The raw truth about the procurement of small arms

India’s small arms procurement process has increasingly become a subject of misinformation and speculation, particularly on social media. Every step — from the grant of Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) and Final Evaluation Trials (FET) to the final contract — becomes an occasion for debate, often driven by conflicting agendas rather than a clear understanding of operational realities.

The result is a distorted narrative that ignores the complexities of military readiness and the strategic calculus behind India's decisions.

Small arms procurement is not merely about buying new rifles; it is about ensuring that soldiers are equipped with the most effective weapons suited for combat. It is a balancing act between meeting immediate operational needs, integrating indigenous industry and maintaining logistical efficiency.

The reality is far removed from the simplistic claims that procurement choices are dictated by lobbying or bureaucratic inefficiency.

The selection of the SIG Sauer 716 and AK-203 rifles follows a deliberate strategy tailored to the Army's operational needs. The SIG Sauer 716, a 7.62x51-mm battle rifle, has been inducted specifically for frontline infantry and mechanised units, providing enhanced lethality and longer-range effectiveness.

Conversely, the AK-203, a 7.62x39-mm assault rifle, is intended for broader deployment across the forces, replacing the ageing INSAS rifles with a rugged, reliable platform. This strategy for small arms procurement was driven by the vision of the late General Bipin Rawat, former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It marks a game-changing step in making our soldiers future-ready.

General Rawat was committed to ensuring that infantry soldiers were equipped with the best weapons and systems in the world. During one of his visits to the Army War College, where I was the Commandant, he conveyed his belief that the modernisation of infantry was critical to battlefield success.

The battles of Bakhmut and Avdiivka in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war have underscored the necessity of empowering infantry soldiers with the latest and most advanced weaponry. Future conflicts will demand nothing less.

The argument that these acquisitions complicate ammunition logistics is misleading; their phased induction ensures streamlined supply chains without overwhelming the existing systems.

The decision to procure the SIG Sauer 716 in two tranches — 72,400 rifles in 2019 and 73,000 in 2025 — was guided by urgency. These weapons were acquired under the "Buy (Global)" category to immediately enhance the firepower of frontline troops even as the indigenous small arms manufacturing ecosystem continued to evolve.

The AK-203, on the other hand, is a product of a long-term vision for self-reliance, developed through a joint venture with Russia. The project aims to manufacture 6.71 lakh rifles domestically over a decade — a significant step towards reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. The first batch of 35,000 rifles was delivered in 2024, marking progress in this transition.

Critics question why the Army has opted for a dual-weapon system instead of a single standard rifle. The answer lies in the distinct operational needs of different units. The SIG Sauer 716 offers greater accuracy and stopping power for specialised combat roles, while the AK-203's reliability and ease of use make it ideal for widespread issue.

The notion that this creates logistical chaos disregards the Army's structured approach to managing ammunition supply chains. The military already operates a variety of small arms and introducing weapons with complementary roles does not disrupt logistics; it enhances combat

effectiveness.

Misinformation also surrounds the larger debate over "Buy Indian" versus "Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured" (IDDM) procurement. The SIG Sauer acquisition was necessitated by immediate battlefield requirements while the AK-203 represents a strategic push for indigenous production under the IDDM category, which mandates at least 60 per cent domestic content.

However, the reality is that indigenous small arms production remains a work in progress. The AK-203 project, despite its merits, faced delays due to cost negotiations and technology transfer issues. These challenges highlight why a pragmatic mix of imports and domestic manufacturing is essential rather than focus on one over the other.

Another myth is that the small arms procurement process is riddled with unnecessary delays. While it is true that defence acquisitions have historically suffered from bureaucratic inertia, it is also a fact that stringent field trials are necessary to ensure that weapons perform reliably across diverse combat environments.

In recent years, only a fraction of the planned procurements has been completed within the stipulated timeframes, often due to protracted evaluation phases. This caution is justified; rushing untested weapons into service can lead to operational failures, as experience has demonstrated. The Army's rigorous testing protocols exist to prevent precisely such shortcomings.

India's long-term small arms roadmap is clear: a systematic phasing out of outdated inventory, steady modernisation and development of a strong domestic manufacturing base. But modernisation cannot come at the cost of battlefield readiness.

The push for self-reliance must be balanced with the imperative of ensuring that soldiers are not left waiting for weapons while domestic production catches up.

Successful indigenous defence projects in other domains — such as artillery and missile systems — demonstrate that self-sufficiency can be achieved without compromising operational effectiveness. The same principles must guide small arms procurement.

Public debates around military procurement often overlook the fundamental reality that a soldier's rifle is more than just a weapon — it is a lifeline in combat. The Army's approach to small arms procurement ensures that this lifeline is reliable and effective, now and in the future.

It is time to move beyond the noise and recognise that equipping the military is not a matter of popular discourse but of strategic necessity.

Views are personal

(Author is Director General, Centre for Land Warfare Studies)