UNSC should look beyond power of veto

Commentator and Author

The irony of world history is that Europe, the most developed of all continents in modern times, has also been the prime destroyer of world peace and prosperity through mindless violence, conquest and killing across all continents during the past 400 years. Thus, whereas “confidence from below and power from above”, along with unprecedented goodwill and support, transcending borders, helped Napoleon ascend throne and reach the dizzy heights of power and prestige through the November 1799 coup, it also resulted in his ignominious downfall when the same supporters (from home and abroad) jointly turned against the butchery of the French monarch.

Thus, after Napoleon’s 1815 Waterloo debacle, it was the Austrian Chancellor Prince Metternich’s system of collective security, which implied that the monarchs (of Europe) “must hang together if they were not to hang separately”. That led to the “Concert of Europe” or the “concerted” effort by all against an aggressor. Understandably, this post-Napoleon 19th-century system later developed into the post-First World War League of Nations and the post Second World War “selective security” initiative of the much-vaunted, but not much-valued, UN Security Council (UNSC), notwithstanding its exemplary enterprise in areas far from the West.

Initially though, the UNSC showed promise in the Korean War (1950s) in the aftermath of the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet its subsequent performance left the Third World disappointed owing to its being the primary success/failure or operations arm of the New York-headquartered guardian of “collective security”. Broadly speaking, the UNSC, till date, hasn’t got the desired result owing mainly to the preferred interests of the rich and powerful members of the West. And there’s nothing to indicate that the familiar trends could be any different from what’s been happening thus far since its foundation in 1945.

Indeed, UNSC actions reveal its multi-faceted fiasco: the biased choice of collective security arena and areas, and the selection of wrong or weak targets, actors and factors. Like its predecessors, the Concert of Europe in the 19th century and the League of Nations between the two World Wars, the UN today appears a familiar yet a forlorn force on file, with a missing set of canine teeth to bite, notwithstanding the fact that its charter still appears much more robust for collective right than anything of its predecessor, the League of Nations.

Take for example the Cold War. The members preferred to act in fringe area conflicts wherein the big power interest was absent, but never in serious crises where the interests of the superpowers were present. Thus, whereas Yugoslavia and Iraq stand out as classic examples where the West-led UN collectively decided to pounce upon owing to perceived threat to its “collective security”, it consistently played an insignificant role in Israel-occupied territories, Rwanda and Sudan; and was conspicuous by its absence in Chechnya, or during Pakistan’s Kargil invasion.

The list of action or inaction in the right proportion, in the right place and at the right time is too long for the comfort of the New York-based hallowed building overlooking the long line of skyscrapers adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean.

The reality is the lack of transparency and objectivity leading to the selection of the UNSC’s “to be or not to be” target dilemma and the consequential criticism. This certainly gives rise to challenging the legitimacy of the Council’s act in a given situation. To top it all, the four states with veto power of the Occident and the one from the Orient stand out as permanent stumbling blocks to fair and fearless resolution of disputes between the strong and the weak. One just has to note the frequency of use of veto power by the Club-5 of the UNSC to assess the different and differing motives of each one of them. So much so that the legitimacy thereof inevitably becomes suspect even if, and when, there’s little to suspect.

It stymies the UNSC permanently and there’s no way to come out of this morass as none of the Big-5 will ever relinquish veto power, thereby making a mockery of every UNSC session. Thus, post-1991 break-up of the Soviet Union, three broad trends have emerged. The principles of “just war”, “human rights” and “peacekeeping” force now have a new meaning in the busy work-station of the UNSC. “The so-called ‘just war’ tradition, which invokes a series of precautionary principles to help to determine the justifiability of use of force, gives prominent place to the notion of proper authority.” And that ‘proper authority’, as perceived, belongs to the UNSC.

The UNSC-authorised ‘proper authority’ led to collective punitive ops by the West against Yugoslavia over “human rights” violations. Afghanistan fell under the “just war” category because it appeared to be resorting to an “unjust war”, adversely affecting the West, with the biggest adversary being the US. Hence, it was under the UNSC authorisation that the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with combatants assembled from 42 countries, entered deep into landlocked Afghanistan, ostensibly to fight the war against terror from 2001 to 2014, with the US precariously hanging around till 2021 without accomplishing its avowed mission.

So, the best-of-the-worst situation left for the UNSC is to selectively deploy ‘peacekeeping forces’ as Third World countries gladly invest significant diplomatic capital and human resources in garnering the New York-based institution’s stamp of legitimacy for their uniformed men in places where angels fear to tread or tread with fear, thereby giving them a sense of pride, belongingness and a perceived place under the sun. The West has learnt the bitter way through the two World Wars that the prospect of physical conflict in hot terrain is no longer their cup of tea. Body contact or proximate war is better avoided.

Nevertheless, before February 24, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the UNSC still had some semblance of status and stature, being perceived as an effective instrument for both success and failure, depending on the vision of one’s loyalty to one’s flag. Yet, the UNSC appears to be past its prime as it no longer acts in matters befitting its charter. Indeed, owing to its partisan acts over the years and failure to resist the pressure of the West, post-Cold War era, it is slowly and surely going the way of the League of Nations. Its revival and restoration appear remote, until some extraordinary intervention revives its journey towards ensuring fair play, objectivity and bi-partisanship.

Thus, contextually though both the League of Nations and the UN were established with lofty ideas and alluring ideology, one can’t but feel that the complexities of multi-cultural tradition and philosophy will inevitably elude the “collective security” proponents owing to domination of the few and rejection of the overwhelming numbers’ views.