‘Future generations of military historians will have their work cut out’

What is the role of military historians in contemporary times, especially in the context of current scenarios like Operation Sindoor?

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Shiv Kunal Verma: First of all, kinetic warfare, as we knew it, is perhaps passe, a thing of the past. And yet we must remember the old saying, ‘the more things change, nothing ever changes’. The paradox is stark, especially in the context of geopolitics, where the perennial power struggles to shape the world order this way or that are continually being played out.

Operation Sindoor, and then the drone attacks on the strategic Russian bombers parked 4,000 km away from Ukraine… to say nothing of the Israel-Iran conflict that is raging even as we speak… has suddenly sent everything ballistic. On the night of May 8, when Pakistan sent a swarm of drones across from Leh to Sir Creek, I had mentioned in an interview that we had a 48-hour window to inflict whatever pain we could on the Pakistan army, for there would be a ceasefire of sorts.

Having written ‘1965: A Western Sunrise’, I was looking at the US-Pakistan relationship from a historical perspective. With Iran reaching a boiling point, none of the post-Sindoor US-Pakistan cosying up should be surprising simply because a leopard cannot change its spots.

Ever since Eisenhower’s visit to Pakistan in the mid-1950s to embrace the first self-styled Field Marshal (Ayub), Pakistan has been pivotal to the thinking within the Pentagon. They have, after all, rather brazenly admitted they have been ‘doing the dirty work for the West, especially the Americans’, Even though in the Pakistani bed they also have the Chinese, the Yanks have learnt to live with the concept of two husbands.

I just cannot help wonder though, had we (India) jumped at President Trump’s ‘generous offer to buy’ the F-35 and not gone looking at the SU-57, if the script would have played out differently. One thing is for sure… the next generation of military historians is going to face a near-impossible task as the war of narratives sometimes overtakes the actual events on the ground.

How has India's approach to military operations evolved over the years — from Kargil to Operation Sindoor? What are the most significant changes you observe in strategy, execution, or communication?

SKV: Kargil was more than a quarter century ago. The terrain, the technologies and the circumstances were totally different, so the only aspect one can perhaps comment on is the mindset of the civil and military leadership. There were two factors that in my opinion contributed to the somewhat slow and hesitant start on our part. The first was the Intelligence failure and enough has been said about that. The second was the Corps Commander’s appreciation of the situation that was based on an exercise held just prior to the detection of the infiltration, wherein serious ingress in the sector had been ruled out.

In a zero-sum game where any breach is seen as a failure in the command system, even when the scale of infiltration became obvious, there was still a hesitation to accept the numbers. Having said that, I believe the Army did a fantastic job, and some of the subsequent witch-hunts focused on the wrong aspects.

We did something similar in 1962 when the Indian leadership, having regrouped and built up our defences at Sela, declared that no more than a platoon (30 men) could outflank our positions by crossing Tse La and Poshing La. The basic premise was faulty… for if 30 men can cross, so can 300. Once the Chinese showed up at Dirang Dzong and Thembang near Bomdila, we just imploded.

Op Sindoor was a different cup of tea. As the CDS, General Anil Chauhan, seemed to suggest in his comments in Singapore, we made ‘certain adjustments’ after the first attacks on terrorist bases. I still feel the Fiza’ya (PAF) is taking the credit, but it was probably the ground defence system of modified HQ-9 missiles which caught us on the wrong foot. These next days, Pakistan escalated the situation by launching drones that were almost entirely intercepted. We then took out the surface to air systems after which it was a Turkey shoot (both figuratively and otherwise).

Pakistan’s narrative to their own public is an inbuilt part of their war dynamics. In their scheme of things, everything is a victory. Even after a good spanking on his bottom, Asim Munir is promoted to a Field Marshal’s rank. Their optics are different. Let’s see how cosy the Yanks are with them after the dust settles in Iran.

In an age dominated by breaking news cycles and social media analysis, how can military historians maintain academic distance and ensure that the true story of conflict is preserved?

SKV: As I said earlier, future generations of military historians will have their work cut out for them. With AI also kicking in, it’s a matter of time before Pakistan and China in our immediate neighbourhood will actually have clone versions of Indian television channels saying exactly the opposite of what they’re saying on the Indian side.

Even in the past, history has always been shaped by the victor. As the saying goes, in the jungle, the main protagonist is the tiger, and no one cares about the deer’s story. Without wanting to sound cynical or overly dramatic, military history after the turn of the century, is now more about perception management.

But here again, I feel not just military historians but historians in the subcontinent in general, have to chisel away at the various untruths that have been fed to us, especially by the British post-1858 when they reformed the education system. Unless we know who we are and what we are, unless we know our military geography, and understand how each one of us is a part of what I call ‘Fortress India’, we will fall victim to this tsunami of manipulative information that is coming our way.

We must reform our educational institutions, especially the student body, and create a non-jingoistic understanding of key issues that are a part of our National Security. I think academics and historians have a critical role to play, but for that, platforms that speak ‘the language’ have to evolve. It’s not an easy task, for I’ve always said that the ‘gates to India have always been opened from within!’

Is there a risk that military history gets co-opted by the prevailing public mood or mainstream narratives? If so, how do you maintain objectivity and intellectual integrity in such a climate?

SKV: I think Op Sindoor was a classic case and it’s imperative for us as a nation to learn from it. After Pahalgam, I thought we could have perhaps handled the situation a bit differently. In an article in the Sunday Guardian, I had pointed out that Asim Munir had for the first time, in his speech before the Pahalgam attack, deviated from the age-old tactic of deniability. We should have declared him a criminal, and while putting the Army and Air Force on high alert, used the Navy to apply a squeeze. All TV channels needed to maintain ‘Chitrahar silence’ (play only non-jingoistic love songs) and let Pakistan stew in its own juice.

But Pulwama, Balakot, Uri, etc, and the optics around those events, had shaped not just the public mood, it closed some of our own options. Though it demonstrated the ‘new India’s’ resolve to strike back, I felt we took the ‘whistle off the pressure cooker!’ For anyone to think the crisis has blown over, they are only deluding themselves. The government must now find ways and means to cut procurement red tape and the country simply has to strain every sinew towards complete self-reliance.

We are at war, whether we want it or not, and like the armed forces, we must take stock of our media and work towards creating a platform of intellectual integrity.

We have to face the truth. During the four-day snarling match with Pakistan, our media made us look silly and overly jingoistic. During our earlier conflicts, Radio Pakistan was known as Radio Jhootistan! We cannot become like them. Someone has to address this issue.

How would you compare the Indian military’s relationship with the media and civilian perception today with that of the 1990s? Has the communication strategy changed in substance or merely in speed?

SKV: I thought our official briefings were superbly handled. However, allowing senior officers to appear from different arms in uniform should be avoided. Even television networks going and interviewing families of those who spoke bordered on the ridiculous, and actually compromised their security.

During the Kargil War, even the Army Liasion Cell and the ADGPI were still finding their feet, as a result of which we had a lot of flexibility. In my own case, I was not affiliated to any newspaper or TV channel, and since I had flown extensively with the IAF while making the film, ‘Salt of the Earth’, I volunteered to fly and film targets that would give pilots a visual reference. That didn’t happen, but I was given the go-ahead by the Army. I was my own cameraman and with helicopter support could get to certain areas like Batalik and Chorbatla.

You can imagine the paucity of footage at the time. After I came back to Gurgaon, anyone wanting shots from the Army was told to contact me. I freely gave the footage to anyone who asked, but ensured I saw their news despatches. Phrases like India-occupied Kashmir were not acceptable, and most international channels, except for the BBC, dropped it. I then put out my own film, ‘Baramula to Kargil’, that was screened for Bill Clinton. The film ‘Aakash Yodha’ then followed, where I filmed from MiG-21s, 23s, 29s, Jaguars, Mirage 2000s and even Canberras. Even the eight PoWs were filmed by me and that footage finally forced Pakistan to acknowledge them and take them back.

In today’s scenario, where the canvas is so large, I don’t think anyone can do that.

Military history demands a level of rigour that does justice to those on the ground, the decision-makers behind the scenes, and the extreme conditions in which they operate, while remaining rooted in facts, even when outcomes are unfavourable. What, in your view, goes into the making of an objective military historian?

SKV: In combat, every man’s perception of events is different. The man on either side of you sees things differently, and at the end of it, the only common factor will be the location and time. No one is lying, so it’s a minefield of information one has to traverse through to paint an accurate picture. Even then, you cannot obviously be a hundred per cent accurate, so one just tries to be as objective as possible. Also, whatever you say, there will be someone saying something else.

Senior leadership in combat is a lonely business. Take away the smiling group photos and fanfare, decisions that cost lives can only be taken within a vortex of deadly silence. Decisions whose impact you have to live with for the rest of your lives. In India, we tend to eulogise or trash people, not realising that every man’s character is 10 per cent white, 10 per cent black and the truth lies somewhere in between. As one documents and gives shape to the overall canvas that stretches across hundreds of kilometres, you will comment and give your opinion, for that is the essence of any book.

In the documentation of military history, frankly both victory and defeat are imposters, if I may borrow from Kipling. You just try and be as honest as you can.

Everything is a learning curve. There are no absolute versions, but the one thing that does not change is the ground itself. To write about a war, one has to feel the terrain. Maps, satellite images do help, but only just. It’s a lot of hard work, and even at the end, you might just be wrong. The only test for me, be it ‘1962: The War That Wasn’t’ or ‘1965: A Western Sunrise’, is when I myself read what I wrote a decade later, the voice that guides us must say, ‘It couldn’t have happened any other way.’ That is the true test of time for any military historian I guess.

"We are at war, whether we want it or not, and like the armed forces, we must take stock of our media and work towards creating a platform of intellectual integrity."

 — The writer is a student of Hansraj College, University of Delhi