Perils of a Chinese mega dam

Xinhua reported on December 25 that the Chinese Government had approved the largest-ever hydropower project in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet. This announcement, reportedly made without informing India, a lower riparian state, is a reminder of the complexity of rebuilding relations with the northern neighbour.

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The proposed project, under preparation for several years and closely tracked by India, has major negative implications for India. As an upper riparian state, China has an unfortunate record of reluctance to cooperate, show transparency and safeguard interests of downstream states, as it is obliged to do. We have, therefore, another major irritant emerging in an already difficult relationship.

Xinhua lauded the venture as a “green project” without offering details. However, a report in Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) said the total investment in the dam could exceed 1 trillion yuan ($137 billion). It is expected to generate nearly 300 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually, more than thrice the designed capacity (88.2 billion kWh) of the Three Gorges Dam in China, presently the largest in the world.

According to the SCMP report, this would be the world’s largest infrastructure project and involve drilling four to six 20-km tunnels and diversion of half the river’s flow. Yet, the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson claimed that it would have no negative impact on downstream countries (India and Bangladesh)!

The proposed project is likely to be at a site in the Big Bend area of the Yarlung Tsangpo, where the river takes a U-turn and enters India just over 20 km downstream. The adverse consequences of the project for us will manifest in many ways. It will disrupt water flows in the Siang, as the river is called after entering India and is the main channel of the Brahmaputra river system. According to an Assam Government website, the catchment area of the Brahmaputra is 2,93,000 sq km in Tibet; 2,40,000 sq km in India and Bhutan; and 47,000 sq km in Bangladesh. The bulk of the waters of the river flowing in India are generated within our territory, but this mega project will significantly impact the river flows and consequently, livelihoods of residents downstream.

China’s development of smaller hydropower projects in the upper reaches of the Mekong (called Lancang in that country) and its cascade operations are leading to irregular fluctuations, drying out of certain areas, declining fish catches and the loss of access to fertile sediment deposits in the Lower Mekong Basin, affecting riparian residents in Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This presages foreseen and unforeseen consequences of the proposed dam for India and Bangladesh.

Equally, there will be an ever-present danger of disasters linked to this humongous project undertaken in an ecologically fragile and earthquake-prone geography. Even if there is no damage to the dam by an earthquake, large-scale diversion and impounding of waters will affect ecosystems and biodiversity downstream. This writer recalls emergency management by a group headed by the Cabinet Secretary when an artificial lake had formed in 2004 on the Parechu river, a tributary of the Sutlej, in Tibet.

Given the relatively good relations with China at that time, we could get advance notice and data, augmented by information generated by our geospatial resources and other means. The lake did not burst before freezing over, and drained partly the next year with only limited damage downstream in India due to preventive measures. Risks stemming from the planned project will be exponentially larger, even if we do not talk of weaponisation of stored waters, as some experts are doing.

It is with patient diplomacy that we have been able to put in place limited collaborative arrangements with Beijing, including three memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on the provision of monsoon season data by China for the Brahmaputra, on monsoon season data for the Sutlej (signed after the Parechu scare) and on “strengthening cooperation on trans-border rivers”. The first two MoUs are renewed every five years and have now lapsed. No project has been possible under the umbrella MoU. The Chinese are niggardly in extending cooperation, not even agreeing to provide lean season data, let alone discussing broader cooperation like sharing of waters of trans-border rivers.

A similar approach characterises China’s dealings on trans-border rivers with other neighbours. It takes full advantage of its status as a predominantly upper riparian state vis-à-vis its co-riparians.

Neither China nor India is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). However, two key principles of the Convention — “equitable and reasonable utilisation” of shared waters and the “obligation not to cause significant harm” to downstream states — have broad relevance. India has been a responsible upper riparian state, even providing generous terms to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty despite troubled bilateral relations. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of China.

A spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs remarked on January 3, “As a lower riparian state with established user rights to the waters of the river, we have consistently expressed, through expert level as well as diplomatic channels, our views and concerns to the Chinese side over mega projects on rivers in their territory. These have been reiterated along with the need for transparency and consultation with downstream countries following the latest report.”

India has hitherto opted for quiet diplomacy. However, we are in new territory now, given the unprecedented scale and implications of the proposed project that will involve diversion and huge storage, unlike the existing run-of-the-river projects in Tibet. The Indian side must seek clarifications on technical parameters of the project and environmental impact studies. China should be asked to respect the principles of “equitable and reasonable utilisation” and the “obligation not to cause significant harm” to downstream states. In fact, we should formally ask for the suspension of any further work until there is full consultation and mutual understanding on the project.

Quiet diplomacy has its limitations. Our concerns would have to be articulated forcefully through official channels with China and in the public domain. India’s existing user rights on the waters of the Brahmaputra would have to be augmented with the implementation of hydropower and other projects with greater urgency, without compromising on environmental norms and interests of the local population. While the government would not do so, there is nothing to prevent our non-governmental organisations from expressing their concerns at relevant international platforms on large dams. Indeed, this mega project is at odds with the widely shared thinking on proceeding with extreme caution on large storage projects.