Lessons from 1965 air war that remain relevant today

ON the occasion of the diamond jubilee (60 years) of the India-Pakistan war of 1965, it is time to reminisce the gallant efforts of the Indian armed forces thwarting Pakistan's nefarious design to annex Kashmir. This was to be the first air war between the two air forces.Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar and escalated with Operation Grand Slam. However, its egregious designs were comprehensively defeated by the Indian Air Force (IAF), which not only stemmed the tide but also turned it around with tenacious operational and tactical brilliance. It is said that history tends to repeat if the lessons are not properly integrated into doctrine, strategy and tactics. While technology has undergone a huge transformation, some lessons remain relevant in the context of the present air war milieu.The IAF was not used offensively, both during the 1947-48 and 1962 wars. With the apprehension that air power is escalatory, this mindset continued during the 1965 war too.The IAF had begun modernising with MiG-21s but still relied on older fleets of Vampire, Mystere, Hunter, Canberra and Gnat, while the PAF fielded more advanced US-supplied Sabres and Starfighters.Political directions were clear before the war: Do not allow Pakistan to wrest Kashmir, destroy the offensive power of Pakistani armed forces and occupy minimum territory to force satisfactory conclusion of war.The use of air power was tightly controlled by the political leadership, resulting in its reactive and defensive use, which severely restricted the initial outcomes.At the war's outset, the IAF had numerical superiority, but many aircraft were tied down on the eastern front, reducing its edge in the west.The air war must, therefore, be viewed in this context, where PAF had unambiguous plans of concentrating its combat power on the western front in consonance with its overall plan. The quantitative edge of the IAF was virtually neutralised by the qualitative edge of the PAF, which had better aircraft, weapons and radars.As the government had stopped the IAF from taking offensive action inside East Pakistan, 38 per cent of the IAF was left out of the battle. Hesitation in using air power proactively was a major lesson of the war, especially when faced with a technologically superior adversary.The IAF joined battle to counter a major ground offensive by the Pakistani armour in the Jammu sector on September 1, 1965, restricting it to operate only in the Chamb sector. The IAF used Vampires in the initial waves, followed by Mysteres by night. The IAF lost three Vampires to Sabres on the first day itself. This was a major blow and Gnats were pressed into operation against the much better Sabres.The IAF adopted innovative tactics and on September 3, Sqn Ldr Trevor Keelor, flying a Gnat, shot down a Sabre — the first kill by the IAF. Restrictions on the use of air power are counterproductive, while innovation produces disproportionate outcomes and surprises the enemy.The PAF conducted pre-emptive strikes against IAF bases at Halwara, Adampur and Pathankot on September 6, destroying IAF aircraft on the ground. A lesson: Assets need to be secured under heightened alert situation.Base and asset protection remains relevant to date, when the means to strike have diversified from drones to loitering munitions and long-range precision weapons. The latest examples are Operation Rising Lion (Israel) and Spider Web (Ukraine).In response, the IAF struck PAF bases, including Sargodha, Chaklala, Peshawar, Risalwala and others. The significance of offensive employment of air power and ingenuity was driven home, as with every strike, the IAF gained ascendency.In the days following the initial skirmishes, Gnats shot down seven Sabres, earning them the sobriquet "Sabre slayers". The lesson: realistic training, initiative and innovation during operations can outmanoeuvre a superior air force.The IAF lost aircraft to air defence guns during strikes by the day. Adaptability of air power was highlighted when the Air Force shifted to night operations since most anti-aircraft weapons were ineffective at night. Even today, most air forces operate by night, but the sanctuary of safety at night has largely shrunk with modern radars and weapons.The IAF flew more sorties overall, but restrictions on offensive use gave the PAF room to operate freely, thus wresting the initiative. Counter air operations are imperative to achieve desired control of air.The IAF-commissioned book, 'The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle: The First Indo-Pak Air War', released on September 1, 2015, acknowledges that the IAF suffered "disproportionately higher losses."Despite higher overall aircraft losses, including many on the ground, the IAF matched the PAF in air combat through ingenuity and tactics. IAF pilots displayed guts and resilience, undeterred by the much superior Sabres and Starfighters.Air Marshal Arjan Singh led the IAF with elan. He was disheartened when the ceasefire was declared after 17 days of war since the IAF had consumed less than 10 per cent of its resources. He was prepared for a three-month conflict. Also, the ceasefire was declared when the IAF was gaining ascendency.It is important to drive home the advantage against the enemy to create long-lasting deterrence. The PAF would have been largely neutralised had the war continued. This is true even today. However, political and military objectives have to be aligned. It calls for clarity on outcomes and pre-war dialogue. Otherwise, there is always a dilemma on the extent of force application.Some takeaways from the air war are: Air power must be used offensively; quantity has a quality of its own, as the IAF had the depth to endure longer war; realistic training, spirit of personnel and innovation can change the outcome; force protection is extremely important to preserve combat power; the Pakistani notion of victory was higher IAF losses.However, Pakistan had lost more territory and more aircraft in the air combat; more importantly, Kashmir remained with India. The 1965 war was the first time the IAF was offensively used. Though the IAF started a little late, it overcame adversity with tenacity, innovation, ingenuity and gallant warfighting. It played a major role in creating favourable conditions for the ground offensives.Lessons were learnt, many of which remain relevant: intelligence, jointness, offensive use of air power and force protection. With this war began the IAF’s glorious era, in which professionalism, ingenuity and spirit to achieve more with what we have continue to thrive.Air Marshal RGK Kapoor (retd) is former AOC-in-C, Central Air Command.

Lessons from 1965 air war that remain relevant today

The quantitative edge of the IAF was virtually neutralised by the qualitative edge of the PAF in the 1965 war

Air Marshal RGK Kapoor Retd

Lessons from 1965 air war that remain relevant today

The quantitative edge of the IAF was virtually neutralised by the qualitative edge of the PAF in the 1965 war

Air Marshal RGK Kapoor Retd

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