Surfeit of dynasts, defectors lays bare leadership vacuum

Amarjit Bhullar

Ex-Professor, University of Northern British Columbia, Canada

A significant number of the candidates fielded by mainstream political parties in the current parliamentary elections in Punjab, Haryana and some other states are political dynasts or turncoats or both. The parties are facing a dearth of ideologically committed, competent and electable candidates. Most of them have poached members of other parties to get ‘suitable’ candidates — for instance, in West Bengal.

Those who are ambitious or feel marginalised in their own parties gladly accept such offers. Immediately after the switchover, they begin a campaign to undermine the party they have left and cheer the top leadership of the party they have joined. They had often criticised the same leadership before joining its ranks.

Yet another way to fill the gap is to bring in film stars or sportspersons who have mass appeal. The experience, so far, shows that few have performed and gained the confidence of people over the years, while many have found the political climate difficult to handle.

Why is there a vacuum in the parties? Why have even 100-year-old parties failed to nurture their young leaders to compete in the political arena?

In fact, a majority of these leaders treat political capital as other forms of capital (like land, gold, etc.) and not as goodwill earned by serving the electorate. Politics, as a profession, allows them to accumulate the political capital, which, unlike other forms of capital, cannot be transferred by a legal will to anyone of their liking. Rather, one must engage in the political process to receive that. In countries like India, power, status and prestige are derivatives of the political standing. So, naturally, there is an incentive to retain political power in the family or in the coterie.

Political leaders utilise some time-tested methods to transfer the political capital within their families/coterie.

In the last few decades, top leaders of political parties, barring a few, have demolished internal party democracy and tried vigorously to establish family control over the party by blocking the entry of young, competent leaders. They have passed their political legacy, which include the brand name as well as the financial, social and human capital advantages, to their progeny to consolidate their dynastic control. The inheritance of political power within families is a common phenomenon across the world and true even in democracies. But the inheritance is not as easy and quick elsewhere as it is in India.

The dynastic political perpetuation limits the ‘pool of candidates’ who can compete in politics and win elections. In this way, the founders of dynasties create a situation of political emptiness in their parties so that the heirs may face little competition.

Established leaders of political parties often select their associates on the basis of incompetence. Political scientists call it negative selection. Negative selection, as per everipedia.org, a blockchain-based online encyclopaedia, is “a political process that occurs… when a person on the top of the hierarchy, wishing to remain in power forever, chooses his associates with the prime criterion of incompetence — they must not be competent enough to remove him from power”. Resultantly, sycophancy becomes a means to entering a party. It determines one’s status and remuneration in the party rather than one’s ability to perform for the benefit of the party and the public.

Certainly, the strengthening of dynastic rule and negative selection are a risk for a party, but most leaders consider it a risk worth taking. Economists call it a moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when a person takes a risk because someone else bears the cost of that risk. So, when a dynasty is established or an incompetent second-rung leadership is formed in the party, the gains, if any, are accrued to the top leaders and if the heirs/second-rung leaders underperform as public representatives, the sufferers (of their underperformance) are the people. “Moral hazard explains 40 per cent of the descendants’ underperformance,” say Siddharth Eapen George and Dominic Ponattu in their study titled How Do Political Dynasties Affect Economic Development? Theory and Evidence from India.

At the time of elections, parties face a self-created shortage of good candidates, forcing them to recoup it by promoting defections. Therefore, the quality of governance and development processes decreases as members of the legislative and executive bodies are selected from a limited pool.

How does such politics affect optimal governance? Such behaviour disturbs the legitimacy of democracy and worsens the quality of public policies as politicians have motivations to implement policies that will increase their gain and ensure their continuation in power. Politicians place personal interests above public and party interests. It leads to patronage and corruption, which weaken governance institutions. Politicians, while in power, make public investments for their own gains.

Economic development is also hit due to bad governance. “We find that dynastic politics has an overall negative effect on economic development,” says the study by George and Ponattu.

Dynastic succession and negative selection are the most significant challenges for political parties in general and the electorate in particular. Most of the parties do not adhere to open, transparent and democratic procedures for their functioning. There are limited opportunities for ordinary members and ideologically committed workers to climb the ladder in the party, while elevators are available for the descendants and their cronies.

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