Why the army will keep dictating terms in Pakistan

Luv Puri

Journalist and Author

GENERAL Asim Munir has taken over as the Pakistan army chief weeks after two incidents forced the military leadership to attempt damage control following a flurry of allegations — the assassination attempt on former Prime Minister Imran Khan in Wazirabad and the assassination of journalist Arshad Sharif in Kenya.

The failure of the security apparatus to prevent the attack on a former PM is a reflection of the turbulence in the country. Imran had expressed apprehensions about an impending assassination attempt on him and gone to the extent of even identifying the plotters, including the present PM, Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan and a senior army commander.

Former PM Benazir Bhutto had also gone public with similar fears before being assassinated on December 27, 2007, allegedly by a 15-year-old suicide bomber. Reportedly, the suspects Bhutto had mentioned in the letter were Brigadier Ijaz Shah (retd), Lt Gen Hamid Gul (retd) and former Pakistan Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi. In 2009, the UN-appointed commission, which was formed by then then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to probe Bhutto’s assassination, had concluded that the attack could have been prevented if adequate security measures had been taken.

Arshad, who was killed under mysterious circumstances, had fled Pakistan as he feared harassment from the current political elite. He had echoed Imran’s allegation that the US was responsible for the ‘regime-change operation’ in Pakistan that led to the former cricketer’s ouster as PM. I knew Arshad as we had spent nearly a month together as part of a conflict-reporting course for journalists at Cardiff University in February 2006. As part of the course, we travelled to different parts of Northern Ireland and there were several occasions to hear the perspectives of various participants, including Arshad, on various issues. His vociferous support to the narrative of ‘regime change’ was no surprise as he was critical of the US role in various parts of the world, including the Pak-Afghan region.

The US, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or even China, which have also been Pakistan’s financial benefactors, find it easy to engage with the army’s leadership on critical issues facing the country. (Quite similar is the way China enjoys a close relationship with the Myanmar army, an institution which too is infamously entrenched in the country’s political landscape.) The Pakistani army has been able to get a favourable outcome from foreign players when the political executive failed. This can be empirically proved in the context of recent favourable economic outcomes after every intervention by the Pakistani army leadership. The external advantage is linked to the heft the army has historically commanded on the ground.

In various colonies across the world, the British identified some communities that they categorised as "martial races" and based on other political considerations as well, they carried out military recruitment. In the South Asian context, after the 1857 mutiny, the present-day Pakistani Punjab replaced the present-day UP and Bihar as the prime catchment area of the British military in the last quarter of the 19th century.

Recruits from various parts of Punjab were sent to far-off shores of Europe during the two World Wars. The army as a career continued to be attractive even after 1947, when the Pakistani army conducted recruitments in western Punjab. The Sudhans, Jats, Rajputs, Mughals and other groups from Pakistan Punjab’s northern area, commonly called Pothwar, and the central pocket filled the ranks of the Pakistani army at the soldier and officer levels.

With a few exceptions, it is not a coincidence that most of the Pakistani army chiefs, including General Munir and his predecessor Qamar Javed Bajwa, come from the northern and central parts of the Punjab province. In the context of lack of land reforms, 63 per cent population aged between 15 and 33 years and poor societal depth of party institutions, the army is seen as the meritocratic institution for upward social mobility.

The support to former PM Imran, which has been manifested in the form of veiled as well as open protests or statements against the army leadership, or former chief Bajwa’s farewell statement, where he said the army has decided to remain apolitical, doesn’t mean civilian supremacy is on the cards anytime soon. The past is a good guide to say so. For instance, in 1988, former PM Bhutto’s return to the country after exile, preceded by the death of General Zia in an air crash, was seen as the dawn of democracy. Her government fell within two years as she and her husband were accused of corruption. As admitted by former generals in the years to come, the elections that followed her dismissal were rigged in favour of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif in 1990.

The lawyers’ agitation in 2009 against then President and former army chief Pervez Musharraf was accompanied by street protests against the army’s interference in politics. Within a few years of Musharraf’s exit, the army leadership regained public acceptance and was back in its role of the principal kingmaker. Against this backdrop, it will not be surprising if former PM Imran reverses his stance and reaches out to the army’s new leadership or even moderates his public positioning on the US in the near future.

Pakistan’s structural realities are here to stay and will enable the army to quickly regain public acceptability and thus stay as the most determining state institution politically. 

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