Tighten the noose around Pakistan

INDIA is angry. The cold-blooded and communal killing of 26 innocent civilians in Pahalgam on April 22 led to the demand and expectation of retribution. Pakistan did not have to wait long for the kinetic action that it was sure would come. And it came in the wee hours of May 7 when nine terror facilities were targeted in precision attacks. These included the headquarters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) at Bahawalpur and of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) at Muridke.

For India, the road ahead was clear. It had served notice on Pakistan after Uri in 2016 and Pulwama in 2019 that it would not accept terror in inter-state relations and there would be costs to pay. Pakistan seemed to have forgotten those lessons and resorted to a terror strike in Pahalgam. Hence, India now has to impose more severe costs on Pakistan for indulging in cross-border terrorism. The pain would have to be long-term and decisive. PM Narendra Modi has articulated this when he stated that the consequences would be unimaginable.

Earlier, India’s non-kinetic retribution was swift, changing the rules of engagement. Within a day, several measures were taken, of which the key one was holding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance. Since Pakistan is totally dependent on the Indus and its tributaries for its irrigation needs, this measure sent severe shockwaves in that country. Simply put, Pakistan’s water system is already on the verge of collapse and the country is staring at water scarcity. Further disruption of water supply would not only exacerbate the existing scarcity but have a cascading effect on crop yields and food security. There would thus be long-term consequences for Pakistan’s agriculture.

Trying to keep pace with India, Pakistan announced the suspension of bilateral accords, including the Simla Agreement, and also banned trade and use of its airspace with India, apart from reciprocating diplomatic measures announced by India. It also threatened that disruption of the IWT would be considered as an “act of war” and “responded with full force across the complete spectrum of national power.”

The Pakistan narrative, as developed since April 22, has the following elements:

(i) Pakistan has nothing to do with the Pahalgam incident.

(ii) Indian allegations against Pakistan are without an iota of evidence.

(iii) Pakistan demands an independent and transparent probe by neutral investigators.

(iv) India is diverting attention from its inability to suppress the inalienable right of Kashmiris to self-determination, its security failures as well as its decades-long state terrorism and oppression.

(v) India is seeking to suppress Kashmiris and defy UNSC resolutions on the issue.

(vi) India needs to explain why such incidents usually coincide with high-profile visits.

(vii) Holding the IWT in abeyance is unilateral and illegal.

(viii) There are strong indications that India plans to launch military strikes on multiple targets despite the absence of any evidence of Pakistan being linked to the latest terrorist attack.

(ix) After the attacks, Pakistan has claimed that all the targets were mosques, trying to give a communal colour to the strikes against terror facilities.

The above narrative has been peppered with the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by political leaders and officials.

The most interesting part of Pakistan’s narrative was the assertion of Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar that as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Islamabad pushed to water down the language in the US-proposed statement, which originally named and shamed The Resistance Front, a proxy of proscribed terror group LeT. Deliberately calling it a ‘Forum’ formed by the local population, Pakistan rejected its classification as a terror group. If the ‘Forum’ (actually Front) was merely an Indian outfit, having no connection with the Pak-based LeT, why would Pakistan go out of the way to have the reference blocked?

Meanwhile, Pakistan is preparing international legal action over India holding the IWT in abeyance. It is working on at least three legal options that include raising the issue at the World Bank; taking action at the Permanent Court of Arbitration; or at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. A fourth diplomatic option is to raise the issue at the UNSC.

Though Pakistan sought to create the impression that the attack was due to an indigenous uprising, the targeting of Hindu tourists showed that it was a religiously motivated act of terror. The attack showed Pakistan’s frustration since it sought to degrade the growing tourism sector that directly impacted the livelihoods of Kashmiris. It also sought to dent the Indian narrative of normalcy since the abrogation of Article 370. Finally, the timing of the attack was significant since it coincided with the high-profile visit of US Vice-President JD Vance to India and PM Modi’s trip to Saudi Arabia.

After the Pahalgam attack, there have been confessions from Pak ministers that clearly implicate Pakistan in the terror architecture it has created over the past few decades. Thus, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, replying to a question during an interview with Sky News on April 25, said, “We have been doing this dirty work [backing and funding terror groups] for the United States for about three decades... and the West, including Britain....” Then, former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto, in a conversation with Sky News on May 1, acknowledged the country’s link with terror operatives, saying that Pakistan has a past.

A related development has been the sudden appointment of Lt Gen Muhammad Asim Malik as Pakistan’s National Security Adviser (NSA), marking the first time a serving ISI chief holds both posts simultaneously. The post of NSA in Pakistan had been vacant since April 2022 when the civilian incumbent, Moeed Yusuf, vacated it following the ouster of Imran Khan as PM in a no-confidence motion. The dual appointment does signal a strengthening of power of the Pakistan Army, relegating civilians to the sidelines when there are heightened India-Pakistan tensions. The NSA, who holds the status of a federal minister, also heads the National Security Division, based in the Pak PMO.

This move is clearly an attempt by Pakistan Army Chief Gen Asim Munir to take charge of backchannel talks with India. It should suit India since the interlocutor on the Pak side would represent the real power-brokers, something that would be critical in times of crisis.

With India having taken out terror camps, it remains to be seen how Pakistan will react. Its options are limited since there are no terror camps in India. So what would Pakistan target?

Views are personal

Tilak Devasher is former Member, National Security Advisory Board.