Ukraine war marked by atypical aerial battle

Group Captain Murli Menon (Retd)

Defence analyst

The ongoing war in eastern Europe has seen atypical air force operations, especially by Russia. The intensity of air attacks has been rather subdued, considering the overwhelming air inventory of the Russians. It is reported that the Russians have fired a record number of air-to-ground missiles, post World War II — nearly 2,154 against Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have been pitching for fighter aircraft assets and air defence weapons from their NATO well-wishers, though very few Russian- origin aircraft have been forthcoming from the inventories of Poland, Moldova etc, perhaps on account of fear of angering the Russians, or simply due to non-availability of platforms such as MiG-29s, SU-27s and Su-24/25 on which Ukrainian pilots are trained.

Now, as the conflict rages on, it is highly probable that NATO considers providing western fighter planes of the likes of F-16s to make Ukraine’s air war-waging capability more viable. The Ukrainians see the threat from Russian cruise and other missiles to be more worrisome in the present phase of the war. Most of their Russian inventory comprising SU-27s, MiG-29s, SU-24/25s has been either shot down or neutralised for want of spares by now. The efficacy of Turkish Bayraktar class of drones has been drastically negated, thanks to smarter air defence deployment by the Russians. The limitations of drone operations have been driven home.

Interestingly, the Ukrainian air force has stopped putting much stock in the drone option, though the American “Switchblade” drones are said to have been effective against targets in the tactical battle area. In some revealing interviews given to the western media, some Ukrainian fighter pilots have been pitching for advanced fighter platforms to counter the Russian cruise missile threat, clearly the most dangerous air threat for them.

The Russian X-22 missiles of the 1960/70s are supersonic and Ukraine has no counter to these. As such, the radar cross-section of an aerial missile is so little that you need sensors capable of shooting them down. That is the reason why Ukrainian fighter pilots yearn to have western fighters of the F-16 class, whose advanced air interception radars can pick up cruise missiles and neutralise them with their advanced air-to-air missiles.

But any acquisition of western fighter technology by the Ukrainians would call for several weeks of training by their pilots. Indeed, even advanced air defence systems such as the Javelin anti-tank missiles, M777 howitzers and HIMARS/Harpoon rockets, known to have been supplied by the Americans since February this year and worth nearly $6 billion, call for specialised training to operate as Russian air defence systems are generally vastly inferior, other than those of the generation of S-300/400 class which are modern and have much higher kill probabilities. In a few cases where the Ukrainians managed to shoot down Russian cruise missiles, they are known to have employed the IRST (Infra Red Sensor Tracker), which calls for nearer ranges to have a lock on the target and depends on the strength of the infra red signature of the fighter or missile target. The Ukrainian fighter pilots are confident of getting hands-on training quickly enough on aircraft of the F-16 class and exploit them for their Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) campaign against the Russians.

Since the air war is happening all over the country, they need several air defence systems and fighters, they argue. The stand-off achieved by the American-supplied Stingers against the Russian Mi-24 Hind gunships in Afghanistan in the 1980s may be a motivator for the otherwise outmatched Ukrainian warriors to hold out longer against the air opposition known to be at least 15 times larger and more capable. In traditional air campaign planning, aspects such as throw-weight ratios and effective SEAD and counter-air wherewithal would have dictated outcomes. But the manner in which this war has progressed, it has been a case of one half-hearted punch followed by several days of recouping. The hesitation by Russia to attempt to gain air superiority is the reason why the much weaker opponents have held out this long. The Russian inability to orchestrate an effective and modern air campaign has no doubt helped the hit-and-run tactics by the Ukrainians.

Clearly, the initial tom-tomming by President Putin of threatening to employ nuclear weapons has petered out and we are likely to see a prolonged conventional war over the next few weeks till it ends. As for the end of active warfare, there is no predicting when that would happen. Either Ukraine would capitulate totally or Russia would deem that it had driven enough lessons home to the NATO bloc. The war’s impact on global economy has been massive and several countries are already collapsing economically, thanks to unmanageable inflation and possible stagflation. To sustain an aerial war, substantial monies would be required and even if the West bankrolls it, there is a limit to which Ukraine would be able to sustain the Russian onslaught.

Intangible war-winning factors such as military leadership and tactical superiority are unlikely to help the outmatched Ukrainians much. The vicious information war by both sides would make it even more difficult to discern who is actually winning or losing. Beyond a point, the Ukrainian morale would be affected so adversely that their fighter pilots would be unable to perform, even if they have platforms and weapons, because the law of probability would work against them, since sheer superiority in numbers would work for the Russians. And as long as the NATO is recalcitrant and fighting shy of provoking the Russians into a nuclear war, this conventional conflict, air war included, is bound to meander listlessly till the weaker side loses its will. 

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