WMD and the new terror playbook

THE arrest of a doctor in Gujarat for an alleged ricin-related plot and arrests of other doctors linked to the recent terror attack in Delhi have brought the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) back in focus. WMDs encompass nuclear, chemical and biological agents, defined by their capacity to cause mass casualties and large-scale disruption. Chemical agents such as sarin and toxins like ricin can produce rapid, lethal effects even in tiny quantities. Biological agents like anthrax or the eradicated but still-stored smallpox carry the added danger of a silent spread, overwhelming public health systems and destabilising regions. The convergence of radicalisation, technical expertise and access to sensitive materials frames the security context in which these cases must be viewed.

A single gram of ricin could theoretically kill 1,200-2,500 people, while one gram of aerosolised anthrax could kill millions. These are theoretical rather than practical figures, but they explain why both agents are the most tightly regulated and feared threats in global security planning.

Even small-scale attacks can cripple critical infrastructure through fear and shock. The 2001 anthrax letters illustrate this. Though the attack killed just five people, it shut down major portions of the US mail system and Congress, closed key postal facilities for years, and required around $320 million for the decontamination of congressional offices and postal hubs. More than 30,000 people sought prophylactic antibiotics despite minimal exposure, showing how fear can overwhelm systems.

Agro-terrorism — the targeting of crops, livestock or food supply chains — poses a massive threat, capable of causing economic and social shocks, exceeding those of traditional WMD scenarios. As agro-terrorism requires low technical sophistication, uses easily accessible pathogens and exploits open farm environments, its impact can be devastating. US models show that a severe multi-state foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak could cause $37-$228 billion in losses. The UK's accidental 2001 FMD crisis inflicted at least $14.5 billion in damage.

India is vulnerable due to its dependence on agriculture for livelihood and food security, vast and often unregulated farming landscapes and limited biosecurity. The 2020 locust swarms demonstrated how quickly a pest or pathogen could spread across regions.

Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 Tokyo subway attack where the cult released sarin, killing 13, and the 2001 US anthrax letters refined by an insider biodefense scientist show how trained individuals can weaponise advanced agents. Ricin surfaced in the 1978 assassination of Georgi Markov and the 2020 ricin-laced letters sent to US officials, while ISIS employed low-grade chlorine and crude mustard gas from 2014-2017. Since 1990, major WMD events have stemmed not from armies but from radicalised insiders, lone actors and terror groups.

In the US, 2024-2025 investigations have revealed attempts by visiting scholars to smuggle restricted biological materials into university labs, along with involving the illicit transfer of Fusarium graminearum, a destructive crop fungus, a potential agro-terrorism agent. The 2025 sentencing of a Wisconsin man for possessing chemical-weapon precursors highlights risks tied to chemical ingredients. The US’ determination that Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024 marked a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, while Germany's conviction of an individual who produced ricin underscored how low-tech toxins can be weaponised.

The government should remain vigilant as the possibility of chemical or biological terrorism is real. The involvement of educated professionals underscores the need for broader attention across the sectors that intersect with sensitive scientific, industrial, agricultural or logistical processes. Biotechnology firms, universities, chemical industries, agricultural systems, transport networks, waste-management services, high-tech equipment suppliers and private laboratories form a vast ecosystem where awareness and responsible oversight quietly strengthen national safety.

Investigators must also remain informed about pathways, indicators and risks associated with chemical and biological threats as individuals involved in one plot may provide leads to other terror cells, links that would be impossible to identify.