The problem of building trust with China

No single barometer exists to judge Indian feelings towards China, but negative views of the northern neighbour have visibly increased sharply since 2019, although not so much against the Chinese people as directed against the CCP-run government and its policies. Its leadership cannot be trusted and, as such, it is harder in every way.

The negative perception of China among Indians has largely developed due to some historical reasons in the 20th century, partly also an outcome of the West-driven narrative. India and China are not ancient enemies. The two shared a common spiritual destiny and trust was inbuilt.

In contrast, westerners coming from an individualistic ‘low-context culture’ amplified their need for going through the quanxi (personalised relationship) process — vital for negotiating trust with the Chinese. It is the complex art of managing cultural contradictions that can override even legally binding contracts.

The westerners find the Chinese indirect, subtle and implicit in their views and Chinese envoys are often viewed as wily. The Chinese find their western counterparts as aggressive and impersonal. Those who have learned to navigate the differences do a thriving business in China. For example, despite the recent rhetorical and tense ties, no major uptick is seen in US companies shifting their supply chains out of China.

In comparison, the Indian and Chinese attitudes towards each other differed markedly. They were culture-driven rather than transaction-or diplomatic-driven ties. Both valued the means more than seeking the end; finding the way, not the truth, was important to them. The Chinese still follow the non-legalistic means and notably use the phrase “mutual understanding and mutual respect.”

“Saving face” is important to both the Indians and Chinese; maybe more to the latter, as they seek informal openings to manage differences and avoid direct conflict. In the Indian context, protecting status becomes critical. For example, India’s grandiose reception to a visiting dignitary is not as much about whether it can push through a deal but to convey the message of the return that the prospective investor can get in ‘soft power’ terms — an alibi not just in terms of investment, but also to fulfilling India’s demand for joint production.

The westerners resort to applying assertion in the backdrop of their diplomacy against the Chinese statecraft that revolves around three cardinal principles: seek a hierarchical relationship as defined by the Confucian ethical codes, look for a middle ground based on the Taoist notion, and build a harmonious relationship based on the Buddhist equanimity concept.

Foreigners not fully aware of the Indian thinking can also get flustered. For instance, when affronted by the US on the Indian human right issues or over India’s recent decision to buy discounted crude oil from Russia, the blunt Indian responses — “we don’t seek an approval from self-appointed custodians of the world” and “don’t politicise India’s legitimate energy transaction especially by those themselves importing from Russia” — were sufficient for flattening out the western morality.

The grandeur of India’s “independent foreign policy” is on full display. The world is still aghast at how India employs its most powerful unallied wisdom of striving for mutuality and realises goal interdependence on the spectre of the unfolding global geopolitics. In fact, we are currently witnessing probably something spectacular in Indian diplomacy that has emerged in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and Quad, and even being praised by our adversaries Pakistan and China.

In fact, despite all the hype created over India aligning with the high-pitched US ideological agenda of Quad, India seems brilliantly succeeding in preventing it from taking a militaristic shape so as not to repeat the Cold War spectre. When China and Russia are challenging the already fractured world order of the West, India’s approach to setting unity with all things is bound to surprise China, Russia and the rest of the world.

It isn’t that India and China share no congruencies, but they prefer not to build concurrences. The key issue is about the perception gap. If the Indians find the Chinese to be ‘unreliable’ and ‘deceitful’, the Chinese perceive the Indians as ‘inflexible’. For instance, during the 13th round of the India-China military talks, Chinese interlocutors termed India’s “constructive suggestions” as “unreasonable and unrealistic” that led to a stalemate in the Ladakh standoff.

China then opts for the haggling approach — a quid pro quo settlement for both sides holding equally valid positions (mutual gains), which it describes as a ‘win-win’ outcome. But the Indian experience is that signing a pact holds no sanctity to China unless the trust is built — often on its term.

Interestingly, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his farewell meeting with Indian envoy Vikram Misri, had raised both the perception and trust factors, as he also put forward the “three dos and three don’ts” for China-India relations: need to understand and not misjudge each other; need to take a long-term view and not be disturbed by one moment; build each other up and don’t wear each other out. He said, “With mutual trust, even the Himalayas cannot stop us from friendly exchanges. Otherwise, it is difficult even if there are no mountains in the way.”

But, the Indian experience shows that building trust with China is a euphemism for submission, à la Pakistan kowtowing to Beijing. Developing quanxi, therefore, carries little meaning when the Chinese wouldn’t walk the talk.

It isn’t that India and China never tried to reset their terms of engagement. But matching the two different aspirations has been found challenging. So far, attempts at harmonising them may have faltered over differing perceptions and political signals about each other’s geopolitical concerns.

This has rather drawn out meaninglessly for too long, which has led them to fall into the sticky trap that they are now unable to extricate themselves from — neither side is able to compromise with the other.

Clearly, both the countries are experiencing extreme anxiety in their relationships. It is time to discuss the underlying causes of the long-festering perceptual differences and lack of object constancy in their ties. Trust-building, in any case, is sequential that one need not nurture it. China needs to restore peace along the LAC before the ties can be improved.