The glorious victory at Hajipir in 1965

Brig Shamsher Singh (retd) Former Officer, Corps o

The capture of the Hajipir Pass and establishing the Uri-Poonch link-up during the 1965 Indo-Pak war were an astounding success. It remains a classic offensive undertaken by an infantry brigade in the mountains.

Our lukewarm reaction to Pakistan crossing over into the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 emboldened the neighbour to plan more serious operations into J&K. Pakistan launched a clandestine infiltration with a large number of guerillas into the Kashmir Valley, Kargil and Rajouri sectors in early August 1965 (codename Operation Gibraltar). However, partly due to effective counter-infiltration operations by the Indian Army and partly due to no support to infiltrators by the local population, Operation Gibraltar got stalled by mid-August.

The then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri realised that the only way to eliminate infiltration was to go on the offensive across the Line of Control (LoC) and destroy the sanctuaries inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

The Hajipir bulge was identified for an offensive across the LoC as it was being used by the saboteurs for infiltration into the Kashmir valley and Rajouri sector. It is located on the Pir Panjal range at a height of 2,637 metres (9,000 ft) on the road between Uri and Poonch.

The plan was to launch a pincer assault along the axis of Uri-Hajipir with 68 Infantry Brigade from the north and 93 Infantry Brigade from Poonch in the south. The main role in the offensive, codenamed Operation Bakshi, was allotted to 68 Infantry Brigade under Brig ZC Bakshi (‘Zoru’ Bakshi), a World War II veteran and highly decorated soldier of our Army.

The Hajipir Pass is dominated by Bedori (3,760 metres) in the east; and Sank, Bisali and Lediwali Gali (3,140 metres) in the south-west. It was essential to capture all these features prior to attacking the Pass. After deliberations, it was decided to advance along two separate ridges —Bedori on the left and Sank-Sar-Lediwali Gali on the right. D-Day was fixed as August 24, 1965.

It is said that “if there is a plan which goes according to plan, there is something wrong with the plan.” Operation Bakshi was no different. D-Day had to be postponed to August 25 due to heavy rain in the area, making the mountain slopes almost non-negotiable.

The attacks were launched during the night of August 25-26, but in spite of the determined attack, 1 Para fell back, and 19 Punjab could not proceed beyond the Bedori base. The first light of August 26 was the defining moment for the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade as both thrust lines got stalled.

In the afternoon of August 26, the commander was informed that Bedori had been captured by a flanking formation and the news was broadcast to the nation on All India Radio. Brigadier Bakshi reluctantly believed in the news about the capture of Bedori and tasked 4 Rajput to skirt around it. While bypassing Bedori, 4 Rajput came under heavy fire from Bedori. It was realised the next day that the information was wrong and that Bedori was still with the enemy.

On the night of August 26-27, 1 Para attacked again and captured Lediwali Gali by midday on August 27. With Bedori, a formidable feature, still with the enemy, the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade planned to contain it through 4 Rajput and pull out 19 Punjab to task it to capture the Hajipir Pass by moving through 1 Para on the Lediwali axis.

It was turned down by the ‘powers that be’ and, instead, the commander was directed to capture Bedori on priority and Hajipir subsequently since Bedori had been announced to have been captured. However, the commander remained committed to capturing Hajipir without loss of time. Speed was the most essential factor for capturing Hajipir since any delay would give time to the enemy to reinforce defences.

Brigadier Bakshi decided upon an unorthodox plan: to send a self-contained company plus a column from 1 Para under Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal from Lediwali Gali during the night of August 27-28 (i.e. from Lediwali Gali height of 3,140 metres, descend to Hyderabad Nullah below, cross it and then ascend to Hajipir Pass at 2,637 metres — all in one night). The weather was at its worst, with rain and slush coming down the craggy slopes. Brigadier Bakshi spoke to Major Dayal in chaste Punjabi: “Agar te jit leya Hajipir te tu hero ban jayenga, nahi te mainu command ton remove kar den ge” (If you capture Hajipir, you shall be a hero, and if you don’t, I’ll be sacked) or words to that effect.

Major Dayal carried out the arduous mission in the treacherous terrain and weather prevailing that night. He appeared at the Pass by the first light of August 28. Pakistan had moved a company of 20 Punjab during the night to reinforce defences at Hajipir. Pakistan troops were so surprised that they retreated from the shoulders of the Pass with little fight, leaving behind weapons, radio sets, charging engines, meter maps and desi ghee!

The capture of the Pass validated the importance of the element of surprise by taking calculated risks and making bold manoeuvres.

Meanwhile, 19 Punjab remained held up near the Bedori base because the ridge was narrow and it was not feasible to capture Pt 12330 (Bedori) from the north-west. Brigadier Bakshi now decided to launch 19 Punjab from a completely different direction. The 3.7-inch Howitzer artillery gun was used to decimate the bunkers and Pt 12330 was captured on August 29.

However, a complex of high mountain features, Gitian, and Pt 8777 dominated the road from Hajipir to Poonch. 6 Dogra, with an additional company from 19 Punjab, was tasked to capture the Gitian complex.

It was captured by September 21, albeit after a fierce battle. It was probably the toughest battle in the entire Hajipir operations where Pakistanis resorted to repeated counter-attacks, both during the night and day. Our three officers, one junior commissioned officer (JCO), and 32 jawans were killed in action; five officers, three JCOs, and 80 jawans were wounded. The enemy had 90 dead, while an estimated 200 were wounded. For this valiant effort, 6 Dogra was bestowed with the battle honour ‘Hajipir’. Hours prior to this battle, the vital communication line between the tactical headquarters at Hajipir and 6 Dogra broke down due to heavy shelling, leading to a precarious communication gap which was vital at this critical juncture. The restoration of the line by the author, then a young Captain, under intense enemy fire was recounted by Lt Gen Zoru Bakshi 20 years later in a New Year’s card to the author.

In the meantime, 68 Infantry Brigade continued its advance from Hajipir Pass along the Eastern Ridge with 6 Dogra and 19 Punjab to link up with Poonch. 93 Infantry Brigade captured Raja and Rani by September 7. The Meghdoot Force (commando force under Maj Megh Singh), advancing from Poonch, linked up with 19 Punjab on September 10.

Up against superior force levels and a terrain advantageous to the enemy, 68 Infantry Brigade achieved remarkable success. It liberated 500 sq km of enemy-occupied territory. Brigadier Bakshi’s presence with the forward troops and his calm demeanour in the vicissitudes of the battle acted as an inspirational tonic. His relentless offensive (15 battalion-level attacks in 28 days), the launching of unorthodox operations to capture the Hajipir Pass without looking over his shoulders and, of course, the daunting courage displayed by young officers leading their respective commands from the front were the reasons for this historic success.

— The author, then a young Signal officer, accompanied Brig Zoru Bakshi through the entire Operation Bakshi as his ‘Sparrow Signals’

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