Trump’s double play

Ex-Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat

Jon MEACHAM, former Newsweek editor, gives interesting examples of the contrariness of relationship between heads of state who might be considered as close friends. His bestseller, Franklin and Winston (2004), gives a fascinating account of the personal bonds between Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, called ‘Inseparable partners’ of World War II, who spent 113 days together in ships and on land during 1939-1945. Yet, this did not always extend to their foreign diplomacy.

In 1943, Roosevelt did not want Churchill to be with him when he was planning to meet Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. He sent his secret envoy to Stalin on May 6 without informing Churchill, who was arriving at the White House on May 11, 1943. Roosevelt repeated this in October 1944 by cautioning Stalin that Churchill, who was visiting Moscow, was not authorised to speak on his behalf. Interestingly, Churchill and President Harry Truman, who were not called ‘friends’, got on well to face the Soviet Union and the Cold War.

These two incidents are of special relevance to those examining President Trump’s remarks on Pakistan that countries, even known as ‘abiding’ or ‘natural’ partners, need not agree on the trajectory of their diplomacy. Trump called Modi a ‘true friend’ at the Motera function on February 24 and shared India’s concerns on radical Islamic terrorism. However, he surprised all by deliberately adding that the US had very good relationship with Pakistan. The first take on the Motera show in foreign media was what NBC had beamed, ‘Trump praises Pakistan while announcing $ 3 B Indian arms deal’. Trump repeated this on the 25th during the ‘joint statement’ function at Hyderabad House, and later during a press conference at the Maurya. He referred to terrorism originating from Pakistan and said his government was talking to PM Imran Khan with whom he had ‘good relations’.

Behind this was the Taliban factor which was Trump’s priority for long, especially as he is facing the November elections. It is not that Trump had not made this clear to us. In 2017, he said while announcing his South Asia Strategy: ‘India makes billions of dollars in trade in the United States, and we want them to help us more with Afghanistan.’ This was a marked shift from his predecessors’ policy of not involving India in Afghanistan for fear of offending Pakistan.

In January 2019, he expressed his disappointment with India and others for not doing enough in Afghanistan. In fact, he mocked PM Modi for building a ‘library’ which was like ‘5 hours that we spend in Afghanistan’. India hit back on January 4, saying that India was ‘building lives’ in Afghanistan. Trump repeated this complaint in August 2019 that for 18 years, the US was left to deal with terrorists 4,000 miles away while countries like India or Pakistan were ‘not doing enough’. We must have conveyed our own reasons for not putting our ‘boots on ground’ which did not serve our national interest.

But Pakistan took up the challenge by using its ‘assets’ who were, till recently, criticised for ‘cross-border terrorism’ by the US and India. This was similar to its record of coming to serve critical American foreign policy interests earlier. In 1970, President Yahya Khan met Chinese PM Zhou Enlai to facilitate Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in 1971 for President Nixon who wanted to normalise relations. In 1978, President Zia-ul-Haq helped the US and allies to wage the Afghan War (1979-1989), suffering in that process various hardships, including accommodating three million refugees.

Thus on February 22, Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi claimed that Pakistan was successful in ‘constructing a road map’ for the Taliban peace deal. He said they started working seriously after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit last year when he told them that ‘the pathway to fixing relations between Pakistan and US came through Kabul’. He wanted to remind the US that they had ‘played our role in ensuring that the negotiations were successful’. Thus, Pakistan was able to convince the Trump administration that they held the ‘trump’ card on peace compared to US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad who was struggling since 2018.

It was Pakistan’s masterstroke that the result of its efforts were beamed directly to the American people by way of an op-ed in New York Times, ‘What we, the Taliban, want’ on February 20, three days before President Trump arrived in India. The article was written, of all persons, by Sirajuddin Haqqani, deputy leader of the Taliban, who carried a $10 million reward for capture. Two of his brothers were killed in drone attacks. The blurb said— I am convinced that the killing and the maiming must stop, the deputy leader of the Taliban writes.

An incredulous Dawn added that this was the first time Sirajuddin had ever communicated in English as he was noticed using only Pashto, and that too through audio messages. Sirajuddin also added — to convince the Americans — that the Taliban was sensitive about women’s rights. It was in 1997 that US Secretary of State Madeline Albright had reversed the US policy of dealing with Taliban on account of their ‘despicable’ treatment of women.

Trump was visiting India at a time when this fragile accord to stop violence in Afghanistan was being finalised with Pakistan’s help. He was certainly not expected to create problems for that process by openly agreeing with the Modi government’s assessment that all India’s problems in Kashmir and country-wide CAA protests were engineered by Pakistan.

For Trump, the India visit was a double accomplishment which will be helpful for the November 2020 elections: A dazzling public assembly at Motera, which will have a direct impact on Indian Americans, and his success in ensuring that the Indian bonhomie did not affect Pakistan’s attitude towards the Taliban accord. For India, the mayhem in New Delhi during the visit was a loss of face.