When America favoured Chinese communists

Successive US presidents had sincerely tried to stabilise China after the 1941 Pacific War till the end of 1946 by stationing special envoys. Perhaps, China wants to forget that era when even communist leaders had exhibited a deferential attitude towards the US. That was when Presidents Franklin D Roosevelt and Harry Truman had indicated that the US was prepared to assist China to rise from the position of ‘a helpless, hopeless and inert mass’, as derisively referred to by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1919.

On July 20, The New York Times said that deterioration of US-China “relations… has surpassed even the four tumultuous years of dealing with President Donald J. Trump.” However, Qin Gang, the newly appointed Chinese ambassador to America, sounded positive on July 29, recalling how this relationship had started 50 years ago after Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing. He added that both countries were now “entering a new round of mutual exploration, understanding and adaptation.”

Had Ambassador Qin Gang been more retrospective, he would have found that successive US presidents had sincerely tried to stabilise China after the 1941 Pacific War till the end of 1946 by stationing special envoys. Perhaps, China wants to forget that era when even communist leaders had exhibited a deferential attitude towards the US.

That was when Presidents Franklin D Roosevelt and Harry Truman had indicated that the US was prepared to assist China to rise from the position of “a helpless, hopeless and inert mass”, as derisively referred to by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during the 1919 post-World War I Conference in Paris.

In fact, during this period, the US deliberately, or unwittingly, gave the impression that the relationship with the communists (Chinese Communist Party or CCP) was more important than with the Nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT).

This policy was not merely to check imperial Japan’s expansionist activities. It continued even after Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945.

The story starts on December 7, 1941, when the Allied powers, at their Arcadia Conference, chose Chiang Kai-shek as the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the China Theatre. Roosevelt felt that Chiang would not be effective unless China’s internal situation was stabilised with the CCP’s help. For that, he stationed Gen Joe Stilwell as his personal envoy and Chiang’s Chief of Staff in 1942.

Barbara W Tuchman’s biography of Stilwell memorably describes that period. It started off well, but ran into difficulties after Stilwell’s failures in Burma. More so, when Stilwell proposed using the CCP’s militia to reconquer Burma, a suggestion approved by Roosevelt, but vetoed by Chiang as both the KMT and CCP were vying with each other to occupy guerrilla bases in the Chinese mainland during 1937-40. Stilwell ended his mission in 1945.

On a parallel track, Roosevelt stationed Gen Patrick J Hurley as ambassador from 1944 to press Chiang to forge a coalition with the CCP. Hurley managed to draw up a ‘Five-Point’ plan between the CCP and KMT to have one army to fight the Japanese. After getting Chiang’s approval in principle, he flew to Yenan to meet Mao Tse-tung on November 7, 1944. His ‘Five Point’ underwent changes at Yenan, which was rejected by Chiang’s Central Government at Chunking. Instead, a three-point plan was suggested by Chiang, which was rejected by the communists.

Hurley would not give up. He made another visit to Yenan in August 1945 and convinced Mao to accompany him to Chunking to have personal discussions with Chiang.

Taiwanese scholar Wei Liang Tsai, who had recorded these events, says that Mao stayed in Chunking for a month and a half. A 12-Point agreement between them was arrived at on October 11 and Mao returned to Yenan. This was hailed as a landmark agreement, which subsequently failed while they were establishing local governments in the ‘Liberated Areas’.

In April 1945, President Harry S Truman became the US President. He continued Roosevelt’s policy of stabilising China even after the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945.

Hurley, who went home in September 1945 for consultations, felt that he was betrayed by the State Department and by Gen Douglas MacArthur’s advisers in Japan who did not want his mission to succeed.

Military conflicts started between the CCP and KMT. American press described his mission as a failure. Hurley resigned in November after openly criticising the State Department bureaucracy. Truman wanted Chiang to incorporate the CCP and ‘Democratic League’ in his Nationalist Government. He then sent Gen George C Marshall, the symbol of US victory in the Second World War, as his envoy. Truman said in his policy statement that the US wanted the Chinese National Government to “rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy and establish a military organisation capable of discharging China’s national and international responsibilities.”

Marshall arrived in Shanghai on December 20, 1945. His first appointment, on reaching Chunking, the temporary capital of the National government, was with CCP leader Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai). He met Zhou and his team before he met Chiang, then Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China. Zhou was unrestrained in his public praise of America — China should learn three things from America: spirit of independence, democratic form, and agricultural and industrial reforms. A three-member committee was constituted for unification under Marshall’s Chairmanship, along with Zhou and Chang Chun (Zhang Qun), Chiang’s confidante.

Chiang’s ‘cessation of hostilities’ announcement on January 10, 1946, also granting fundamental rights, multi-party system and elections, was hailed as the first step towards a democratic China. An MoU on the merger of the Communist Army with the National Army was signed on February 25 by a committee consisting of Zhou and General Chang Chih-chung (Zhang Zhizong) of the National Army, with Marshall as adviser.

Three days after the signing, Marshall, accompanied by Zhou and General Zhang, toured Northern China, especially the communist strongholds. They met Mao and Chu Teh (Zhu De). Marshall was hailed as the ‘Saviour of China’ wherever he went.

On that ebullient note, Marshall left for America for five weeks on March 12. That was the undoing of all the hard work he did. Wei Liang Tsai says that even Mao advised him not to leave China at that juncture. The Soviet Union vacated Manchuria in April and encouraged the communists to fill the vacuum. Malinovsky, under Stalin’s orders, gave all weapons captured from the Japanese to the CCP army. Clashes broke out between the communists and Nationalist Army in Manchuria, which spread all over China for the next three years till October 1, 1949, when Mao ousted Chiang to Taiwan.

Would the history have been different had Marshall not left China for five weeks between March 12 and April 17, 1946?

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