The great Indian transfer bazaar

MY mind goes back to the mid-1990s when I was posted at the police headquarters in Chandigarh in an administrative capacity. One afternoon, the Director General of Police (DGP) called me over and desired that I should accompany him to a meeting with the chief minister at Punjab Bhawan. Both of us reached there in time but the CM was not there; after some time, a colleague of his turned up on his behalf. After the exchange of pleasantries, the minister pulled out a piece of paper from his pocket and handed it over to the DGP. My boss was well known for a short fuse and I could see him turning red in the face. He then handed the paper to me; it had a list of about 20 transfers. The proposed transfers were based on one principle: all the rakes go to the field and all the good officers to desk jobs. The DGP asked me for my opinion, I seconded him and held forth that not even one proposal was acceptable. The DGP got up, and as we prepared to move out, the minister suggested that we could discuss the matter and make some changes. He was told in no uncertain terms that we were not into bargaining, and we exited the meeting on that note. I dropped the DGP at his place and told him to be prepared for a transfer. After two days, both of us were shifted out as also was the chief secretary (evidently, he had had a similar experience). However, times were different and values and principles still existed as none of our careers were adversely affected. In fact, the DGP went as the Governor of a state, the chief secretary as Principal Secretary to the PM and I was appointed DGP of Jammu and Kashmir.

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Will this unholy alliance ever be broken? It seems only the combined will and strength of the people can fix this malaise.

This incident took place when we were still not completely out of the woods as far as militancy was concerned. Even otherwise, the old rules and regulations regarding postings and transfers were still being followed. Proposals were sent from the DGP to the Home Department and differences, if any, were ironed out between the home secretary and the DGP and then the names were sent to the CM. Also, because of militancy, the DGP’s proposals were generally accepted. Even before this, the practice since pre-Independence times was the same and was meticulously followed. There was no question of large-scale political interference in these matters. Reforms were introduced in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in the mid-19th century (as a result of Lord Macaulay’s 1854 report on the ICS) and the recruitment shifted from patronage to a merit-based system. These reforms were also introduced in the British Home Civil Service. In a paper written by Elke Frank (Hunter College, City University of New York), he describes the importance of the bureaucracy in transition: “Because bureaucracy is the ‘core of modern government’, the role of the bureaucrats is especially crucial in the process of political transition. When one government succeeds another, whether the transfer of power reflects a revolutionary change in the political system, or merely a reversal of party fortunes within the established constitutional framework, the bureaucrats are expected to remain at their posts and attend to the activities of government much as usual. However drastic the changes in the policy machine, the wheels of government may not grind to a halt. Essential programmes and operations must be continued; basic commitments must be respected, lest the whole social fabric disintegrate.”

It is this premise of meritocracy and that basic commitments must be respected which form the heart of democracy and a competent government. However, with the general fall in standards of political and administrative competence, accountability and morality, outside interference began to creep into the civil services. It began with those in power wanting officers of their choice in their areas of influence and officers using their political connections to go to positions they wanted — a quid pro quo was established. In the beginning, it was a trickle and then the floodgates opened. The reason for this was politicisation of the civil services and the emergence of the politician-criminal-police nexus, which was augmented by the introduction of the halqa incharge system by political parties (the halqa incharge went by different names in different states). Civil servants openly aligned with political patrons and in turn patronised criminal gangs in order to help their political masters with money and muscle. Transfers at the district and subdivision levels, i.e. of the DSP, SDM and SHO, were farmed out to the halqa incharge, who then became the conduit for these officers, whose allegiance was no longer to their seniors and the service but to this mafia. This development broke the back of the hierarchy in civil services and its moral spine, and the days of the civil services being committed to the rule of law were over. Most of the good officers were sidelined or opted for deputation to the Government of India (it took some time for the malaise to spread there also, but now it is well-entrenched). Because of the increasing need for money and muscle, corruption grew exponentially, and big ‘dirty’ money came from organised crime syndicates which supplied the muscle also. It ushered in the era of full-time smugglers, drugs and money-laundering mafias — the gangs. Gangs that had never been heard of, but now it is difficult to keep up with their proliferation. There are gang shootouts, fights in jails and targeted killings of the drug mafia. In the extensive network here and abroad, the inimical hand of political parties is always there. This network has become even stronger as the way elections to the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha are conducted, they both need increased money and muscle power.

I have participated in scores of elections at different places and in different ranks. For the life of me, I have never been able to understand how the transfers of police officers and other civil servants just before the elections can affect their outcome. For example, the police, in the best of times, are not popular; people only fear them and not respect them. I do not understand how these ‘chosen’ police officers can help, except by providing men and money. They could be useful if there was total and open rigging, which thankfully is not the case yet. They are not capable of manipulating machines and this allegation has never been proved, especially when different political parties are winning and coming to power. Be that as it may, the institution of the police and other civil services which constitute the criminal justice system lies broken and unrecognisable from what it was. The judiciary, a crucial pillar of this system, also needs to introspect and find an answer to the millions of pending cases. We launch agitations and form taskforces whenever a gruesome incident takes place. However, with the passage of time, all is brushed under the carpet — but the nexus remains. Will this unholy alliance ever be broken? It seems only the combined will and strength of the people can fix this malaise.

The author is a member of the Tribune Trust