Strategic lethargy is exacting psychological cost in Ladakh

Arun Joshi

Ladakh is a strategic asset of India. The collision of sorts between the PLA and Indian troops is a deep strategic crisis. Strategic lethargy over decades is the root cause of this situation, the culmination of which is not known at the moment.

The dimension of the situation is multilateral. The propensity of Indian experts to see it as perceptional delusion of the PLA about the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a delusion in itself.

Until the problem is diagnosed with clinical precision, Ladakh will have to live with many more repeats of scuffles and stand-offs in future.

Ask villagers and shepherds living in the hamlets close to the LAC, perceived or otherwise, as to how they feel. They are unable to graze their sheep in their own pastures. A number of times, they were pushed back by the Chinese villagers under the armed patronage of the PLA. It had been happening over decades. The nation came to know of it only after the trickle of information made it to the headlines in media.

The usual Indian response that Chinese actions were not intrusions but “transgressions” because of the varying perceptions about the LAC was nothing but an excuse to look the other way. It was a strategic failure and was sought to be offset by some measures which, at best, can be described as fire-fighting ones rather than assertion of a particular strategy.

For instance, when the things came to a head in 2008-2009, India reactivated its airfields – Daulat Beg Oldie, Fukche and Nyoma. The current condition of these airfields where the airstrips remained without repair for years tells its own story. The road connectivity to the LAC from this side is far behind the Chinese assets.They have airfields very close to the LAC.

The Army and the ITBP did what they were supposed to do, but the Ministry of External Affairs shied away from taking action on the Army’s suggestions to engage Beijing in delineating the LAC.

Of course, there are technical and geographical challenges in Ladakh where the mountains of sands make it difficult to draw a line or erect a fence. Nevertheless, a boundary is a must to keep things quiet over there. The LoC that divides Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh between India and Pakistan was also drawn when the technology was not as advanced as it is today.

Satellite images can be put as lines on the map with mutual agreement.

It is important because Ladakhis are paying a huge cost of these recurring skirmishes and hostile action by the PLA troops. They feel threatened.

The grant of the Union Territory status to Ladakh, fulfilment of a long-standing wish of Buddhists, gave them some sense of political protection against what they used to deem as Kashmiri rule’s interference and transgressions in their areas. But this does not mean that their fears emanating from Chinese side are over. They are still squeezed strategically – PLA troops intruding and making their life difficult close to the LAC. And when this message travels in the mainland of Ladakh, it raises concerns about the strategic deficiency in the region.