What stirred the pot
Ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1988, relations between Russia and some of its neighbouring European republics have been uneasy or strained. While Russia’s relations with the former Soviet Islamic republics, to its East, have remained cooperative, former Soviet European republics like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia joined NATO. They have since progressed economically, as newly elected members of the EU. Ukraine, which was an important industrial centre, retained close economic, linguistic and cultural ties with Russia. It was also strategically located, securing Russia’s access to the warm waters of the seas of Azov, Baltic and Mediterranean. Driven by suspicions of possible inimical takeovers of its exits to the sea, Russia seized control of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, while also securing control of the Russian-majority Donbas region. This accelerated the downslide in ties and the election of the dynamic, and some would say impetuous, Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s President didn’t help matters. He soon invited the wrath of the Russians with his rhetoric and proximity to the US.
The US was within its rights to expand military ties with Ukraine, but it was not wise to adopt a belligerent posture on Russia’s crucial access to the Black Sea.
Matters came to a head in 2021, when US Secretary of State Blinken and his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba signed a declaration in Washington, provoking a strong response from Moscow. The declaration called for ‘substantive measures, to prevent direct and hybrid aggression against Ukraine, and hold Russia responsible for such aggression’. It added that the US intended to cooperate with Ukraine in implementing defence industry reforms, and deepening cooperation in areas, such as Black Sea security. While the US was within its rights to expand military cooperation with Ukraine, it was not wise diplomatically to adopt a belligerent posture on an issue of grave concern to Russia, which involves its crucial access to the Black Sea. It should have been obvious that given its historical interest in securing access to the sea, Russia would spare no effort to ensure full and free access to these seas.
Russia is now in the process of taking control of maritime centres in Ukraine, like Luhansk and Donetsk, to get unhindered access to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Securing control of the Port of Odessa will, however, remain another, but more difficult, objective to achieve. Luhansk and Donetsk have majority Russian populations.
In the meantime, the US and Ukraine had jointly proclaimed that ‘the United States intends to support Ukraine’s efforts to counter armed aggression, economic and energy disruptions, and malicious cyber activity by Russia, including by maintaining sanctions against, or related to Russia, and applying other relevant measures, until restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders.’ The language of such threats will have to be replaced by serious dialogue between the two most militarily powerful countries, with the largest nuclear arsenals. There is, however, a growing feeling that after the fiasco that marked the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Biden administration wants to be seen domestically and internationally as being firm and tough in its dealings with Russia.
The US policies in Ukraine’s neighbourhood were spelt out explicitly in the 2021 joint statement, which also asserts that the US ‘intends to support Ukraine in its efforts to counter armed aggression, economic and energy and violations, and malicious cyber activity by Russia, including by maintaining sanctions against, or related to Russia, and by applying other relevant measures, until restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.’ Russia was declared a ‘potential aggressor’ and these aims were spelt out two-three months prior to the start of the current military hostilities. The Russians, however, erred by getting into a wide-ranging conflict with Ukraine, instead of concentrating on smaller areas of maritime strategic interest.
The provocative provisions of the statement were, however, the trigger. The close US-Ukraine ties also stirred concerns about Ukraine becoming yet another NATO-like partner of the US, with its ports being made available for use by the US military. Moscow has, therefore, confined its territorial ambitions to areas near its borders with Ukraine, like Donetsk and Luhansk. Given the presence of the US Fifth Fleet across the Black Sea, Russia has little choice but to keep control of its south-eastern borders with Ukraine. These are issues which can only be resolved constructively in a direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine.
In the meantime, the entire issue of India’s relations with Russia was raised by US assertions, notably by President Biden, that like other members of Quad, India should have fallen in line with US policy on Russia. The activities of Quad are confined to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India has made an active contribution to Quad’s moves to resist Chinese expansionism across its land and maritime boundaries, where Beijing has used, or threatened to use force against a number of countries, ranging from Japan and the Philippines to Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. India has worked in Quad, together with the US, Japan and Australia to deal with such challenges. India is, however, under no obligation to do likewise for differences the US has with Russia, in Ukraine or elsewhere. India firmly believes that such issues should be resolved peacefully, bilaterally or regionally, through direct negotiations between those involved.
