80 years of the Bengal famine

The famine of 1943 is estimated to have killed over 30 lakh people. The catastrophe was not the result of agricultural failure, but of human action — British PM Winston Churchill’s disdain for Indians, the colonial administration’s complete policy failure, the wartime grain import restrictions, and the deliberate diversion of food from starving Indian civilians to well-supplied British soldiers and to top up European stockpiles. Based in Lahore then, The Tribune was in the forefront of speaking truth to power on the making of the unprecedented humanitarian crisis and its brazen mishandling. Here are glimpses of its bold coverage...

October 10, 1943
The rice problem
By Mr Kalinath Ray

The manner in which the rice problem in Bengal has been and is being dealt with by those whose business it is to deal with it has assumed the proportions of a grave scandal — the gravest that the present writer has witnessed in the whole course of his public life now extending over forty-five years. Not a day passes without the afflicted people of Bengal being assured by the highest officials, both Central and provincial, that they are determined to do and are, in fact, doing everything in their power to give relief to the starving millions in the province. And yet the actual situation, the amount of destitution, suffering and starvation, remains substantially unaltered. Compared with the week or so immediately following the fixation of process, when no rice could be had in the open market at many places, there is probably some improvement. But it is not only lamentably inadequate, but for the most part illusory.

The first question which naturally arises is, where is all the rice that is being sent to the province from other provinces going? The only available answer is that a considerable part of it is going exactly where all the rice available in the market on the day before the fixation of the process went as soon as the prices were fixed. If all the rice that is reported to have been sent to the province had reached the hungry millions, it is perfectly certain that the pangs of hunger would have been at least appreciably mitigated.

The Government has not even succeeded in making rice in adequate quantities available to middle class families… who have still the means to buy rice at moderate prices. Is there any sincerity behind the fixation of prices? One question which has never been answered is, what steps did the Government take at the time it fixed the prices to prevent rice from disappearing from the market? Up to the very day when the prices were fixed, rice was available in moderate quantities, though at exorbitant prices. What became of this rice? In order to find an answer, one must examine somewhat closely the price fixation order itself. Can anything be more monstrously absurd? Everyone knows that the people of Bengal consume not one but several qualities of rice, that the prices have always varied, that generally all these qualities of rice have always been available in the market, and that they were available right up the time when the prices were fixed. By a single stroke of the pen, all qualitative distinctions were completely done away with and the shopkeepers, whether wholesalers or retailers, were told that they must sell rice at the maximum prices fixed by the Government, irrespective of the quality of the rice.

Is it any wonder that the better qualities disappeared completely from the open market? Rice of a very coarse quality is being sold at controlled rates, rice which large numbers of middle class people have never used and cannot possibly live upon without gravely injuring their health. Where are the thousands of people for whom it is impossible to consume the rice that is being sold at the controlled rates to get their supplies from? Is not the Government literally forcing them to resort to the black market as the only means of saving themselves from death?

The new Governor of Bengal is credited with the intention of setting things right. Will he make a personal enquiry as to the quantity and quality of rice which his ministers and the higher officials, to whom rice is staple food, have in stock? And will he invite them to his house and ask them to take two consecutive meals prepared from the rice being sold in the open market at the prices fixed by them?

If the Government does want to fix prices — and no one can deny that this is necessary — let it fix different prices for different qualities of rice and make sure first that these will be available in the market at the prices fixed by it. And secondly, that no discrimination will be made between officials and non-officials.

---

October 18, 1943
Govt has blundered

LONDON: It has been undoubtedly realised throughout Britain that the ghastly famine deaths could have been prevented if the Central Government’s belated decision to take control of the food situation and override the provincial government (Muslim League ministry) had been reached a year earlier. Political circles feel that Mr Amery’s (Secretary of State for India) rejection of the proposal to set up a commission to enquire into the causes of famine is probably due to the apprehension that any such impartial commission’s report would indict the Government of India.

Saturday’s Daily Express published an interview with Mr HS Suhrawardy, Bengal’s Civil Supplies Minister, who says: “The British Government was satisfied with its own food economy years ago, but even after Japan came into the war, it never offered us the benefit of its experiences.” (From Our Own Correspondent)

---

October 18, 1943
Suppressing truth

CALCUTTA: Against Mr Amery’s statement in the Commons that the weekly death rate in Bengal is estimated at about 1,000, but that it might be higher, the Statesman makes two computations of the mortality figure. According to one, it should be 10,710 weekly, and according to the other, 9,200. The paper adds: “The very imperfect official statistics available suggest that it might also be higher than our 9,000 or 11,000.” API

---

October 22, 1943
Profiteering by Govt

WESTMINSTER: Sir John Wardlaw Milne asked if Mr Amery would seriously consider as soon as the crisis was over asking the Government of India to set up a commission to discover the causes of this famine and place the blame on right shoulders. Mr Amery said that he would consider submitting the points, but, after all, the important thing now was to remedy the evil rather than try to distribute blame.

Mr Geoffrey Nicholson (Conservative) asked whether Mr Amery had seen the statement that the Bengal Government bought grain from the Punjab at 10.5 rupees a maund (37 kg), free on rail, and resold it to the mills of Bengal at 15.5 rupees per maund. Mr Amery replied: “I understand the Bengal Government did resell grain at a higher price and that the profits so made were subsequently devoted to providing food for the poor.” Reuter

---

October 23, 1943
Editorial
A pitiful apology

India cannot be too grateful to Lord Huntingdon and Lord Strabolgi for the manner in which they put forward the point of view of the people of this country in the debate in the House of Lords on the famine. Lord Munster’s apology for the failure of the Central Government and their inaction in face of the growing crisis was pitiful in the extreme and most unconvincing. It is agreed that the Central Government and the British Government have all the powers necessary to override provincial authorities in an emergency. “These powers,” said Lord Huntingdon, “are immense.” Why, he asked, were drastic steps not taken when the welfare of millions of Indians was concerned? Lord Munster’s reply was that these powers were granted to the Centre not to coerce provincial administrations who seemed over-anxious to protect the interests of their own population, but for use in a war emergency. To this, Lord Huntingdon’s retort was crushing. “I understood,” he said, “that these powers were given for use in any war-time emergency. Surely, this famine is about as great an emergency as we could come up against.”

Bengal is the province which lies nearest to enemy-occupied Burma and if the United Nations ever embark on an invasion of Burma, it is from Bengal that the Allied forces will operate. That the province should be decimated by famine, with thousands dying of starvation and destitution, is certainly an emergency which cannot but produce its repercussions both on the defensive and offensive strategy of the Allied nations.

That a Government which is prepared to ride roughshod over all political sentiment on the flimsiest excuse respects autonomy to the point of allowing famine and pestilence to stalk the land is more than anyone can believe in and we believe there is greater popular support behind the demand of the Lea Bridge Works Factory Committee (demanding the removal from office of the Secretary of State for India and the liberation of political leaders in India) than Mr Churchill would believe, that the man responsible for bringing on this country this disaster, namely, Mr Leopold Amery, must go.

---

November 5, 1943
Grave responsibility

WESTMINSTER: After reading for many days past the harrowing account of distress caused by the Bengal famine, Members of Parliament assembled to debate the situation... The first speech was made by Mr Pethick Lawrence, a former Socialist Minister. He said, ‘If this terrible death rate had occurred in any part of the British Isles, the member who sits for that locality would be vociferous in demanding that something should be done. He would not allow any member of Government to rest while these terrible things were happening. In this House, there are no actual members for the immense part of the British Empire, the sub-continent of India, and that fact must not be allowed for one moment to let this House, responsible as it is for India, forget its grave responsibility.”

---

November 6, 1943
Blame & responsibility

LONDON: The House of Commons debated the famine situation in India for five-and-a-half hours. Mr Amery, Secretary of State for India, issued a warning that the task of relief was no easy one. Every ship released for this purpose was a diversion from the war effort, then came this significant passage: “We have all to balance against our desire to reduce the effects of the famine in India by our urgent duty to finish the war as quickly as possible. It is only in that way, indeed, that we shall relieve that strain of the war upon India, which has led to the present distress.”

Mr Ammon said, “Both blame and responsibility are here. It is no good trying to shift it elsewhere.” Sir George Schuster said: “It was a story of half measures and vacillation.” Mr Godfrey Nicholson said: “It will be tenfold disgrace to us if we let further tragedies of administration occur.”

---

December 11, 1943
An act of God

LONDON: Secretary for State for India, Mr Amery, emphasised that the famine was due ‘primarily to an act of God’. He recalled that towards the end of 1942, fears of famine arose, especially in the regions dependent on rice imported from Burma. The measures initiated by the Central Government of India with the co-operation of provinces successfully overcame the danger and averted what easily might have been a far greater famine than that of Bengal. At that time the Bengal Government, through its premier, claimed that Bengal would satisfactorily fend for itself. Unfortunately, the forecast was upset by rest of India’s pre-occupations and Britain’s shipping shortage. (From Our Special Correspondent)

---

December 11, 1943
Editorial
Act of God or man

Both in his own interest and in the interest of the country on whose behalf he is directing the administration of India, Mr Amery will do well not to open his mouth till the time comes for him to quit the India office. It is a virtue which he will do well to learn from the ex-Viceroy, the Marquess of Linlithgow, who between them have brought on this country direr disasters than it has been ever its misfortune to suffer. It is blasphemy on Mr Amery’s part to ascribe to God what he knows fully well is man’s responsibility and his own more than that of anyone else. The war which cut off Burma and with it her supplies of rice was not an act of God but man’s.

Who was responsible for the boat-denial policy which dislocated communications throughout East Bengal, making the movement of foodgrains difficult? Who was responsible for the purchase and removal of foodgrains from the eastern districts of the province on the score of preventing them from falling into the hands of the enemy, thus depriving the people of reserves in times of emergency? Who, pray, embarked on the policy of undiluted inflation which raised prices all round to unheard-of levels? Who, again, was responsible for the incapacity of our internal transport system to cope with the strain placed on by it by the war? Who was it who refused to encourage an Indian shipping industry, in spite of decades of public agitation, with the result that even for the import of food to save our dying people, we have to depend on others to whom the saving of Indian lives from starvation comes next to destruction of life elsewhere through war?

If ever there was a man-made famine, it was the one in Bengal and both Mr Amery and Lord Linlithgow will have to answer for it on Judgment Day.

---

December 29, 1943
Rice sold at Rs 80-130

AMRITSAR: Mr NC Chatterji, while proposing a resolution at the Hindu Mahasabha session, gave a detailed account of the distress in Bengal. The claim that one of the biggest blessings of English rule in India was that famine for all time had been ended had once again been proved to be false. It was a pity that in the province of Bengal, the home of Desh Bandhu Chitranjan Dass, whose charity knew no bounds, people had died for want of food. Rice had been sold at Rs 80 to Rs 130 per maund (37 kg) with the result that the poor man was not able to purchase rice for personal consumption.

---

December 30, 1943
Gratitude to Punjab

LAHORE: “Every Bengali, particular those living outside Bengal, must remember with all gratefulness the active sympathy shown by the people of every part of India at the time of Bengal’s distress. In this regard, Punjab’s contribution is undoubtedly the greatest. It came forward to the help of Bengal by men, money and foodgrains.” Thus observed Dr Shyamaprasad Mookerji, addressing a meeting of local Bengalis under the auspices of the Lahore Bengali Association. (From Our Special Representative)