Why we shouldn’t look at Op Sindoor through a flawed lens

IN the wake of Operation Sindoor, India's most sophisticated air campaign to date, one would expect thoughtful analysis from our military veterans. Instead, we are treated to a misreading of facts from Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh (Retd). His recent article not only distorts airpower employment through a flawed lens but also attempts to derail camaraderie between the services by vitiating the image of one.

It is imperative to dissect the some of the biases and half-truths in his piece. Here's a rebuttal:

Prestige platforms and solitary glory: The Admiral accuses the IAF of chasing "prestige platforms" and "solitary glory." Apparently, investing in Rafales-with AESA radars, Spectra EW suites, sensor fusion, and Meteor BVR missiles-is vanity, not capability. By that logic, the Navy should avoid new ships, and the Army should still wield the .303 rifle.

Deterrence rests on credible, repeatable options-penetration, standoff, escort, suppression, and time-sensitive targeting. The mere availability of such options alters the adversary's calculus before a shot is fired. Modern warfare is technologically driven; it is necessary to have better platforms, they are not indulgence.

Pakistan anticipated the strike: Yes — and still failed to prevent precision strikes on nine terror sites. The IAF executed the mission with surgical accuracy, avoiding escalation and civilian casualties. That's not failure-that's textbook airpower.

Rafale downed? Official briefings indicate the entire strike package on May 7 returned to base. Even if a Rafale was lost, attrition is part of any combat plan. Air combat isn't a walk in the park. What matters is how swiftly the PAF folded-within 90 hours of sustained strikes. Long-range SAMs, including S-400s, constrained Pakistani aircraft, with 12 downed by IAF claims. Please debate the numbers, but not the deterrent effect.

Standoff weapons and lesser aircraft: The shift to standoff weapons was prudent. Adapting to high-threat airspace with BrahMos, SCALP and similar munitions is doctrinal evolution, not retreat. The Admiral's belief that any aircraft can deploy these weapons betrays a limited grasp of target acquisition, lock-on protocols, mission planning and precision delivery. Advanced munitions are not plug-and-play; they require platforms with integrated sensors, real-time processing, electronic protection and endurance to operate in contested environments. Stripped of these enablers, even the most sophisticated weapons are reduced to blunt instruments.

Rafale, Su-30MKI and other modern fighters have that ecosystem inbuilt. You cannot bolt a Meteor onto a basic airframe and expect parity. To use a naval analogy, you cannot fit a BrahMos on an offshore patrol vessel and expect destroyer-scale effect. The Admiral's suggestion that land or naval BrahMos could have delivered the same impact ignores the requirement of speed — airpower can reposition 800 km in an hour, not crawl at 15 knots or 60 kmph. Precision, tempo and escalation control demanded exactly what was done.

Operational shortcomings and failure to break fighter defences: Every service studies its history. The IAF learned from 1965 and applied those lessons in 1971. Likewise, from Op Balakot in 2019 to Op Sindoor in 2025, adaptation was rapid. The question of why MiG-21s were used in Balakot should not be aimed at the IAF, which had sought replacements since the early 1990s-approval arrived only decades later.

The Balakot airstrikes marked a watershed moment in India's counterterrorism doctrine, demonstrating a calibrated use of airpower to neutralise cross-border threats without triggering full-scale war. By striking deep into Pakistani territory and targeting terror infrastructure with precision, the Indian Air Force not only redefined the rules of engagement but also imposed a psychological and operational cost on the adversary. The aftermath was telling: despite the revocation of Article 370 — a move with profound political and strategic implications — there was no major retaliatory escalation from Pakistan. For nearly six years following Balakot, the Line of Control remained relatively quiet, and large-scale terror incidents saw a marked decline. This period of relative peace was not accidental; it was earned through credible deterrence, strategic signalling and the demonstrated ability to project force deep within enemy territory with restraint and precision.

Even in Op Sindoor, lessons from the first night were assimilated within 24 hours, yielding telling effect. The mission was to punish terror infrastructure and degrade enabling military nodes, not stage cinematic Top Gun-style dogfights. Destruction of C2, radars, runways, and logistics mattered more than visual-range kills. The fact that no significant target on Indian soil was damaged clearly reflects how effectively IAF operations neutralised Pakistani airpower.

Resistance to jointness: The IAF has consistently supported joint operations, with emphasis on clear command relationships and unity of effort-reasonable requirements for complex, time-compressed missions like Operation Sindoor. Jointness means common plans, interoperable command and control, and rehearsed tactics. The IAF already maintains a Joint Force HQ with Army and Navy commands.

To dismiss a service's viewpoint merely because it contradicts another's is dangerous and undermines national security. The IAF's concern with current theaterisation proposals stems from strategic assessment, not institutional ego. Branding such divergence as dissidence invites risks that could jeopardize India's long-term defence posture.

Drumbeat of victories: Calling Op Sindoor a success is not chest-thumping. It reflects calibrated objectives achieved in days — confirmed through operational outcomes and official citations. Pride and professional introspection can, and must, coexist.

Final approach: Vice-Admiral Singh's arguments are riddled with factual errors, strategic misreadings and a fractured understanding of aerial warfare.

The IAF does not need to "come clean." It must continue doing what it did in Operation Sindoor: adapt, integrate, and dominate-from 300 km away if necessary. The next step for the joint force is clear: harden ISR against third-party surveillance, tighten cross-service kill chains, and align maritime posture with the tempo and objectives of the air and land campaign. Aerospace dominance will always belong to those who can sense first, shoot first and remain unseen the longest.