Explainer: GPS spoofing rattles aviation

A quiet deception unfolded in India’s skies recently. Several aircraft flying close to Delhi suddenly began receiving misleading navigation data, their GPS systems showing false coordinates. For pilots accustomed to absolute trust in satellite navigation, it was an unsettling breach of faith. This was no random glitch. It was GPS spoofing, a deliberate manipulation of satellite signals to mislead an aircraft’s position.

Unlike jamming, which blocks satellite signals outright and triggers alarms, spoofing works silently. It feeds counterfeit coordinates that appear authentic, tricking aircraft navigation systems into believing they are somewhere else. Such interference has been documented in global conflict zones like the Middle East and the Black Sea region. But the recent detection of such manipulation over Indian airspace has exposed a worrying vulnerability in the country’s aviation network.

An alarming escalation

The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has acknowledged that incidents of satellite navigation interference are not new. In a written reply to Parliament earlier this year, the Ministry of Civil Aviation confirmed that around 465 cases of GPS or GNSS interference were reported between November 2023 and February 2025, primarily in India’s border regions with Pakistan. While many of those involved jamming, the latest pattern of spoofing marks an alarming escalation, showing that India’s airspace, once considered secure from such deceptive technology, is now being tested.

Pilots operating flights across western and northern India reported receiving false positional data, particularly over approach corridors around Delhi and many other cities’ airports. In a few instances, flight management systems showed conflicting coordinates before stabilising when radar and ground-based references took over. No incidents led to accidents, but the pattern was serious enough for the DGCA to issue an urgent directive across the aviation network.

Advisory for pilots

The new advisory, issued this week, requires every pilot, air traffic controller and airline operations centre to report any suspected GPS anomaly or spoofing within 10 minutes of detection. The regulator said immediate reporting would help track interference in real time and prevent confusion in a busy airspace.

Senior officials confirmed that the Indian Air Force and the National Security Adviser’s office are assisting the DGCA in analysing the data. The agencies, it is learnt, are studying whether the anomalies were accidental or part of a targeted attempt to mislead flight systems. Initial assessments suggest that while jamming remains common around sensitive border zones, the spoofing detected over civilian corridors likely involved advanced transmitters capable of imitating satellite signals.

The threat, experts warn, is not limited to civil aviation. GPS spoofing can distort aircraft routes, trigger false terrain warnings, or even mislead autonomous systems that rely heavily on precise positioning. In crowded sectors like Delhi’s airspace, where hundreds of flights operate daily using satellite-based navigation, even a brief deception can have cascading safety implications.

Need for indigenous alternative

Aviation experts say the recent incidents underline India’s dependence on the US-based Global Positioning System. “Our aviation infrastructure runs almost entirely on GPS-based systems. Any interference, however brief, shows how fragile that dependence is,” said an aviation systems analyst. The growing consensus among specialists and policymakers is that India needs a strong indigenous alternative, through the Indian Space Research Organisation’s NavIC system.

NavIC, short for Navigation with Indian Constellation, was designed to provide accurate positioning over India and surrounding regions. It includes ground-based monitoring stations meant to verify satellite integrity and issue alerts in case of tampering or errors. ISRO recently announced plans to expand NavIC’s coverage and add new satellites, making the system compatible with most civilian GPS devices.

However, NavIC’s integration into commercial aviation is limited. Most aircraft flying in India still use standard GPS receivers approved by international regulators. A few newer aircraft are equipped with dual-frequency systems that can read both GPS and NavIC signals, but widespread adoption will take time and regulatory coordination.

As investigations continue, questions loom large. Were these incidents the result of a technical overlap, or deliberate attempts to test India’s satellite defences? How many of the 465 recorded anomalies were spoofing cases rather than ordinary signal distortion? And, crucially, does India have the technology and coordination needed to detect and neutralise such deception before it endangers air traffic safety?