Time to engage, not get entangled, with Af

When the Najibullah government collapsed in April 1992, it appeared that India would find no friends left in Afghanistan. The impression was that New Delhi had burnt its finger by supporting the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. But it didn’t take long before India bounced back as the first Afghan jihadi government (Mujahideen) within months reached out to New Delhi.

In a replay of 1992, Mullah Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai now came to the Indian embassy in Doha, hours after the last US military aircraft left Kabul. This marked the first official contact that may be causing nightmares in Islamabad. Clearly, diplomacy has once again prevailed in moderating India’s statecraft.

In May 1992, soon after Burhanuddin Rabbani informed an Indian TV team that Kabul will strengthen ties with India, the first interim President of Afghanistan, Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, expressed his desire to visit India, ostensibly to pay homage to his ancestors buried in Sirhind, Punjab. Mujaddedi was the head of Afghanistan’s mystical Naqshbandi Sufi order and a descendant of Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind (1624) or Mujaddid Alf-e-Sani, who led the Naqshbandi movement in India during Jehangir’s rule. Sirhindi’s family shifted to Afghanistan in the 18th century at the behest of Ahmad Shah Abdali. The Sirhindis still have a strong support base among the Pakhtuns of Paktia, Logar and Ghazni.

Mujaddedi’s visit marked the sign of an unavoidable yearning among the Afghan jihadis for the need to revive their lost contacts with New Delhi.

Kabul’s rift with Islamabad began after the ISI’s duplicitous Afghan game soon got exposed. It started when Rabbani took over the presidential post from Mujaddedi on June 30, 1992. The ISI chief, Hamid Gul, resisted the idea of the Jamiat-i-Islami chief heading the Islamic state of Afghanistan. He was adamant on installing Hizb-i-Islami head Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who among other things, promised to confederate Afghanistan with Pakistan by doing away with the Durand Line. He was also committed to ending Afghanistan’s ties with India, especially to ensuring India’s non-entry into any of the peace diplomacies.

The ISI supported Hekmatyar to oust Rabbani militarily, but the latter was able to hold on to power with the military support of Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Masood.

The ISI’s dubious plans set alarm bells ringing among Mujahideen leaders and when Benazir Bhutto, after returning to power in 1993, decided to revamp the Afghan policy by abandoning the Mujahideen networks in favour of creating a fresh militia — the Taliban. By 1994, Mujahideen leaders, including Hekmatyar, distanced themselves from Islamabad. Hekmatyar patched up with Rabbani and became PM under a power-sharing arrangement in 1996. The then Prime Minister Deve Gowda was quick to send his congratulatory message to Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar too responded by accepting India’s invitation to be at its Independence Day reception in 1996.

In the current play of events, the ISI appeared to have helped the US a trouble-free evacuation from Kabul, but not without disabling the aviation equipment before leaving. We don’t know what the quid pro quo for Pakistan was. The Taliban would likely feel cheated by Pakistan and this would have serious consequences for the Taliban’s future ties with Pakistan.

Stanikzai’s call for normalising ties with India needs to be viewed in this context. The game has just begun.

We need to be aware that the basic points that infuse flexibility in India’s approach and ability to adjust quickly with the changing situation in Afghanistan are driven by the following:

First, the historical ties and nostalgic analogues between India and Afghanistan, whether the Sufis, Wahabis, Deobandis, or the secular, crave for their roots and their ancestry in India couldn’t be wished away.

Second, India’s upholding of Afghanistan’s territorial integrity is considered vital for Afghans, and vice-versa, any prospect of a part of Afghanistan falling into Pakistan’s control undermines the Indian state.

Third, India’s policy of not taking sides in the internal Afghan conflict helped it. Notwithstanding functional ties with the Communist regime, New Delhi maintained discreet contacts with major Mujahideen factions. No Mujahideen leader, including Rabbani, Sibghatullah, Hekmatyar, Abdul Sayaf, Ahmad Shah Masood and Dostum, was a stranger to India. The Soviet withdrawal, in fact, helped India broaden its political manoeuvring space in Afghanistan.

Fourth, India’s policy thrust of supporting progressive change and spurring modernity among the Afghan people worked in its favour in contrast with the regressive agenda pursued by Pakistan

Fifth, India’s low-key presence, while providing economic and humanitarian assistance, for example, supplying medicines during the crisis period (1973-1992), worked to its advantage. Even till the Taliban took over Kabul, Indian doctors fitted 1,100 artificial legs within a month in 1996. It paid diplomatic dividends for New Delhi.

Sixth, the decision to maintain its diplomatic mission in Kabul despite all odds worked in its favour. India was the only country, besides Iran, Turkey and Indonesia, to have a mission there when the Taliban took over Kabul.

The underlying core point that invariably shapes India’s position is less by its own efforts and more by default of the Pak-Afghan contradictions.

Pakistani intrusive approach always threatened Afghan room for manoeuvre. Pakistan’s India-centric policy obstructed Kabul’s desire to diversify its foreign relations. As a result, Kabul viewed New Delhi as an immediate window and gateway to reach to the world outside. Mujahideen even sought India’s help for training pilots of Afghan National Airlines, Ariana, which served as the lifeline for Afghanistan.

In the process of constraining Indian influence, Pakistan often landed up generating more suspicion among the non-Pashtun Afghans. In 1992-93, as the situation evolved, India once reopened its mission in Kabul. Narasimha Rao’s meeting with Rabbani at the Jakarta Non-Aligned Summit in 1992 and the latter’s stopover in New Delhi, on his way back home, altered the situation. The Afghans loath being run by a puppet master, and detest Pakistanis.

We need to be aware that Afghan irredentist claim in Pakistan’s Pashtun areas versus Pakistan’s revanchist ambitions in Afghanistan will continue to create mutual animosity. Whether it was Mujaddedi, Rabbani, Karzai or Ghazni in the past or Mullah Baradar tomorrow, they will never compromise on the Durand Line.

Thus, Kabul can’t help but look towards Delhi for political legitimacy, and for protection against Pakistani threats. The fear of the Afghan Taliban escaping from the Pakistani cage would be causing nightmares in Rawalpindi. As New Delhi gets closer to Taliban, the ISI will start spreading disinformation and mischievous propaganda. In the past, Rabbani and Masood were accused of taking help of an Indian pilot to kill Hekmatyar. India, therefore, needs to stop viewing Afghanistan from the Pakistani prism and instead evolve a multi-dimensional policy approach.