The Sir Creek story of a chance missed

THE India-Pakistan boundary dispute over Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch has flared up again. Pakistan is building fortifications on its western bank, presaging a more aggressive posture. India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh issued a stern warning last week, saying that any Pakistani misadventure in the Sir Creek area would invite a severe Indian response that “could change both history and geography.” That sounds ominous, but it is in line with the ongoing escalatory narrative on both sides.

This dispute had come very close to resolution in the India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue during 2005-07 when relations between the neighbours was perhaps in their most hopeful and constructive phase. That phase is being recalled to make the point that diplomacy is worth keeping in play even when dark clouds are hovering over us.

During my tenure as India’s Foreign Secretary (2004-06), India-Pakistan negotiations were focused on two issues on which both sides had agreed that an “early harvest” was possible. One was Siachen and the other was Sir Creek. The latter was considered relatively easier to resolve.

The Sir Creek dispute had originally erupted between Kutch and Sindh in 1908 over what was then known as ‘Ban Ganga’. In 1914, the British colonial government in Bombay, which had jurisdiction over Gujarat and Sindh, issued a resolution that had contradictory provisions with respect to the alignment of the boundary along the creek. In paragraph 9, it located the alignment along the eastern bank of the creek favouring Sindh. In the very next paragraph, it accepted the mid-channel of the creek as the boundary on the grounds that the creek is navigable most of the year. Pakistan obviously takes the earlier paragraph as being operative. India insists on observing the Thalweg principle in defining the alignment along the mid-stream channel. The Indian case is strengthened by the fact that in 1925, boundary pillars were installed midstream, several of which still exist.

Why is the alignment so important? Most of the Sir Creek area is salt-laden marshland with little habitation. The resolution of the land boundary is critical because the agreed-upon land terminus point will serve as the baseline from which the maritime boundary in the Arabian Sea will be drawn. A change of only a few kilometres at the mouth of the creek would shift the maritime boundary line, potentially affecting thousands of square kilometres of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf under the jurisdiction of each country. The EEZ is believed to contain significant oil and gas reserves and rich fishing grounds. The country that gains the most seaward area would acquire greater rights over these vital resources.

A compromise proposal was discussed during the 2005-07 phase of the Composite Dialogue, which involved technical discussions between the naval hydrographers and surveyors of the two countries. The hydrographers used scientific mapping to narrow the dispute over the undefined maritime area at the mouth of the creek to a more limited triangular zone. This zone was created by drawing lines from a mutually agreed point in the ocean to the coastline according to each country’s proposed land alignment. A possible compromise involved a land-for-sea swap. If India accepted the Pakistani alignment — the eastern bank boundary of the creek — it would be compensated with a larger share, reportedly 60 per cent, of the residual undefined triangular maritime zone. If the Indian alignment was accepted in the creek, Pakistan would be compensated with a bigger share (reportedly 60 per cent of the zone). The principle was accepted by both sides, though it was left to the political leadership of the two countries to decide the actual terms of the compromise.

This was an innovative approach aimed at an overall balance, based on give-and-take for which the credit must go to the naval hydrographers of India and Pakistan. They began with a joint survey of the Sir Creek area from November 2006 to March 2007. This resulted in a “Common Map”, which was important for creating an agreed baseline enabling a follow-through on the compromise. The Pakistani side was looking for a “package solution” covering both Siachen and Sir Creek. When the Siachen deal fell through, Pakistani interest in the Sir Creek agreement also evaporated.

This episode demonstrates that the two adversarial states have the capacity to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions to some of the difficult outstanding issues — if they have the political will.

The current state of India-Pakistan relations does not favour any diplomatic engagement that could even begin to address these issues. The absence of engagement and the deteriorating state of bilateral ties have led to these issues becoming even more complex and intractable than they already were. The Indian decision to keep the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance is an example.

We should acknowledge that after Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has broken out of its extended diplomatic isolation and this has put new pressure on India. What may be tactical moves on the part of the US under President Trump may over time result in a changed strategic landscape for India. One should not take comfort from the prevailing calculation that China’s “iron brotherhood” with Pakistan would put a real limit on US dalliance with Pakistan and prevent a return to India-Pakistan hyphenation in its foreign policy.

From 1960 to the end of the 20th century, both the US and China had maintained a strategic partnership with Pakistan through phases when US-China relations were deeply confrontational and when they were united in a common alliance against the Soviet Union. Even during the Cultural Revolution in China, the Americans never objected to Chinese material and military support to Pakistan, and Beijing never criticised similar American support to Islamabad.

Convergent interests in a local theatre may coexist within a larger strategic confrontation. This has not happened yet, but we should be alert to that possibility. In that context, a cautious re-engagement with Pakistan may provide India with much-needed, even if modest, room for manoeuvre.

Shyam Saran is former Foreign Secretary.