladesh have been reactivated, while Bangladesh’s ports of Chittagong and Mongla have been made available for Indian transit cargo to North-East India.
The India-Bangladesh border, covering 4,095.7 km, is the longest land border that India shares with any of its neighbours. On the midnight of July 31, 2015, India and Bangladesh implemented their historic Land Boundary Agreement to transfer 51 erstwhile Bangladeshi enclaves in India and 111 erstwhile Indian enclaves in Bangladesh to the other country. This laid the groundwork for operationalising appropriate border management systems on both sides, including for border fencing, joint inspection of boundary pillars and joint boundary demarcation, including of riverine boundaries, which impact on security and migration issues.
In July 2014, the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) had awarded Bangladesh an area of 19,467 sq km, four-fifth of the total area of 25,602 sq km disputed maritime boundary with India in the Bay of Bengal. India’s swift acceptance of the award provided the impetus for generating mutual trust and confidence with Bangladesh. It also led to the dynamic growth of regional cooperation, with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) establishing its Secretariat in Dhaka.
Third, following the unconditional surrender of the Pakistan army on December 16, 1971, to India, strategic conditions were created in South Asia for asserting the primacy of resolving disputes through bilateral treaty-based negotiations. The Simla Agreement, signed in July 1972 as a bilateral treaty, was negotiated and signed by the elected governments of India and Pakistan. It was registered with the United Nations as a legal framework that can be invoked “before any organ of the United Nations” under Article 102 of the UN Charter.
This strategic outcome has served India’s interests well. It has ensured that an undemocratic and unreformed UN Security Council has not succeeded in reopening the Kashmir issue after the war. India has prioritised applying bilateral frameworks to address its disputes with its neighbours rather than taking such issues into ineffective multilateral frameworks.
Fourth, the war established India’s ability to act invoking the principle of ‘strategic autonomy’. India put its national interests above international attempts to dictate terms to India through the UN in December 1971. The most striking illustration of this was the rebuff to the display of a nuclear-armed maritime force by the USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal to try and prevent India from achieving its objectives in the war.
At a time when international relations are being increasingly subjected to the dictates of major military powers, including the imposition of unilateral sanctions, ‘strategic autonomy’ is a strategic outcome of the 1971 war that India has a strong incentive to build upon as it transitions into a major power.
